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ABSTRACT
FRAGMENTS OF THE CONCRETE: ECOLOGY AND TECHNICAL
MEDIA IN GERMAN ROMANTICISM
Bryan Nelson Norton
Catriona Macleod
This dissertation investigates how German romantic speculation concerning the
possibility of constructing a perpetuum mobile sheds light on the central role played by
technical media in the relationship between politics, poetics, and the life sciences around
1800. Focusing on the figures of Novalis, Schelling, Goethe, and Hölderlin, the project
traces the contours of a discursive shift in the romantic reception of what Immanuel Kant
calls the “technic of nature,” a concept Kant employs as a heuristic device for explaining
the appearance of self-motivated activity in nature. While for Kant, this term refers to the
ways internal forms of human cognition lead the observer to perceive a distinction
between the autotelic activity of organic life and events determined by mechanical
causality, for Kant’s romantic readers, the ‘technic of nature’ comes to signify a
reciprocal mode of material relationality between humans and nature that combines
organic and mechanical processes. This relational, exteriorizing comportment towards the
making of technical objects and natural knowledge, what the philosopher of technology
Gilbert Simondon calls mechanology in his overlooked engagement with romanticism,
becomes the basis for a series of thought experiments concerning perpetual motion which
seek to develop a negentropic ecology of spatial relations for romantic poetics and nature
philosophy.
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1. Introduction (Notes for a Romantic Mechanology)
Novalis and the ‘mechanical turn’ in German romanticism
In a striking entry to his Notes for a Romantic Encyclopedia, the German romantic
writer Novalis suggests that the novice “may not yet reason. [S]he must first must
become mechanically adept, then [s]he can begin to reflect.”1 Before beginning to engage
in reason or serious reflection, the sort of conceptual activity most readily associated with
Romantic writings, Novalis urges his readers to engage in the material, technical
specificities of mechanical knowledge. The Romantic subject “must become a complete
and total self-tool,” he writes elsewhere.2 Scholars working in media theory and cultural
studies may detect hints of the late Friedrich Kittler’s plea for humanities students to turn
their back on the traditional lecture hall and pick up computer programming in these
utterances.3 On this view, theoretical speculation is dead on arrival if it is not the product
of specialized technical expertise. Indeed, Novalis’s use of terms such as the self-tool, the
Selbstwerkzeug, contain concrete references to specific technical artefacts, showcasing
the expertise he would have acquired while studying with the celebrated geologist

1

NS III, 245. Nr 47: “der Lehrling darf noch nicht raisonirren,“ he writes. “Erst muß er mechanisch fertig
warden, dann kann er anfangen nachzudenken.” References to Novalis’ work are from Novalis Schriften:
die Werke Friedrich von Hardenbergs, ed. Paul Kluckhohn and Richard Samuel (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer
Verlag, 1960-1988) and will be composed according to the above reference: NS (Novalis Schriften)
followed by volume in Roman numerals, then by page number and, when available, passage number in
Arabic numerals. Translations are my own.
2
NS III 297. Nr. 321: “Mensch[en]L[ehre]. Der Mensch soll ein vollkommenes und Totales
Selbstwerckzeug seyn.“
3
Friedrich Kittler, “There Is No Software,” in The Truth of the Technological World: Essays on the
Genealogy of Presence, trans. Erik Butler (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 219 – 229.
For more on this, see Kittler’s “Towards an Ontology of Media,” in Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 2–3
(March 2009): 23–31, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276409103106 and Nicholas Gane’s essay, “Radical
Post-Humanism: Friedrich Kittler and the Primacy of Technology,” Theory, Culture & Society 22, no. 3
(June 2005): 25–41.
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Abraham Gottlob Werner and working as a salt assessor in the Freiberg mines.4 This
understanding of the term mechanics and the priority given to the concept by Novalis,
however, is also indicative of a larger seismic shift on the order of the romantic concept
of the mechanical. Novalis is arguing for an understanding of mechanics that provides the
material grounds for stabilizing post-Kantian ontology. Likewise, Friedrich Hölderlin
suggests that poets embrace what the Greeks called mechané (μηχανη), one of a plurality
of processes “through which the beautiful is brought forth.”5 It is through this modified
and non-determinative understanding of mechanical activity, we will see, that Romantic
writers like Novalis and Hölderlin seek to provide a material, technical a priori that
serves to ensure and maintain the subject of Kant’s sensus communis. Such stability is not
provided by the transcendental self-positing of Fichtean idealism, but by a material,
technical externality capable of mediating relations between the subject and its
environment. Statements from Novalis, Hölderlin, and others can be seen to fulfill what
the philosopher of technology Bernard Stiegler has referred to as the need for a technical
a priori in the wake of Kant’s project that would ensure the smooth functioning of
judgment, while establishing grounds for a functional and intersubjective polis of
conjoined interests.6 Without any sense of technical externality for Kantian critique, there
is no way for the subject to connect practical reason’s need for a “thing in itself,” which

4

Jocelyn Holland’s work is extremely useful in this regard. See “The Poet as Artisan: Novalis’ Werkzeug
and the Making of Romanticism,” MLN 121 (2006): 617–30 and “From Romantic Tools to Technics:
Heideggerian Questions in Novalis’s Anthropology,” Configurations 18, no. 3 (August 13, 2011): 291–307,
https://doi.org/10.1353/con.2010.0021.
5
HSA V: 195.
6
This is indeed the central claim of Technics and Time 3. See Bernard Stiegler. La technique et le temps 3.
Le Temps du cinema et la question du mal-être in La technique et le temps. (Paris: Fayard, 2018), 583-842.
Also see his more recent essay on “Kant, Art, and Time,” Boundary 2 44, no. 1 (February 1, 2017): 19–34,
https://doi.org/10.1215/01903659-3725845.
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grounds ethics and morality, with the metaphysical impossibility such dogmatism would
present for theoretical reason as it deals with epistemology and its relation to natural
knowledge. Politics thus becomes unmoored from epistemology, with natural, empirical
knowledge possessing nothing but a tentative link to aesthetics and morality.7
What we will be calling Romantic mechanology, after Gilbert Simondon, aims at
addressing just this set of issues that seem so unavoidable for poetry and philosophy in
the wake of Kant. Scholars of Romanticism have long noted the crisis inaugurated by the
recognition that the faculty of judgment appears at an impasse in the third Critique, as
Kant’s romantic readers proved ultimately dissatisfied with the deus ex machina of
Kant’s regulative, reflective judgments.8 These unique types of judgment were inserted
into the “Critique of Teleological Judgment” in order to tidy up the mess of dealing with
the contingencies that arise when philosophy deals with art and organic life. Post-Kantian
Romanticism, however, has been in many ways largely understood as an attempt to create

7

Kant, of course, believed to have found a solution through the introduction of judgments that were both
“reflective” and “regulative” in the critique of teleological judgment, but many of his Romantic readers
were less than convinced. For more on this type of judgment in Kant, see Paul Guyer’s essay on “Kant’s
Principle of Reflecting Judgment in Guyer (ed.) Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment: Critical Essays.
(London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 1-49 and Chapter 9, “Life” in Michel Chaouli’s recent Thinking
with Kant’s Critique of Judgment (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2017), 243 – 67. Also see
paragraphs 67 – 70 in the Critique of Judgment, A:292/B296 – A:312-B308. For analysis of the impact on
romantic aesthetics, see Manfred Frank, Einführung in die frühromantische Ästhetik: Vorlesungen.
(Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp: 1989).
8
Perhaps the most influential diagnosis of this ‘Kantian crisis’ for Romanticism can be found in Philippe
Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy’s L’absolu littéraire: Théorie de la littérature du romantisme
allemand (Paris: Seuil, 1978). More recent attempts at coming to terms with this crisis can be found in
works by Frederick Beiser, Dalia Nassar, Manfred Frank, and Leif Weatherby. See Frederick C. Beiser,
The Romantic Imperative (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); Manfred Frank, “Unendliche
Annäherung”: die Anfänge der philosophischen Frühromantik (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1997); Dalia Nassar,
The Romantic Absolute: Being and Knowing in Early German Romantic Philosophy, 1795-1804 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2013), and Leif Weatherby, Transplanting the Metaphysical Organ: German
Romanticism Between Leibniz and Marx (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
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alternatives to the dissatisfying, tentative status of the Kantian solution.9 Of course, the
suggestion that mechanics offers a material solution to this crisis also requires thinking
beyond prevailing assumptions about mechanics around the turn of the nineteenth
century, where mechanics was still largely confined to the Newtonian paradigm of
mechanica rationalis.10 This bilateral view separates mechanics into two spheres:
theoretical knowledge gained from observation and the practical application of laws
derived from such knowledge. Novalis and Hölderlin, for their part, offer a much more
experimental project that extends into poetry, philosophy, and reflections on biological
life. In Novalis’s view, mechanics reveals first and foremost a range of technical,
epistemic, even aesthetic possibilities that open out through the sensory apparatus onto
the realms of nature, politics, and aesthetics. The subject “understands how to bring about
a world,” he writes, “the only thing that is missing is the proper apparatus, the proper
fitting of his sensory tools.”11 Such “tools arm the human.”12 This requires what might be
called an ordo inversus on the prevailing understanding of mechanics.13 Rather than a

9

For more on the role theorizations of contingency plays in critical discourse after Kant, see Markus
Gabriel’s Transcendental Ontology: Essays in German Idealism (New York: Continuum, 2011) and Yuk
Hui’s recent Recursivity and Contingency (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2019).
10
This view can be seen most clearly in the entry for “Mechanick” in Christian Wolff’s Vollständiges
mathematisches Lexicon. Wolff divides mechanics into two spheres, the first theoretical, the other applied.
He describes mechanics first as a “Mathesis impure siva mixta, welche die Größe besonderer in der Natur
vorkommender Dinge erweget und ausmisset,” and then as „Mathesis practica,” which applies the findings
of this observational “mathesis impure” to the construction of tools and machines. Cf. Wolff, 871 - 872.
This bilateral view of mechanics can also be found in other prominent eighteenth-century lexicons, such as
the Zedler Lexikon and Adelungs Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der hochdeutschen Mundart.
11
NS II, 453: 88: “Man kann wohl sagen, der Mensch versteht eine Welt hervorzubringen, es mangelt ihm
nur am gehörigen Apparat, an der verhältnißmäßigen Armatur seiner Sinneswerkzeuge.“
12
NS II, 453: 88: “Werkzeuge armiren den Menschen,” he writes. “Man kann wohl sagen, der Mensch
versteht eine Welt hervorzubringen, es mangelht ihm nur am gehörigen Apparat, an der verhältnißmäßigen
Armatur seiner Sinneswerkzeuge.“
13
The ordo inversus, an ontologized form of irony, represents a figure of thought conducting an ontological
inversion, whereby the idea presents itself in inverse fashion effectuating a shift in meaning. Manfred Frank
and Gerhard Kurz often use this term in reference to romantic writings from Novalis and Hölderlin, among
others. See their co-authored essay “Ordo inversus. Zu einer Reflexionsfigur bei Novalis, Hölderlin, Kleist
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top-down operation in which theoretical knowledge gained from passive observation
determines machinic operations, the technicity of these operations arise coevally with
natural observation. Mechanics thus becomes embedded in natural-scientific and
philosophical practices that are simultaneously experimental and concrete. Formulas are
now the “result of a completed scientific universal-machine,” Novalis writes, a machine
which would constitute now “Nature or Chaos.”14
Nature itself, when properly understood, is a technical constellation of hidden
material operations. It is up to Romanticism to tap into these hidden resources and to
experiment with the unforeseen possibilities opened up by this sort of thinking.
Mechanics “lives from perpetual motion,” Novalis writes elsewhere in the Notes for a
Romantic Encyclopedia, “and at the same time seeks, as its highest problem, to construct
a perpetuum mobile.”15 This statement, while citing the Kantian concept of Konstruction,
which forms the basis of the relationship between form and matter in the transcendental
aesthetic, also framing the ways in which the subject perceives the motion and rest of
natural objects in Kant’s natural philosophy, presents a wildly utopian vision for
Romanticism: all activity now, whether it is aesthetic, political, or technical, aims at the
synergistic relationality of a concrete perpetuum mobile.16 “Future doctrine of mankind,”

und Kafka” in Geist und Zeichen: Festschr. für Arthur Henkel zu seinem 60. Geburtstag, ed. Anton Herbert
(Heidelberg: Winter, 1977), 75 – 97.
14
NS III: 91: „Instrumente und Apparate sind reale indirecte Formeln. Maschinen sind Formeln—das
Resultat einer vollständigen wissenschaftlichen Universalmaschine würde eine Natur, oder ein Chaos sein.“
NS II, 453: 88.
15
NS III, 296: Nr. 314: “So lebt eigentlich die Mechanik vom Perpetuo mobili—und sucht zu gleicher Zeit,
als ihr höchstes Problem, ein Perpetuum mobile zu construiren.“
16
In Kant’s terminology, the construction of a concept [Begriff] means the a priori presentation
[Darstellung] of its corresponding intuition [“die ihm korrespondierende Anschauung”]. See paragraphs 17 in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (A:17/B:31 – A:41-B:58) and Kant’s “Vorrede” to the Metaphysische
Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft. Konstantin Pollock’s commentary is also very illuminating. See the
introduction to Immanuel Kant. Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (Hamburg: Felix
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Novalis writes, “everything that is predicated from God contains the future human
doctrine. Every machine, that now lives from the great perpetuo mobile, should itself
become a perpetuum mobile.”17 Mechanics aims at the establishment and maintenance of
this material ideal of fully synergistic Wechselwirkung. For this reason, Novalis turns to
experimental nature philosophy such as Schelling’s World Soul essay in his attempt to
outline the contours of this energetic ideal. Of course, this means parting ways with past
figures such as Leibniz, for whom the impossibility of perpetual motion (which Leibniz
rejects, even in the form of a dynamic theory of the universe as a whole) remained part
and parcel of his adherence to the theodicy doctrine.18 Indeed, the step Leibniz took from
his theodicy in 1710 to the general monadology in 1714 was very much informed by the
framework of the earlier vis viva debates, which for Leibniz played an important role in
the attempt at showing how his vital materialism was not premised on any form of
perpetual mechanical motive power.19
Leibniz theorized alongside simple machines such as lever and pulleys. Romantic
writers at the end of the eighteenth century, on the other hand, found themselves in the
midst of growing excitement regarding what was often seen as the emancipatory potential

Meiner Verlag, 1997), XI – LIX. and Konstantin Pollok, Kants Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der
Naturwissenschaft: Ein kritischer Kommentar (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001).
17
NS III 297, No. 320: “Zuk[unkfts]Lehre der Menschh[eit]. (Theologie.) Alles was von Gott paediciert
wird enthält die Menschliche Zukunftslehre. Jede Maschine, die jetzt vom Großen Perpetuo mobili lebt, soll
selbst Perpetuum mobile—jeder Mensch, der jetzt von Gott und d[urch] Gott lebt, soll selbst werden.“
18
See Gideon Freudenthal, “Perpetuum Mobile: The Leibniz-Papin Controversy,” Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science Part A 33, no. 3 (2002): 573–637 and Carolyn Iltis, “Leibniz and the Vis Viva
Controversy,” Isis 62, no. 1 (1971): 21–35.
19
See for example the 1686 letter titled Brevis demonstration erroris memorabilis Cartesii et alienorum
circa legem naturae, secundum quam volunt a Deo eandem semper quantitatem motus conservari, qua et in
re mechanica abentur which accuses Descartes of confusing the terms “motive force” and “quantity of
motion” in his natural philosophy, thus creating a vision of the universe as a mechanical perpetuum mobile.
Leibniz. Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie I. Ed. Ernst Cassirer (Hamburg: Meiner), 186 –
193.
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embedded in new energetic resources such as the steam engine, electricity and new
discoveries in chemistry.20 This project is an attempt to uncover in thinkers such as
Novalis, Schelling, Hölderlin, and Goethe what might be called, after Frederick Beiser, a
technical imperative for German romanticism, with the aim of discovering, maintaining,
and inhabiting the synergistic ideal of a perfectly concretized, fully automated organic
machine.21 This ambitious program is aimed at combining aesthetics, moral activity, and
natural knowledge in the wake of the Kantian crisis, with the project of romanticizing the
world taking on new universal machinic proportions. Earlier traces of this type of techoutopian, proto-Saint-Simonian thinking in German romanticism can be found, perhaps
surprisingly, in writings from Kant from the early 1790s.22 In his “Theory and Practice”
essay, Kant cites the seemingly endless possibilities for technical innovation as a reason
for belief in moral improvement.23 Yet the understanding of mechanics put forward by

20

There has indeed been a lot of very fruitful research over the years in the field of “Literature and
Science” as it pertains to German romantic writings. See, for example, Jeremy D. Adler, Eine fast magische
Anziehungskraft: Goethes “Wahlverwandtschaften” und die Chemie seiner Zeit. (Munich: C.H. Beck,
1987); Michel Chaouli, The Laboratory of Poetry: Chemistry and Poetics in the Work of Friedrich Schlegel
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Jocelyn Holland, German Romanticism and Science:
The Procreative Poetics of Goethe, Novalis, and Ritter (London: Routledge, 2009) and Benjamin Specht,
Physik als Kunst: Die Poetisierung der Elektrizität um 1800 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2010). Specht’s
introduction provides a particularly useful overview of this field of research.
21
See Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 2006. The
title refers to an unpublished fragment from Friedrich Schlegel: “Der romantische Imperativ fordert die
Mischung aller Dichtarten. All Natur und Wissenschaft soll Kunstwerden—Kunst soll Natur werden und
Wissenschaft.“
22
This more “technical“ side of Kant has been recently brilliantly exposed by Chaouli’s chapter on
“Making” in Thinking With Kant’s Critique of Judgment, 113-148.
23
Cf. “Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis“ in
Kant: Werke 11, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977, 128: “Nun würde man den empirischen
Maschinisten, welcher über die allgemeine Mechanik, oder den Artilleristen, welcher über die
mathematische Lehre vom Bombenwurf so absprechen wollte, daß die Theorie davon zwar fein ausgedacht,
in der Praxis aber gar nicht gültig sei, weil bei der Ausübung die Erfahrung ganz andere Resultate gebe als
die Theorie, nur belachen.“ Furthermore „dasjenige, was bisher noch nicht gelungen ist, darum auch nie
gelingen werde, berechtigt nicht einmal, eine pragmatische oder technische Absicht (wie z.B. die der
Luftfahrten mit aerostatischen Bällen) aufzugeben; noch weniger aber eine moralische, welche, wenn ihre
Bewirkung nur nicht demonstrativ unmöglich ist, Pflicht wird.“
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Novalis, as we have seen, is symptomatic of a deeper dissatisfaction with the crisis
inaugurated by what Hölderlin refers to as the “Kantian boundary.”24 Rather than
accepting the ontological divide between real and ideal, discursive and non-discursive
concepts, Romantic mechanology establishes itself as a way of experimenting with the
technical contingencies of aesthetic production and reproduction alongside the workings
of organic life. It provides a way out from the Kantian “antinomies of pure reason” by
combining “Idealism” with “genuine empiricism.”25
The technical imagination: from organology to mechanology
In On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, Simondon defines the technical
imagination as a “particular sensibility towards the technicity of elements” that opens up
onto new combinatory possibilities for their interrelation, thus “permitting the discovery
of possible assemblages.”26 The technical imagination effectuates a shift in sensibility
from general organology towards what Simondon calls mechanology. While general
organology studies individual technical elements, which present themselves as
components of a larger technical object, like the organs of a living body, mechanology,

24

This romantic project of overcoming the “Kantian boundary” [kantische Grenzlinie] was presented
already in 1794 by Hölderlin in his dissatisfied reception of Anmut und Würde. Schiller, in Hölderlin’s
view “wagered one step fewer over the Kantian boundary, than he should have, in [my] opinion” [“einen
Schritt weniger über die Kantische Grenzlinie gewagt hat, als er nach meiner Meinung hätte wagen
sollen.“] For more on this letter and its potential connection to Hölderlin’s “Being and Judgment” fragment,
see Frank, Einführung, 138-139.
25
NS III, 316. No 402: “Der Idealism ist nichts, als ächter Empirism.“
26
Cf. Gilbert Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques (Paris: Aubier, 1958/1989), 92. Here it
should also be noted that Simondon is quite careful to distinguish the terms technical and technological, a
term which did not take on its current form until well into the nineteenth century. The flexibility of the term
technical, which equally suggests aesthetic activity, the bringing forth of τέχνη, the “know how” of an
engineer and musician, as well as a material configuration that is not yet that of the industrial dispositif of
technology, I believe, captures well its polyvalent importance for romantic thinking. More on this will be
discussed below. Also see Leo Marx’s seminal essay for more on this terminological shift from technics to
technology: Leo Marx, “Technology: The Emergence of a Hazardous Concept,” Technology and Culture
51, no. 3 (2010): 561–77, https://doi.org/10.1353/tech.2010.0009.
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on the other hand, concerns itself with fully individuated, fully concretized technical
objects. 27 While the organological stakes of Romanticism have already been explored by
Leif Weatherby, with similar interventions in recent years from Jocelyn Holland, this
project seeks to examine the technical imagination of romanticism as a means of shifting
the focus from organology towards what might be called a properly Romantic
mechanology. 28 This comportment, found in thinkers ranging from Novalis to Goethe,
Schelling to Hölderlin, seeks to rethink relations between self, nature, and technics with
the goal of developing a fully synergistic Wechselwirkung. This goal of constructing a
perpetuum mobile would entail a fully concretized presentation of Romantic form. The
Romantic fragment, as Friedrich Schlegel famously writes, aims to become fully
individuated and self-sufficient, “like a hedgehog.”29
In urging the novice to “become mechanically adept,” Novalis provides a point of
entry into a Romantic technical imagination that lends focus to unforeseen ensembles of
aesthetic, political, and natural-philosophical practices. This project is less determined by
any one particular element, however, than by a certain shared utopian sensibility which
seeks to retool and reconceptualize relations between humans and nature through
aesthetic and technical experimentation. The perpetuum mobile of Schelling’s World Soul
presents a model for this sort of technical, synergistic relationality. It presents a living,
breathing prototype for the construction of what John Tresch has called Romantic

27

Cf. Simondon, Modes d’existence, 80-81: “Il serait en ce sens possible de définir une organologie
générale, étudiant les objects techniques au niveau d’élément, et qui ferait partie de la technologie, avec la
mécanologie, qui étudierait les individus techniques complets.”
28
See Weatherby, Transplanting the Metaphysical Organ, and Jocelyn Holland, The Lever as Instrument of
Reason: Technological Constructions of Knowledge around 1800 (New York: Bloomsbury Academic,
2019).
29
KFSA I, 2: 205 Nr. 206.
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machines, machines “capable of awakening obscure forces of nature and fixing the
coordinates of technical systems” so that they might grow “into living, dynamic
wholes.”30 Novalis’s insistence that the “novice” become “mechanically adept,” in turn,
can be seen as providing a material basis for the development of a politics of Kantian
judgment as proposed by Hannah Arendt,31 a call that has been revived in recent years in
scholarship on Romanticism and Idealism by the philosopher Yuk Hui.32 While Hui has
turned to figures such as Goethe, Schelling, Hegel, and Hölderlin in his analysis of the
way in which the interconnectedness of parts and whole forms a political and aesthetic
project capable of taking seriously both technical relationality and organic life for
Romanticism, he overlooks the pivotal role played in this project by Novalis.33 Novalis,
for whom “all sciences are sciences of relational sciences,” seeks to establish what Dalia
Nassar has identified as a “relational” absolute.34
In actualizing this understanding of the absolute, Romanticism must become
properly mechanological. In calling for mechanics to both “live from” and “construct” a
perpetuum mobile, this proposition of a mechanological sensibility for German
romanticism requires taking seriously one’s comportment towards the natural world.

30

See Tresch’s description of “Mechanical romanticism” in the introduction to The Romantic Machine:
Utopian Science and Technology After Napoleon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 13 -14:
“Although usually studied as opposites, these exactly contemporary cultural formations—a return to a
mythical past and faith in a rational future—intersected in the figure of the romantic machine: a concrete,
rational, often utilitarian object that was nevertheless endowed with supernatural, charismatic powers. Just
as the romantic-era concept of the self-championed the imagination as a power that could transform the
world, these charismatic technologies were seen as capable of awakening obscure forces of nature and
fixing the coordinates of technical systems that grew into, living, dynamic wholes.”
31
Hannah Arendt, Das Urteilen. (Munich: Piper, 2012).
32
See Hui’s Recursivity and Contingency, in addition to his essay “Cosmotechnics as Cosmopolitics.” EFlux #86, no. 86 (2017).
33
Hui has also turned his attention, rather loosely, to Hölderlin in recent years: Yuk Hui, “Machine and
Ecology,” Angelaki 25, no. 4 (July 3, 2020): 54–66, https://doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2020.1790835.
34
NS 3:56: “alle unsre Wissenschaften […] sind VerhältnißWissenschaften.” Cf. Nassar, The Romantic
Absolute: Being and Knowing in Early German Romantic Philosophy, 1795-1804, chapter 1.
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Mechanology must take itself seriously as a political ecology. As with the “two ideals of
human existence” described by Hölderlin in the “Thalia Fragment,” Romantic
mechanology must work to combine the temporality and technicity of Bildung with
knowledge of and respect for the autoreproductive activity of the natural world.35 The
machinic ideal of the perpetuum mobile might be understood in this light as the
generation of a worldsoul that functions like the Guimbal turbine Simondon describes in
Modes of Existence. While generating power from a running river, the machine uses the
natural flow of the water as coolant to prevent from overheating. The machine exists in
perfect reciprocity and interrelationality with its natural milieu. It presents a harmonious
Wechselwirkung between a machine that is zart in the Goethean sense while embodying
an understanding of the ecological system that is “without nature” as understood by ecocritics like Timothy Morton.36 The Romantic mechanological ideal of perpetual motion,
like the Guimbal machine, seeks to combine unironic emancipatory desire with a
concrete knowledge of the way in which the natural universe, humans, and technical
objects might exist in forms conceived along these sorts of exchange.37
Not just Novalis’s understanding of mechanics, but Schelling’s nature philosophy
and Goethe’s botanical studies also bear witness to this mechanological sensibility in

35

Cf. HSA III:1 163:“Es gibt zwei Ideale unseres Daseins: einen Zustand der höchsten Einfalt, wo unsre
Bedürfnisse mit sich selbst, und mit unsern Kräften, und mit allem, womit wir in Verbindung stehen, durch
die bloße Organisation der Natur, ohne unser Zutun, gegenseitig zusammenstimmen, und einen Zustand
der höchsten Bildung, wo dasselbe stattfinden würde bei unendlich vervielfältigten und verstärkten
Bedürfnissen und Kräften, durch die Organisation, wie wir uns selbst zu geben imstande sind.”
36
Simondon offers this turbine up as an example of concretization. See Modes d’existence, 66-69. Cf.
Timothy Morton. Ecology without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2009).
37
The ecological stakes of this ideal of Wechselwirkung have also been explored recently by Heinrich
Detering, See his Menschen im Weltgarten: Die Entdeckung der Ökologie in der Literatur von Haller bis
Humboldt (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2020).
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romanticism. Schelling’s World Soul fragment attempts to unify post-Kantian
metaphysical speculation with knowledge of natural forces into a single synergistic
concretized object. Goethe’s morphological writings effectuate a convergence of natural
form with technical process via the Kantian logic of intuitive understanding, as recent
writings by Eckart Förster and Eva Geulen have highlighted.38 Novalis’s encyclopedia
project, the Allgemeine Brouillon, is particularly striking in light of Simondonian
mechanology. Simondon claims that the organizational capacity of the French
encyclopedic project inaugurates an epistemic shift in thinking about technical objects in
terms of form and function, giving way to more integrated, concretized technical artefacts
through the production and dissemination of technical knowledge.39 While the French
encyclopedists, writing decades before the sort of mass industrialization critics like Marx
would write about in the mid-nineteenth century, dealt in technical objects lacking such a
high degree of complexity and individuation, Simondon sees by the middle of the
twentieth century a renewal of this encyclopedia tendency in information theorists and
cyberneticians such as Norbert Wiener, whose 1948 Cybernetics presents what he calls a
new Discourse on Method.40 While praising the synergistic possibilities of this new
thinking, focusing on the recursivity of feedback loops as a mode of efficient information
gathering, however, Simondon is quick to note the ways in which Wiener’s emphasis on

38

See chapter 11, “Die Methodologie des intuitiven Verstandes” in Eckart Förster, Die 25 Jahre Der
Philosophie: Eine Systematische Rekonstruktion (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2011), 253 –
76 and Eva Geulen, Aus dem Leben der Form: Goethes Morphologie und die Nager (Berlin: August
Verlag, 2016).
39
Cf. Simondon, Modes d’existence, 135: “Tout ce qui est figure dans le livre encyclopédique est au
pouvoir de l’individu qui possède un symbole figure de toutes les activités humaines dans leurs details les
plus secrets. L’Encyclopédie réalise une universalité de l’initiation […]”
40
Ibid, 147. Also see Norbert Wiener. Cybernetics: Or the Control and Communication in the Animal and
the Machine (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013).
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‘control’ is at risk of promoting very harmful relations between humans, machines, and
the natural world. Romantic mechanology seeks to establish an alternative encyclopedics,
aiming at the concretization of a synergistic Wechselwirkung while acknowledging the
ways in which the relations between humans, machines, and the natural world are shot
through with a measure of irrepressible contingency.
An alternative mode of relation must be established that is able to combine
technical knowledge with a non-colonial sensibility towards nature. As far as studies of
German Romanticism are concerned, Simondon’s own literary examples of this sort of
attitude are particularly revealing. In Part II of Modes of Existence, he turns directly to
Goethe’s Faust in illustrating what a colonizing attitude towards the lifeworld might look
like. Indeed, scholars have often noted how Faust’s sacrifice of that very “special sap of
life” is indicative of such a comportment.41 Helmut Müller-Sievers has recently pointed
out how the text bears symptoms of what Bruno Latour sees as an ontological split
occurring in the eighteenth century between mechanical and organic worldviews.42 Here,
Romantic readers of Kant might recognize the ontological impasse presented in the
“Critique of Teleological Judgment.” Whereas Faust’s sacrifice effectuates what Martin
Heidegger would call the “mechanistic-technological ‘triumph’ of modernity over the
domain of growth” a century and a half later, Romantic mechanology seeks to establish
more equitable relations with the natural world. This means equally avoiding the other

41

See for example Gernot Böhme, Goethes Faust als philosophischer Text, (Zug, Switzerland: Graue
Edition, 2005) and Manfred Osten, “Alles veloziferisch” oder Goethes Entdeckung der Langsamkeit
(Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2013).
42
Cf. Helmut Müller-Sievers, “The Curse of Technics: A Gloss on the World-Curse in Goethe’s Faust,”
MLN 131, no. 3 (2016): 656–61, https://doi.org/10.1353/mln.2016.0043 and Bruno Latour, We Have Never
Been Modern (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).
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extreme identified by Simondon, which entails a naïve attitude towards nature by
insisting on “intuition” rather than knowledge and expertise in our technical negotiations
of our natural environment. In illustrating this new mode of relationality, Simondon turns
again to Romanticism—this time to the sailor-turned-miner protagonist of E.T.A.
Hoffmann’s “Bergwerke zu Falun.” Elias Fröbom, after returning from a long and hard
voyage working on an East India Company ship, is confronted by the ghostly apparition
of an old miner, who tries to entice him into working in a mine. Although initially
resistant to the idea of changing professions, Fröbom falls in love with the beautiful
daughter of the owner of the Falun mines and decides to give it a try. While lacking any
technical training, his intuitive knack for the trade quickly wins the respect of his
employer and the eye of the employer’s daughter. On their wedding day, however, this
lack of technical training proves to be Fröbom’s Achilles heel. Despite repeated warnings
from his co-workers and from the old miner’s ghost, he digs deeper and deeper into the
mines in search of more beautiful minerals to present to Ulla, his betrothed. In the end,
the roof above Fröbom collapses and the protagonist is buried alive beneath the rubble.43
Concretization and romantic form: reconsidering the fragment (again)
Romantic mechanology seeks to prevent the catastrophic scenarios presented to
Simondon by Goethe’s Faust and Hoffmann’s Fröbom, which requires analysis of the
ways in which the process of concretization coincides with romantic form. While
Simondon suggests that objects undergoing the process of technical concretization begin
more and more to approximate the individuated forms of organic life, he also provides

43

Cf. Simondon, Modes d’existence, 128-129.
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further means for understanding the type of concrete exchanges Romantic mechanology
aims to effectuate. Indeed, a radical rethinking of romantic form is already well underway
in writings by scholars such as David Wellbery, who sees in the time around 1800 a
move away from the platonic conception of form as removed from any sense of
materiality and towards a more “endogenous” understanding of form.44 Rüdiger Campe
has also argued for a split from Aristotelean hylomorphism in Friedrich Schlegel’s more
functional form concept, which arises coevally with matter.45 Such reevaluation,
however, must come to grips with the ways in which a broader retooling of Romantic
aesthesis exhibits clear emancipatory, mechanological goals: the fragment aims at full
concretization. Romantic form strives to become a full work on its own, “complete in
itself like a hedgehog.”46 Midway between individuated whole and aesthetic abstraction,
the Romantic fragment is situated at sites of exchange between concrete Darstellung and
a more open, speculative comportment developed in the wake of Kantian (and ecological)
crisis.47 Mechanology seeks to combine scientific knowledge with political and aesthetic
experimentation.

44

See Wellbery’s essay “Form Und Idee. Skizze Eines Begriffsfeldes Um 1800,” in Morphologie Und
Moderne: Goethes anschauliches Denken in den Geistes- Und Kulturwissenschaften Seit 1800, ed. Jonas
Maatsch (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 17–42 as well as his new essay on “Form” in the Goethe-Lexicon of
Philosophical Concepts 1, no. 1 (January 29, 2021), https://doi.org/10.5195/glpc.2021.38.
45
Rüdiger Campe, “Das Argument der Form in Schlegels »Gespräch Über Die Poesie« MERKUR 68, no.
777 (2014): 110–21 and “Das Problem der Prosa und die Form des Romans: Überlegungen zu Friedrich
Schlegels Theorie und Praxis um 1800,” in Die Farben der Prosa, ed. Eva Eßlinger, Heide Volkening, und
Cornelia Zumbusch, 45 – 64 (Freiburg: Rombach, 2016).
46
“Ein Fragment muß gleich einem kleinen Kunstwerke von der umgebenden Welt ganz abgesondert und
in sich selbst vollendet sein wie ein Igel.”
47
For more on this, see chapter 2, “The Fragment” in Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s L’absolu, littéraire,
57-80 and Leif Weatherby’s more recent “A Reconsideration of the Romantic Fragment,” The Germanic
Review: Literature, Culture, Theory 92, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 407–25,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00168890.2017.1370953.
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This project is divided into four chapters. The first provides a detailed analysis of
Novalis’s surprising embrace of the term mechanics, which must first and foremost be
understood within the context of his Kant studies during the years 1795-1796.48
Following his more widely known notebooks on Fichte, Novalis’s Kant studies
effectuated what many scholars have referred to as a “Kantian turn” in his thinking
during the time, which occurred coevally with a growing interest in natural philosophy
and his studies with Abraham Gottlob Werner.49 This shift from Fichtean idealism back
to Kant presents not only a drastic change in tone in his thinking regarding the technoutopian aim of constructing a perpetuum mobile.50 This turn also serves as context for
gaining a more thorough understanding of the new role played by mechanics in
constituting new mechanological forms of aesthesis.51 In calling for mechanics to both
live from and construct a perpetuum mobile, Schelling’s Worldsoul presents to the
technical imagination a functional, energetic absolute which Romanticism seeks to
approximate.52 A radical vision of a world is put forth, and the goal of creating these
synergistic ensembles of relations is explored in the context of numerous philosophical
studies, Novalis’s notes on the natural sciences, and in his poetics.

48

Cf. David Wood, “Novalis: Kant Studies (1797),” The Philosophical Forum 32 (2001),
https://doi.org/10.1111/0031-806X.00072.
49
For more on Novalis’s Kantian turn, see lecture 15 in Frank’s Einführung, 248-261, The first part of
Nassar’s The Romantic Absolute and Ch. 6 in Weatherby, Transplanting the Metaphysical Organ, 206-260.
50
In the Fichte Studies Novalis refers to the perpetuum mobile as an instance of “negative knowledge”
[negative Erkenntnis], safely marking the boundaries of what is possible and impossible for a machinic
thinking bound by definition to the material constraints of the “not-I.”
51
In one fragment from the Encyclopedia, Novalis even tries to reengineer the form-matter relation Kant
outlines in the transcendental aesthetic from the ground up, starting with mechanics: “Raum and Zeit –
Sinnliche Ansch[auung] a priori – w[as] / h[eißt] d[as] /Geometrie /Mechanik / Figuren /
Bewegungschema.” NS III, 392 Nr 660.
52
Gabriel Trop has argued for a similarly energetic reading of the Absolute in “Novalis and the Absolute of
Attraction,” Seminar: A Journal of Germanic Studies 50, no. 3 (September 26, 2014): 276–94. Also see
Frank, Unendliche Annäherung.

16

The second chapter explores Schelling’s Weltseele and other writings from the
time between 1795 and 1800 in the context of a rather puzzling note found in Novalis’s
studies of the World Soul. In this note, Novalis writes that “Nature is eternal, (but not
vice versa),” referring again to the ways in which Schelling’s machinic organism presents
us with a perpetuum mobile. This temporal irreversibility, I argue, is central to the
Romantics’ mechanological aims, and has a great impact on how we understand
Schelling’s reception of Kant in addition to his understanding of Goethe and his later
aesthetics.
The third chapter discusses the concept of the “Kantian Boundary” in Hölderlin,
who employs the term Energie as a means of providing an alternative sort of
Wechselwirkung between humans and the natural environment, a mode of recursivity
which does not force an unnecessary decision between a realist and idealist technics of
nature. While rejecting quick and easy distinctions between organism and mechanism,
Hölderlin’s ontopoetic ambitions lay the groundwork for a vast rethinking of life along
the lines of technical media, media which carefully undo the boundary between the
extensive space of the polis and the environmental khôra. Seen in this light, Hölderlin’s
writings can be seen as sketches for an alternative political ecology that has as its
material basis the poetic worldmaking activities of technical media.
The fourth chapter discusses what I am calling the “Goethean technics of
Antizipation,” which refers to a surprisingly Kantian term used by Goethe in his critique
of the Linnaean doctrine of prolepsis in his Metamorphology of Plants. In arguing that
the growth cycles of plants are not subject to a fixed timescale, as Linnaeus suggests, but
may be technically manipulated by a skilled hand, Goethe refers to the theory of
17

Antizipation as his object of critique. This unique term, seemingly a Germanized version
of Linnaeus’s prolepsis, was entirely absent from German lexicography and critical
discourse during the time, with one notable exception: Antizipation is what Kant calls the
a priori mediating force linking forms of intuition in the transcendental aesthetic to the
concrete data of sense perception, what he calls intuition, in the first Critique.53 In this
chapter we will see how the technical encounter with organic form that Goethe describes
in the morphology folds back onto a view of aesthesis as always already technically
mediated and open to manipulation. The poetic and technical stakes of this sort of
aesthesis are explored in the context of Goethe’s poetic reactions to Schelling’s project,
such as the poems “Weltseele” and “Eins und Alles.”
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Cf. Kritik der reinen Vernunft A:17/B:31 – A:41-B:58.
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2. Mechanology as political ecology: Novalis’s living
encyclopedics
At the outset of Heinrich von Ofterdingen, one of two Bildungsromane left behind
by the poet-engineer Novalis after his early death, the eponymous hero is faced with a
choice between accepting the colonization of the lifeworld on a fragmented planet or
undertaking the behemoth task of constructing a more coherent globe: “Träume sind
Schäume,” Heinrich’s father exclaims after hearing the dream of the blue flower.
“Dreams are suds.”54 Heinrich’s subsequent journey to Augsburg serves as a pretext for
attempts to discover poetic and theoretical alternatives to this cynical law of the father,
according to which the hope of living in a better world appears pointless, as so many
suds. In this chapter, I excavate the origins of Romantic mechanology in the writings of
Novalis, whose claim that the novice must first become “mechanically adept” in his
Notes for a Romantic Encyclopedia sets the stage for an ambitious exploration of the role
played by technical media in nature philosophy, politics, and aesthetics.55 Beginning with
Novalis’s externalized vision of the Kantian mode of reciprocity, this chapter shows how
Novalis’s call for the mechanic both to “live from” and “construct” a perpetuum mobile
in his work must be understood not just metaphorically, but as part of the project of
developing a living encyclopedics, an organizational system in which anthropogenic
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NS I. 195. References to Novalis’s work are from Novalis Schriften: die Werke Friedrich von
Hardenbergs, ed. Paul Kluckhohn and Richard Samuel (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1960-1988) and
will be composed according to the above reference: NS (Novalis Schriften) followed by volume in Roman
numerals, then by page number and, when available, passage number in Arabic numerals. Translations are
author’s own.
55
NS III, 245. Nr 47: "der Lehrling darf noch nicht raisonirren,“ he writes. “Erst muß er mechanisch fertig
warden, dann kann er anfangen nachzudenken.“
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forms of knowledge production partake in the natural operations they seek to describe.56
This reciprocity uncovered between technical system, natural knowledge, and the human
subject in the encyclopedia project leads Novalis to propose a new form of spatial
relations which presents an alternative to the cynical law of the father, a resonant nomos
of externalized mediation inspired by the ‘stirring song’ of Arion in his adaptation of
Herodotus’s Histories in Heinrich von Ofterdingen.57 At the center of this vision of a
technically mediated understanding of the natural world, we will see, lies an attempt to
show how the extensive space of the polis, where sovereign decision making takes place,
becomes irredeemably embroiled in the environmental container-space of khôra.58 A new
form of entanglement between these two realms is outlined by Novalis through the
metaphor of the ship, a medium implicating Romantic cosmologies of nature in the
complex operations of technical processes.59 In a fragment from the Pollen collection,
Novalis writes that, while tools serve to “arm the human,” such reciprocal interaction
contains the seed of a more dramatic co-evolutionary process undertaken by the
Romantic subject and the technical object:
One can very well say that the human knows how to bring about a world,
he just lacks the appropriate apparatus, the commensurate armature of the
56

NS III, 296: Nr. 314.
See the reference to the ‘stirring song’ of the órthios nomos in the Histories I, book 25. Herodotus, The
Histories, ed. John M. Marincola, trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt. London/New York: Penguin Classics, 2003.
58
For more on this, see Jacques Derrida, Khôra, Un Des Trois Essais Avec Passions et Sauf Le Nom
(Galilée, Paris, 1993).
59
Not only does the khôra present a non-extensive “third space” occupied by the globe in Plato’s Timaeus,
it also signifies the space of seafaring, as Bernhard Siegert reminds us. See “The Cultural Techniques of
Seafaring” in Cultural Techniques: Grids, Filters, Doors, and Other Articulations of the Real. trans.
Geoffrey Winthrop Young (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 68-69. For more on literary and
medial explorations of seafaring in current critical discourse, see Hans Blumenberg’s classic study,
Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer: Paradigma einer Daseinsmetapher (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997),
Burkhardt Wolf‘s Fortuna di mare, in particular the concluding discussion of Hölderlin in Fortuna di
mare: Literatur und Seefahrt (Zürich: Diaphanes, 2013), 393-402, and the ship chapter in John Durham
Peters, The Marvelous Clouds: Toward a Philosophy of Elemental Media (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2015), 53 – 114.
57
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tools of the senses. The beginning is there. Thus lies the principle of a ship
in the idea of the master shipbuilder, who is able to embody this idea
through heaps of men and appropriate tools and materials by making
himself, as it were, an immense machine. The idea of a moment thus often
requires immense organs, immense masses of material, and the human is
therefore, if not actu, nevertheless potentia creator.60
The ship provides Novalis with the metonymic means of understanding the turn from
organology to mechanology, a historical development Gilbert Simondon refers to as the
process of concretization, as we have seen in the Introduction.61 Such reflection on the
complexity of technical assemblages also reveals a change in our vision of the human,
who appears now as both creator and symptom of technical media.62 As we will discover
at the end of this chapter, the shift in focus from basic tools to more complex
assemblages also sets the stage for an examination of the reciprocal interaction between
the environmental space of the ocean and the steering mechanism of the ship’s rudder,
providing Novalis with a material point of contact for a new mode of resonance between
humans and the natural world. The key to understanding this vision of political ecology,
we will see, lies in the way Novalis sees late eighteenth-century discussions concerning
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NS II, 453: 88: “Werkzeuge armiren den Menschen. Man kann wohl sagen, der Mensch versteht eine
Welt hervorzubringen, es mangelt ihm nur am gehörigen Apparat, an der verhältnismäßigen Armatur seiner
Sinneswerkzeuge. Der Anfang ist da. So liegt das Prinzip eines Kriegsschiffes in der Idee des
Schiffbaumeisters, der durch Menschenhaufen und gehörige Werkzeuge und Materialien diesen Gedanken
zu verkörpern vermag, indem er durch alles dieses sich gleichsam zu einer ungeheuren Maschine macht. So
erforderte die Idee eines Augenblicks oft ungeheure Organe, ungeheure Massen von Materien, und der
Mensch ist also, wo nicht actu, doch potentia Schöpfer.“
61
Simondon, Mode d’existence des objets techniques, 80-81.
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The reciprocity Novalis ascribes to this relationship between humans and ships also highlights the way in
which Simondonian mechanology, as Mark Hansen has pointed out, offers a productive revision of the
unidirectional view of technics embodied by current “Cultural Techniques” discourse in Germany,
particularly in Bernard Siegert’s analysis of seafaring as a cultural technique. For Siegert, “[w]hat humans
do with ships matters less than what seafaring does with and to them.” For mechanology on the other hand,
what we do with ships and other technical assemblages—how we design, build, and use them—matters just
as much as their ability to affect us. Cf. Siegert, “Medusas of the Western Pacific: The Cultural Techniques
of Seafaring,” 69, and Mark B. N. Hansen, “The Ontology of Media Operations, or, Where Is the Technics
in Cultural Techniques?,” Zeitschrift für Medien- und Kulturforschung 8, no. 2 (2017): 169–86,
https://doi.org/10.28937/1000107980.
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the complexity of organic life as necessarily mediated by reflections on the complexity of
technical objects. While tools present “real indirect Formulas,” Novalis writes in one of
his Pollen fragments, “the result of a complete scientific universal-machine would be
nature, or chaos.”63
Novalis’s “Kant Studies”: the technic of nature and the architecture of reason
Before turning to Novalis’s encyclopedia project, it will prove useful to look at
the specific way in which Novalis employs the Kantian mode of reciprocity, a feature of
his writings that can be readily understood within the context of early Romantic reactions
to Kant during the 1790s. Like many of his Romantic compatriots, Novalis was struck
with a sense of profound ambivalence when confronted with Kantian philosophy. On the
one hand, Kant’s critical methodology presented a radical emancipatory force which
promised to free philosophical, poetic, and empirical activity from the inertial dogma of
inherited tradition. Viewed in this light, Kantian philosophy seemed capable of
“relativizing the universe,” as Novalis remarks in his “Kant Studies” of 1797, where he
likens Kantian criticism to a “Copernican system” that “nullifies fixed points” while
“making floating what was formerly at rest.”64 This sense of euphoric liberation,
however, was quickly counterbalanced by the sobering realization that Kant’s Critique of
Pure Reason presents little more than a “treatise on method,” clearing the ground for
positive knowledge without itself providing a functional “system of science.”65 Novalis,
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NS III, 91. “Instrumente und Apparate sind reale indirecte Formeln. Maschinen sind Formeln—das
Resultat einer vollständigen wissenschaftlichen Unversalmaschine würde eine Natur, oder ein Chaos sein.“
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like the Schlegel brothers, Schiller, and others, seeks to unite the critical impulse found in
Kant with a more constructive attitude towards philosophical, natural, and poetic forms of
knowledge. The most persistent source of frustration for early Romantics concerns the
status of what Hölderlin famously calls the “Kantian boundary,” an integral feature of the
Kantian architecture of the understanding whereby Kant insists on the erection and
maintenance of a rigid partition between empirical and transcendental modes of
thought.66 While Kant, for his part, sought to provide points of contact between these two
realms by showing how it is possible to make what he called a priori synthetic
judgments, judgments in which the regularity and consistency of the mental imprint left
by sense data could be used to trace the contours of a priori forms of cognition,
Romantics like Novalis prove dissatisfied with the tentative validity ascribed by Kant to
such judgments.67 Novalis, like Kant’s other Romantic readers, seeks a more substantial
point of contact between aesthetics, philosophy, and natural knowledge.68
Novalis’s own engagement with Kant began during his early studies in Jena with
Kant’s student and popularizer Carl Leonhard Reinhold in 1791.69 His ideas regarding
Kantian philosophy started coming to fruition six years later during the composition of a
series of notebooks that are known as the “Kant Studies.” These notebooks, it is worth
mentioning, were compiled following a period of prolonged engagement with Fichtean
philosophy, an encounter which resulted in Novalis’s earlier “Fichte Studies.”70 This
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This notion of a Kantian boundary, which Hölderlin outlines with reference to Schiller’s aesthetic treatise
Anmut und Würde, is investigated thoroughly by Manfred Frank in his Einführung, 138-139.
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CPR 158:197.
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For an impressive overview of these attempts, see Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative.
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Cf. Wood, “Kant Studies,” 326.
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For more on Novalis’ “Fichte Studies,” see Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle against
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pivot to Kant during the latter part of the 1790s represents a turn away from the logical
formalism of Fichtean idealism, also corresponding to the start of Novalis’s tutelage
under the geologist Abraham Gottlob Werner at the Freiberg mining academy. Seen in
this light, Novalis’s “Kant Studies” present an early attempt to articulate what Novalis
would come to call “empirical idealism,” a vision of scientific and poetic activity
grounded in a radically material, exteriorized vision of the Kantian mode of reciprocity,
aiming to take seriously both empirical observation and philosophical speculation in its
approach to the formation of natural knowledge.71
Kantian reciprocity, one of three modes of the category of relation, plays a central
role in affirming the functionality of the foremost ambition of Kantian philosophy:
illustrating the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments, which enable us to perceive the
transcendental contours of formal cognitive processes.72 As outlined in the table of
categories, reciprocity presents a mode of relation between two or more entities which
eludes both the determinative logic of linear causal chains and the substance-accident
dualism of traditional metaphysics.73 This recursive logic of reciprocity, for Kant, is used
to explain a form of relationality defined by interactivity among parts of a whole, parts
which codetermine the whole according to a common aim.74 While playing a more
subdued role in the first Critique, reciprocity comes to occupy center stage in the Critique
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of Judgment, where it is used by Kant as a heuristic device for explaining the way
complex entities such as organisms operate, also undergirding what Kant sees as a
necessary search for commonalities hidden behind the appearance of difference in
individual aesthetic tastes.75 Not only does reciprocity provide an important analogy
between aesthetic experience and organic life, this mode of relation also presents Kant
with a way of adapting his otherwise stubbornly Newtonian and Euclidian views of
phenomenal experience to important scientific developments unfolding at the end of the
eighteenth century.76 Foremost among these developments were debates in the life
sciences concerning the way organic individuals appear to self-organize over the course
of their morphological development, suggesting an autotelic process of variable growth
which presented challenges to earlier views seeking to understand life solely in
accordance with strictly rational laws.77 The possibility that organic life forms might
exhibit some type of agency in their evolutionary development, while not yet extended to
the species scale later afforded by Darwinian biology, seemed to point to a sort of life
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force inhering in living individuals, referred to as the “formative drive” by the German
naturalist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach in his 1781 tract on the Bildungstrieb.78 Six years
later, in the Critique of Judgment, Kant turns directly to this hypothesis, asking to what
extent human cognition might be able to recognize such internal purposiveness in the
world, a purposiveness he refers to, after Aristotle’s third cause, as a mode of technics:79
The systems that deal with the technic of nature, i.e., with nature's power
to produce [things] in terms of the rule of purposes, are of two kinds: one
interprets natural purposes idealistically, the other realistically. The
idealistic interpretation maintains that all purposiveness of nature is
unintentional, the realistic interpretation maintains that some of this
purposiveness (the purposiveness in organized beings) is intentional, from
which we could then infer, as a hypothesis, the consequence that the
technic of nature is intentional, i.e., a purpose, even as concerns all other
products of nature in their relation to the whole of nature.80
True to form, Kant details two ways of explaining the appearance of autotelic
organization in nature: on the one hand, there is a realist view which sees such autopoetic
activity as an internal feature of life. Idealism, on the other hand, sees these patterns as
cognitive projections that can never map directly onto the phenomena they aim to
describe. On what side of the Kantian boundary does this seeming purposefulness lie?
Does organic spontaneity belong to nature, Kant asks, or is it a projection of mind?
This dilemma seems to force Kant’s hand in choosing between stubbornly
denying the appearance of purposive activity in nature or making what he would consider
an irrational statement about the teleology of the organism, dogmatically referring to a
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qualitas occulta in describing natural phenomena. In order to extricate himself from this
uncomfortable position, Kant introduces a new type of judgment as a means of cautiously
acknowledging the possibility that the autotelic capacity of life to self-organize might
exhibit a form of what he calls “purposiveness without a purpose,” a mode of activity
wherein regulated patterns emerge in nature without being predetermined by mechanical
laws.81 The judgments we make regarding such phenomena, which Kant refers to as
regulative, reflexive forms of judgment, seek to combine the normative force of reason’s
autonomy with the theoretical capacity of the understanding to make judgments about the
composition of the world. While appearing to take seriously the possibility that the
autotelic formation of natural life might exceed the causal, determinative relations of
rational mechanistic forces, however, Kant quickly reduces the explanatory efficacy of
this operative mode of judgment by maintaining that regulative, reflexive judgments
possess only tentative, subjunctive validity.82 As Kant explains in the “Ideas for a
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim,” any analogies we draw between the ideal
realm of ends—the stuff of reason and human freedom—and the realm of purposeless,
empirical necessity must be taken with a grain of salt. The notion that life presents a
spontaneous activity that self-organizes without reference to human forms of cognition
suggests little more than a “useful idea,” a heuristic aid that tells us nothing about the
inaccessible realm of nature as it exists in itself.83 The “chasm” described by Kant at the
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beginning of the Critique of Judgment between reason—acting as its own law-giver—and
the understanding—which aims to grasp “nature as an object of the senses”—is left fully
intact.84 Both domains are secured against any “reciprocal influence.”85
While the tentative status of such ‘useful ideas’ is underscored by Kant in an
attempt to highlight the limits of human reason, his Romantic readers aim to establish
more substantial connections between humans and nature by revising the very
architecture of the understanding. Novalis, for his part, questions the efficacy of Kant’s
underlying attempt to tear organic life asunder from mechanical motion by opposing real
and ideal technics of nature. For Novalis, a true ‘technic of nature’ would seek to uncover
points of relation between mechanical and organic processes by combining these forms of
activity into a greater whole. “Empiricism is true idealism,” Novalis writes in a fragment
from Pollen.86 According to this relational approach, mechanics would embody not
inflexible determinacy but an experimental “doctrine of construction of the universally
lively” that cannot be reduced to a priori cognitive processes or to the Newtonian rational
mechanics embraced by Kant.87 This Romantic understanding of mechanics presents an
experimental discourse defined by an attunement to the specificities of technical media
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and their employment in the natural world, a central feature of what Gilbert Simondon
calls mechanology in his own remarks on Romanticism, as we have seen. Organic life,
conversely, cannot be viewed over and above mechanical forms of material relationality.
Life is instead embedded within mechanical processes, a feature of Romantic thought that
seeks to articulate an externalized understanding of the Kantian ‘technic of nature.’ In
order to achieve this “construction of the universal lively,” for Novalis, a new relation
between Kant’s architectonics of the understanding and technical media must be
established, one that expands our understanding of technics beyond the bounds of the
Aristotelean efficient cause.88 “Architectonics,” Novalis writes in an entry to his Notes for
a Romantic Encyclopedia: “Shouldn’t crystallization, natural architectonics, and technics
in general—have had any influence at all on previous construction and technics?”89
Instead of restricting natural phenomena and technics to their roles within metaphysical
structures of thought, Novalis wonders if there may be an exteriorized, material mode of
technical discourse that comes to shape how we think about forms of cognition and their
relation to the world.
In order to articulate this discursive shift more fully, highlighting the way in
which mechanics becomes entangled in cognition and organic life, it may prove useful to
cast a glance at the readymade association Novalis finds in Kant’s philosophy of nature
between mechanical forms of motion and the category of relation, a connection Novalis
uses to outline a more flexible understanding of mechanics as an experimental
comportment towards the understanding of natural processes and technical media. In the
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Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Sciences, one of the central texts explored by
Novalis in his “Kant Studies,” Kant attempts to show how his metaphysical approach to
the forms of cognition, presented by what he calls the architecture of the understanding,
might aid researchers more invested in the empirical investigation of natural phenomena
than in metaphysical speculation per se.90 Through his method of “Transcendental
Deduction,” in which the basic forms of empirical experience reveal themselves
piecemeal in a series of logical steps, Kant attempts to illustrate how the transcendental
framework provided by the table of categories provides the natural observer with a secure
foundation upon which to investigate the operative concepts of matter, motion, and rest.91
Doubling down on the divide he had already established in the first Critique between
ideal and empirical modes of thought, Kant takes an important cue from Newton’s
philosophy of nature by separating relative, empirical space from the frame provided to
perception by nonextensive, absolute space, one of the two a priori forms of sense
intuition detailed by the “Transcendental Aesthetic” in the Critique of Pure Reason.92
This privileged observational standpoint provided to the understanding by absolute space,
we will see, becomes an important point of criticism for Romantics who prove skeptical
of the anthropocentric attitude displayed in Kantian epistemology and nature philosophy.
The Kantian subject, existing at a metaphysical remove from relative, empirical space,
occupies a god’s eye view of the world filtered through the lens of such nonextensive
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space.93 Beginning from this transcendental viewpoint, Kant suggests that we are able to
logically deduce four different forms of matter and motion, forms which fit hand in glove
with the categories provided by the understanding:
Space, which is itself mobile, is called material, or also relative space;
space, in which ultimately all motion must be conceived, is consequently
itself entirely immobile, and is called pure, or also absolute space.94
This definition of what Kant calls the “quantity” of motion, phoronomy, is followed by
three other forms of motion, each matched with a logical category found in the table of
categories. Dynamics, which corresponds to the quality of movement, takes the vector of
an object’s motion into account.95 The third form, mechanics, deals in the category of
relation, highlighting a dialectic of motion and rest in the way objects relate to space.
While motion in objects only appears against a resting backdrop, rest, in effect, can only
be seen in contrast to motion.96 Phenomenology, the fourth form of motion, corresponds
to the modality of perception required to cognize this dialectical movement.97
These four forms of motion, unfolding step by step over the course of the Kantian
deduction, represent different stages in our phenomenal understanding of the relationship
between object, perceived motion, and the space occupied by motive force. Novalis, for
his part, seeks to collapse the relational and absolute forms of space into each other by
calling for a reflexive overlap of observational and speculative practices in the
constitution of natural knowledge. Foreshadowing the collapse of the khôra into the
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extensive space of the polis, a core feature of Novalis’s poetic writings that will be
explored at the end of this chapter, Novalis’s call for the novice to become ‘mechanically
adept’ attempts to restage the dialectical relationality of Kantian mechanics as a radically
material approach to natural knowledge grounded in an exteriorized mode of cognition.
“The true observer is an artist,” Novalis writes. “The empirical and the speculative search
are both infinite” operations, he notes, referring to this reciprocal relation as an
experimental attitude.98 “Seeking both at once—the experimental path, it is the true
way.“99 Whereas for Kant, modes of aesthesis seem to have little effect on processes of
poetic making, just as natural observation has no real effect on the forms provided by the
architecture of reason, such natural observation, for Novalis, is imbued with material
processes that are definitively experimental and speculative, processes which aim at
realizing a vision of philosophy that embraces contingency in an attempt to provide a new
“schema of the future.”100 This embrace of corporeal contingency, in fact, leads Novalis
to outline a novel mode of aesthesis, calling for the construction of a revised version of
the transcendental aesthetic by moving the material relationality of mechanical discourse
to the forefront of aesthetic perception: “Space and Time – Sense Intu[ition] a priori –
w[hat] / i[s] t[hat] / Geometry Mechanics / Figural Schema of / Motion.”101 The
suggested recursive loop between technical operations, natural processes, and the
architecture of mind leads Novalis to highlight what he sees as a direct correlation
between the motivating question of Kantian philosophy and the negentropic aims of
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mechanology. The possibility of a priori synthetic judgments, capable of mediating
between thought’s architecture and the sensuous stuff of the phenomenal world, becomes
bound to the task of constructing a negentropic perpetuum mobile:
Kant’s question: are synthetic judgments possible? may be specifically
expressed in the most varied manner. E.g. = is philosophy an art
(dogmatics) (science) = Is there an art of invention devoid of data, an
absolute art of invention […] = is perpetuum mobile possible?102
It is here that we see the very beginnings of Novalis’s attempt to articulate the role
technics plays in a “self-sorting system of nature,” an autopoetic mode of self-expression
in nature that is further developed in his encyclopedia project.103 The perpetuum mobile
provides a vision of nature and technical assemblage where “thing and tool” are
combined into one and in which knowledge becomes integrally linked to poetic processes
of making. “We only know,” writes Novalis in his Pollen fragments, “insofar as we
realize.”104
Mechanology and future technics: the construction of a living encyclopedics
Novalis’s search for what he calls an “intellectual motive principle” in the wake
of Kant’s philosophy of nature, we have seen, leads him to suggest that the relationality
inherent to mechanical forms of motion might provide a radical new form of aesthesis
rooted in the material operations of technical media.105 This mode of relationality, which
we are calling, after Simondon, mechanology, highlights the way in which Romantic
considerations of complex technical assemblages are not excluded from the recursive

102

Trans. Wood, 328.
NS III, 340: Nr. 475.
104
NS 3:357 Nr. 539.
105
NS II, 384: “Die geistige Bewegungsprincip kommt erst alsdann in Betracht, wenn die möglichen
Factoren einer Bewegung überhaupt dargethan sind.“
103

33

logic of reciprocity used to explain life, as was the case with Kant, but instead become
part and parcel of a dynamic overlay of organic and mechanical modes of approaching
nature for Novalis. While searching for what he calls an absolute “art of invention” that
might help us understand the functionality of a priori synthetic judgments, judgments
which should bridge the gap between nonempirical and empirical modes of experience,
Novalis turns away from the rigid architecture of Kantian reason and towards a more
dynamic, flexible system of organization aimed at the construction of a perpetuum
mobile.106 Mechanics, when viewed in this light, becomes a material and experimental
science seeking to establish synergistic relations between technical objects, humans, and
the natural environment.107
Novalis’s most enduring reflections on this vision for a perpetuum mobile can be
found in his encyclopedia project, the Allgemeine Brouillon. Consisting of a series of
fragments composed in 1798 and 1799, Novalis’s Notes for a Romantic Encyclopedic
presents both a formal poetic enquiry into the ability of the Romantic fragment to mediate
successfully between part and whole as well as a speculative attempt to articulate what it
might mean to construct a perpetuum mobile for Romantic mechanology.108 To begin
with, let us turn to the way in which the call for mechanics to construct a negentropic
machine is embedded within a series of reflections on the shifting relationship between
life, technical mediation, and the organization of knowledge at the end of the eighteenth
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century. In one entry marked “Encyclopedics,” Novalis states that “Every S[cience] has
its God, which is also its aim. Thus mechanics actually lives from perpetual motion—and
seeks at the same time, as its highest aim, to construct a perpetuum mobile.”109 We can
clearly see how this vision of encyclopedic organization forgoes any linear relationship
between empirical data and systems of knowledge, favoring a recursive loop that sees
progressive speculation as an integral mediating force in the relationship between knower
and known.110 A feedback system of theorization and observation is proposed by Novalis,
placing the knower not at a remove from the natural operation being examined, but
squarely within it. In another entry marked “Encyclopedics Nr. 517,” Novalis writes that
“[a]ll good researchers—doctors, observers and thinkers—do things like Copernicus.
They turn the data and method inside out in order to see if there isn’t a better way.”111
This Romantic approach to encyclopedics, what Novalis refers to as a “self-sorting
system of nature,” presents an alternative to Enlightenment practices of knowledge
formation by seeking to participate in the autopoetic activity of the natural phenomena
which encyclopedics seeks to describe.112 This interactive process of unfolding, what
Simondon refers to as “genetic encyclopedics,” is further explored by Novalis in his
analysis of the double history of the encyclopedic object and its concept:113
598. Enc[yclopedics]. Every S[cience] has a double hist[ory]—the
Hist[ory] of the object—the history of [the] Obj[ect], as concept. History
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of the [Matter]—Hist[ory] of the S[cience]. (Every Hist[ory] is 3fold—
past, present, and future).114
Objects are bound to the discursive relations that seek to describe them. Human ways of
relating to nature and to technical media are inextricably bound to the stories they tell
about life and technology. This experimental comportment does not mean, however, that
humans are free to construct any fictions they please. In another note on the possibility of
creating a perpetuum mobile, this time in reference to Schelling’s natural-philosophical
treatise On the World Soul, Novalis remarks that
Nature is eternal—not vice versa—it maintains itself by itself. What it is
once brought to do, it continues producing eternally according to the law
of inertia. The reason for transience is to be sought in the intellect.
Perpetuum mobile.115
A key feature of the project of constructing a living encyclopedics consists in the way
such organizational activity proves capable of articulating a view of the natural world that
is integrally opposed to the anthropocentric forms of knowledge Romantics like Novalis
find in Kant. Whereas Kant insists on keeping the observer at an ontological remove from
the natural world, presenting a transcendental framework which does no justice to
organic life or to the role played by technical discourse in knowledge formation,
Novalis’s Allgemeine Brouillon enacts a relational and material mode of construction and
critique. His proposed “critique of human intelligence as the highest metric we have”
would enable humans to forge new relations between nature and technology, providing a
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“propaedeutic of all other critical disciplines.”116 This form of critique, referred to
elsewhere as a doctrine of the “regular, complete construction of philosophy’s task,”
consists in nothing more than an “ordering of data according to the required
equivalences.”117 Forgoing the Kantian split between natural knowledge and technical
discourse, Novalis’s thought experiments concerning the construction of a perpetuum
mobile collapse into the attempt to articulate a “formative doctrine of the universal
scientific organ—or better yet, of intelligence.”118
Novalis’s project of becoming what he calls “mechanically adept” opens up onto a
broader cosmological principle of energetic reciprocity in which human knowledge and
technical mediation are embedded within environmental processes, participating in the
construction of the natural operations they seek to describe.119 “The result of a complete
scientific universal-machine would be nature, or chaos.”120 In order for Novalis to ensure
that this project of Romantic mechanology ends in the self-articulation of the lifeworld,
resulting in stability for the natural environment rather than entropic decay, we must
clarify the position of the subject along the circuit we have been tracing between natural
and technical processes. Selfhood, for Novalis, represents a material point of relation
between machine and milieu: “the seat of the soul is there, where inner and outer worlds
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touch. Where they interpenetrate—it is at every point of their interpenetration.”121 This
medial status of selfhood, according to Novalis, must be embraced. The subject presents a
“self-tool,” he writes elsewhere, while pointing out two possibilities for the observation
of more complex mechanical assemblages:
Main observation of the mechanic: one considers the machine (Conc[ept]
of the Machine) either in static, or mechanical moments, i.e. either in
relation to the equilibrium of its parts, or in motion.122
While insisting on the relational force of such interactivity, Novalis aims to show how
human agents, no longer the center of the post-Copernican universe, can nevertheless be
kept in the loop when confronted with complex technical and natural processes by
participating in the productive processes of encyclopedic documentation and design. This
form of symbiosis is achieved when humans begin to see themselves as a medium of
expression for the natural world, hinting at a vision of encyclopedic practice that focuses
on human participation in the self-articulation of the universe. In a note from his
“Medical Notebooks,“ Novalis turns directly to this role of the human knower as a
negentropic medium of expression:
Authentic desire is also a Perpetuum mobile—it always produces itself
anew (Mechanics is by and large the most useful form of analogy for
Physics) and that this doesn’t happen—Friction—is the reason for all
displeasure in the world.123
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True desire does not necessitate a colonial attitude towards life. Novalis’s thought
experiments with the perpetuum mobile serve to highlight alternative modes of
entanglement with the natural universe via the organizational capacity of technical media.
The speculative labor this requires, however, must be met with an experimental ethos
rooted in an ethical approach to the living.
This relational view of selfhood and its integral role in the project of Romantic
mechanology is explored further in “Alle Menschen seh ich leben,” a late poem by
Novalis which thematizes the speculative activity of constructing a living encyclopedics
by cataloguing different forms of motion arising in response to a variety of observational
vantage points with respect to natural motion. The first lines of the poem open at a distant
remove from the action observed by the speaker, much in the way Kant’s transcendental
subject exists at an ontological remove from the natural world:
All the people I see living
Many floating gently on
Few are toiling, striving forward
Yet it falls just to the one
Lightly Striving, floating living.124
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Alle Menschen seh ich leben,
Viele leicht vorüberschweben
Wenig mühsam vorwärtsstreben
Doch nur Einem ists gegeben
Leichtes Streben, schwebend leben.
Wahrlich der Genuß ziemt Toren,
An der Zeit sind sie verloren,
Gleichen ganz den Ephemeren.
In dem Streit mit Sturm und Wogen
Wird der Weise fortgezogen,
Kämpft um niemals aufzuhören,
Und so wird die Zeit betrogen,
Endlich unters Joch gebogen,
Muß des Weisen Macht vermehren.
—
Ruh ist Göttern nur gegeben,
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Over the course of the poem, this transcendental attitude is replaced by a viewpoint from
which the hero-sage finds himself in a “fight with storm and waves,” at the end finding
that “[r]est is only given to the gods.”125 Since “for us, life is acting,” the only possible
pleasure the speaker finds is through an “exercise of potency” in collaboration with such
natural forces.126 While rejecting any mode of observation that would privilege an
anthropocentric attitude towards natural knowledge, the poem underscores a series of
energetic opportunities unfolded within what Novalis refers to as the “betrayal of time,
the negentropic capacity of life to explore different forms of motive power such as
“striving onward,” “floating by,” and “lightly striving.”127 This encyclopedic
documentation of forms of motion and their affective resonance presents Novalis with a
chance to investigate energetic potentialities in human relations to nature, while also
reflecting on the role played by technical media in this process. In this way, human
systems of knowledge provide a medium for nature’s own activity as a “self-sorting
system,” opening up a recursive exchange between speculation and observation that
enables us to understand the experimental attitude underlying Novalis’s calls to construct
a perpetuum mobile:
Encyclopedics 320. Fut[ure] doctrine of human[kind], everything that is
predicated from God contains the future human doctrine. Every machine,
that now lives from the great perpetuo mobile, must become a perpetuum
Ihnen ziemt der Überfluß,
Doch für uns ist Handeln Leben,
Macht zu üben nur Genuß.
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mobile—each human, who now lives from and through God, should
become God.128
Human beings, like the sage in Novalis’s poem, should strive to become completely
embedded in the motions and rhythms of nature, losing themselves in the energetic
embrace of the cosmos they strive to understand.
Kuber as Cosmogram: towards a new nomos of technical resonance
The mechanological comportment required to construct a perpetuum mobile, as
we have seen, necessitates a drastic shift in the Romantic technical imagination. Humans
must account not only for simple tools but also for more concrete mechanical
assemblages, machines which force us to reconsider the ways in which our entanglements
with the natural world are technically mediated. The ship provides Novalis with a vivid
example of this process of concretization, providing a metonymic tool for the
establishment of Romantic mechanology writ large. Further contours of this development
appear in Novalis’s outline of a living encyclopedics, highlighting the ways in which
technical relationality serves as a mediating force between local techno-cultural practices
and the holistic cosmology informing Novalis’s natural philosophy. The aim of such
mediating activity is nothing less than the articulation of negentropic forms of interaction
between humans, technical objects, and nature. The construction of a perpetuum mobile
constitutes a material process that Novalis sketches in his notes on Kant, in his remarks
on Schelling’s World Soul essay, and in the Encyclopedia project. The outcome of this
heightened sense of attunement between nature, technics, and humans, however, is by no
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means a foregone conclusion: “[t]he result of a complete scientific universal-machine
would be nature, or chaos.”129 Attempts to construct a functional perpetuum mobile can
lead to entropic decay and disorder, in fact, if we do not properly attend to the epistemic
and ethical aspects of our relationship to nature. An important way we have seen Novalis
insure this project against ecological catastrophe is by highlighting the many ways in
which the subject itself is always already imbricated in technical media and natural
processes. This co-determination of humans, nature, and technicity undermines
anthropocentric attitudes toward the employment of reason, foreshadowing later critiques
of technology levelled by philosophers such as Peter Sloterdijk and Martin Heidegger.130
Warning against the “mechanistic triumph” of machines over the lifeworld signified by
the paradoxical adherence to an ideology of the organism, Heidegger urges his readers to
take seriously the threat posed by the enframing function of modern technology, which
threatens to colonize every aspect of the lifeworld.131 This resonance between the critique
of anthropocentric forms of knowledge in Romanticism and the critique of technology
levelled by Heidegger has much in common with the experimental attitude towards
nature and technical objects found in Simondon’s conception of mechanology, as
commentators such as Yuk Hui have noted.132 Novalis, however, adopts a more
progressive attitude towards the possibilities inherent to complex technical assemblages
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than Heidegger would.133 Much like Simondon, Novalis holds an experimental attitude
towards the construction of negentropic technical assemblages. While highlighting the
need for more synergistic machines, Novalis also presents a broader view of the universe
itself as a functional, cosmological perpetuum mobile.
While Schelling’s World Soul essay provides Novalis with the blueprint for a
complex, dynamic machine with infinite motive power, it is up to the Romantic
encyclopedist and poet to document and experiment with the ways in which technical
objects can tap into and equitably distribute the resources made available to humans who
see nature as a perpetuum mobile. This dual feature of Romantic attitudes towards
technical objects, viewed as what John Tresch refers to as “cosmograms” linking
concrete devices to more abstract metaphysical structures, is highlighted by Novalis at
the very outset of Heinrich von Ofterdingen.134 One of two incomplete Bildungsromane
the poet left behind after his death, Heinrich von Ofterdingen tells the story of an
eponymous hero journeying with his mother from their native home in Augsburg to his
grandfather’s court in Thuringia. While the plot appears to be set entirely in the high
Middle Ages, readers are confronted in the opening lines with an anachronistic
timekeeping device that seems ill-placed in this medievalizing universe. In the first
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sentence, readers hear the ticking second hands of a wall clock, a device that was not
invented until a number of centuries after the supposed setting:135
The parents already lay asleep as the wall clock beat its steady pulse and
wind rustled outside the rattling windows; the room brightened from the
alternating glance of the moon. The young man lay restless in bed,
thinking of the stranger and his tales.136
This temporal solecism opens up a space of alterity between the self-enclosed cosmos of
the novel’s medieval setting and the standardizing rhythms of modernity experienced at
the turn of the nineteenth century in Europe. While the clock’s second hand never makes
a second appearance, it calls the reader’s attention to a dual aspect of technics: while
constituted by concrete technical objects, the technosphere nevertheless possesses the
additional function of participating in the construction of vast cosmologies—stories we
tell ourselves about the way in which nature, technical media, and humans interact.
One of the most important of these stories explored by Novalis’s novel concerns
the status of the nomos with respect to the distribution of spatial relations between
humans and the environment. While scholars such as Frederick Beiser have highlighted
the ways in which Romantic aesthetic production seeks to combine natural knowledge
with ethical action, providing points of contact between Kant’s “starry heavens” of the
physical universe and the “moral law” inside the subject, little has been written on how
the externalization of the technic of nature by Novalis and early Romantics leads to the
articulation of a new ethos: a romantic political ecology that is rooted in the complex
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operations of technical media.137 After being confronted with his father’s cynical attitude
towards the aim of creating more equitable relations between humans, technical objects,
and the natural universe—“Träume sind Schäume,” his father exclaims after hearing
about his dream of the blue flower, “dreams are suds”—Heinrich finds himself searching
for an alternative to this cynical law of the father, according to which dreaming of a
better world appears as a useless task.138 Along his journey, Heinrich and his mother are
accompanied by two well-travelled merchants who recount wonderous stories of their
encounters with an array of medievalizing characters, including miners, knights, and
poets from faraway lands. Heinrich is especially taken by the tales he hears about poets
from a mythical golden age. In these stories, Heinrich is introduced to a new cosmology
in which “the entirety of nature” appears “livelier and more sensible” than the present, a
time in which “hidden effects moved lifeless bodies.”139 This view of a time in which
“direct communication with the heavens” seemed possible provides Heinrich with an
early glimpse of alternatives to the compliant cynicism of anthropocentric life.140
The Romantic longing for an irrecoverable past, as many scholars have noted, is
used by Novalis primarily as a means of illustrating a more forward-looking vision for
life on earth, providing the contours of a future in which technical mediation establishes
the basis for more sustainable interactions between humans and the natural world.141
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While the subtitles of the novel’s first section, Die Erwartung, and of the incomplete
second part, Die Erfüllung, seem to remind the reader of the difficulty of realizing any
emancipatory dreams, the poetics of Heinrich von Ofterdingen nevertheless insists on the
urgent need to reject the complacency of conservative cynicism regarding the deployment
of new media with an experimental and open approach towards technics. In one of the
merchants’ tales, for example, Heinrich hears a version of the legend of Arion, a lyreplaying hero from Book 1 of Herodotus’s Histories. Without revealing his source
directly, Novalis adapts the legend as told by Herodotus in order to recover an oftenoverlooked usage of the term nomos in ancient Greek: the ‘stirring song’ of the órthios
nomos.142 Providing a musical alternative to unmediated harmony between Kant’s “law
within” and the physical law of the “starry skies above,” this forgotten understanding of
the term nomos does not reduce law to natural necessity, the physis; nor does it defer to
the arbitrary decision-making of a sovereign being or state, a false dilemma which lies at
the heart of Aristoteles’s Niccomachean Ethics and Plato’s Meno.143 The órthios nomos
provides Novalis with a way of showing how attunement to the operations of technical
media can create material points of resonance between ecology and political life,
establishing a more flexible understanding of natural processes and human activity than
can be found in the embrace of a “new nomos of the earth” by thinkers such as Latour.144
This alternative nomos, furthermore, has explicitly democratic connotations: the term is
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introduced by Aristophanes in the Knights fragment as the chorus celebrates the removal
of a tyrant by the demos, who finally recognizes Arion as its rightful leader.145
Novalis’s main source for invoking this nomos of resonance, however, is
Herodotus’s Histories. Although the legend provides material for a number of Romantic
writings, including poems by Ludwig Tieck and August Wilhelm Schlegel, Novalis’s
treatment of the tale in Heinrich von Ofterdingen is unique in its insistence on tracing the
‘stirring song’ of the hero back to the material, medial conditions of the song’s
production. In Novalis’s retelling of the myth, a “miraculous instrument” or “tool” is
placed in Arion’s hands that is capable of reanimating the slumbering forces of the
natural world.146 Arion, whom the merchants of Novalis’s novel refer to tellingly as a
“Tonkünstler,” a “sound artist,” embarks on a seaward journey to a foreign land while
carrying a brilliant trove of gifts bestowed to him over the course of his travels.147 Upon
his departure, the sound artist Arion is overcome by a band of marauders who threaten to
steal his wealth and toss him into the sea. The hero begs for his life, but quickly realizes
that such pleas are useless. The assailants are merciless. They take all of his money and
present him with a grim choice: Arion must kill himself immediately and receive a proper
burial on land or allow himself to be cast into the ocean’s depths. Overcome with despair,
the hero chooses the latter option, asking for just one dying wish: he requests to play one
final song on his instrument, the “miraculous tool” that accompanies him on all of his
journeys.148 The mention here of the instrument upon which the órthios nomos is played
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is not found in Herodotus’s Histories. It is a unique invention by Novalis, whose
storytelling merchants highlight the importance of technical objects in establishing new
points of resonance between humans and nature.149 After throwing himself overboard,
Arion is unexpectedly rescued by a large sea creature, who thanks him for playing his
wonderful song.150 Tool-based harmony provides the basis for a forgotten type of
attunement between humans and nature, a type of synergistic relational exchange made
available when technical media are seen as externalizations of the recursive functionality
of Kantian reciprocity.
The challenge posed by Novalis’s vision of romantic mechanology is the
following: how might this seemingly forgotten law of technically mediated attunement be
introduced to a world that is no longer defined solely by simple tools and instruments?
The introduction of complex machines can afford humans greater access to the motive
resources of the cosmos, as Novalis explains throughout his writings on the perpetuum
mobile. Such advanced machinery, however, can also accelerate processes of entropic
decay, contributing to the destruction of life and chaotic disequilibrium for the natural
universe. With the careful construction of poetic and epistemic media as described in the
Notes for a Romantic Encyclopedia, however, Novalis seeks to call attention to the
synergistic capabilities inherent to machines, which allow us to forge increasingly
complex ways for humans to relate to themselves and to nature. In the Pollen fragments,
Novalis employs the metonymic device of a ship and shipmaking for conceptualizing
ways in which an evolutionary uptick in technological complexity experienced at the turn
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of the nineteenth century can be met with a new understanding of the human as
irreducibly embedded within natural and technical processes.151 In his retelling of the
Arion legend, Novalis once more turns to the ship as a way of conceptualizing this
historical shift from organology to mechanology. In one more striking revision of the
legend, Novalis’s merchants describe how the catastrophic fate awaiting Arion’s
assailants may be tied to the loss of control over the ship’s steering, which is itself an
unintended consequence of their ignorant refusal to listen to the órthios nomos.152 While
the marauders of Herodotus’s version of the legend happily listen to the stirring song of
the hero before throwing Arion overboard, their counterparts in Heinrich von Ofterdingen
fill their ears with wax so as not to be swept away by the music’s charm:
They knew full well that, if they listened to his magic song, their hearts
would soften and they would be seized with remorse; they therefore
decided to grant his request, but filled their ears during the song, hearing
nothing so they could stick to their plan.153
In a striking reversal of Homeric ocularcentricism, Novalis presents the hero’s lied as a
siren song for the assailants. As cynics of the Anthropocene, the antagonists fear the
resonant power of Arion’s music, the hidden capabilities of his wonderous instrument.
While Herotodus’s hero relates his tale to his companion Periander after returning to
shore, and he is even able to confront his assailants when they arrive upon the mainland,
in Heinrich von Ofterdingen, the marauders’ failure to hear the órthios nomos sets them
on a path of irreversible self-destruction. At first, they fight ruthlessly among themselves
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over Arion’s splendid riches. A deadly fight takes many of their lives, and the treasure
itself is lost in the struggle.154 The confusion and loss of life also leads to a loss of control
for the remaining crew on board: “the few who remained were unable to govern the ship
alone, and were quickly swept to shore, where the ship collapsed and sunk.”155
While allegorizing the catastrophic effects of ignoring the tool’s mediated form of
resonance, Novalis uses the verb regieren to call attention to the way in which the ship
might be understood as a metonymic device for working through the political and
ecological changes initiated by the historical appearance of complex machines. After
refraining from listening to the nomos of even a simple instrument, Arion’s assailants are
poorly equipped to deal with the more complicated feedback mechanisms of the ship’s
steering rudder. They are not attuned to the ways in which the ship’s motion responds to
the ocean’s tides and flows. Externalizing the complex recursive functionality of the
Kantian mode of reciprocity, the failed steering presented in Heinrich von Ofterdingen
suggests an important point of nondistinction between the environmentality of the ocean
and the realm of political decision-making. Falling neither on the side of a realist technic
of nature, according to which interaction between humans and the natural environment is
determined by the laws of the physical universe alone, nor on the side of an idealizing
technics that would reduce the alterity of natural motion to a projection of human desire,
the ship’s capacity to run aground under these conditions presents a stark warning from
Novalis to his readers: already by the beginning of the nineteenth century, humans are
entering a time in which they can no longer distinguish between the governmentality of
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the polis, with its extensive technologies of control presented through the familiar
metaphor of a ship, and the non-extensive space of what the ancient Greeks called khôra,
signifying both the sea itself as a space outside of the polis and the metaphysical
container upon which the entirety of the universe rests.156 Completing the collapse of
Kant’s absolute non-empirical space into the relative space of perceived phenomena, a
technically mediated epistemology and poetics that Novalis began to articulate in his
vision of the novice “becom[ing] mechanically adept,” Novalis puts forth an
understanding of technical mediation which harbors no Promethean illusions about the
impact of technology on nature. Human beings cannot simply engineer their way out of
environmental disaster by filling the planet with ever newer mechanisms of control.157 On
the other hand, Novalis’s vision of Romantic mechanology also resists the cynical
realism embraced as a “new nomos of the earth,” a determinism which would ignore the
mediating status of technical objects in the organization of knowledge, as well as the vital
role played by the polis in keeping human subjects afloat during times of ecological
crisis.158
Coda
As we have seen over the course of this chapter, Novalis’s invocation of the
órthios nomos played by Arion constitutes the introduction of a new law of attunement
for Romantic thinking about technology and the environment. Through the invocation of
the musical instrument, a harmonious resonance materializes and mediates the two poles
of what Kant refers to as the ‘technics of nature:’ realism and idealism. Laying the
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groundwork for a negentropic political ecology externalizing the recursive functionality
of Kant’s mode of reciprocity, Novalis shows how the machinic ideal of constructing a
perpetuum mobile might provide a more synergistic, non-colonizing approach towards
nature by reflecting carefully on the energetic and organizational capacity of technical
media. Refusing to reduce the nomos to the unmediated architecture of the understanding
or to the motive force of the physical universe, this new sense of attunement aims to
create stability and resonance between humans and nature by paying careful attention to
the design and employment of complex devices. Referring to this process as becoming
“mechanically adept” in the Notes for a Romantic Encyclopedia, a mode of relation
between technology and nature that Gilbert Simondon calls mechanology in his
reflections on Goethe and E.T.A. Hoffmann, Novalis hints at the possibility of
establishing and maintaining equitable relations between humans and the lifeworld by
exploring the evolutionary increase in technical complexity occurring at the turn of the
nineteenth century. Such Romantic aims, of course, are not easily realized, as Novalis
acknowledges in an entry to the Notes for a Romantic Encyclopedia. “The simpler the
laws,” he writes, “the more difficult their application,” reflecting on the role complexity
plays in the negentropic ideal of constructing a perpetuum mobile.159 As the ship’s
criminal crew experiences in Novalis’s adaptation of the Arion legend, such attempts to
modulate complicated feedback systems can lead to utter catastrophe for human subjects,
especially for those who refuse to listen to the nomos of resonant, material technicity.
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The medial status of the ship’s steering device will be investigated further in the
fourth chapter, which attends to the ways in which Goethe seeks to outline a material
understanding of the temporal process Kant calls Antizipation.160 Mediating between a
priori forms of intuition and the empirical temporality of sense data, Antizipation presents
Goethe with a way of re-establishing a forgotten link between organic formation and
technical modulation, the absence of which is mourned by the court poet Torquato Tasso
in his closing monologue.161 Before exploring this technics of anticipation in Goethe’s
morphology, however, we must first turn to the Romantic Naturphilosoph Friedrich
Schelling, whose Weltseele essay has provided Novalis with an instance of a working
perpetuum mobile. While Schelling himself first explores this machinic ideal only in
1809, his writings on nature philosophy from 1795 to 1800 present an important reminder
of the ways in which the specificities of organic life must be carefully considered when
reflecting on experimental forms of relation between technology and the environment.
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3. Between function and figuration: machine and organization in
Schelling’s World Soul

In the last chapter, we saw how Novalis’s reflections on the scientific
systematization and poetic presentation of natural knowledge in his philosophical
notebooks and in the Notes for a Romantic Encyclopedia led him to suggest that all
systems of knowledge ultimately participate in the construction of the phenomena they
aim to describe. On this account, Romantic nature philosophy and poetics present an
externalized, material supplement to the teleological character of what Kant calls the
“technic of nature” in the Critique of Judgment.162 Conjoining considerations of organic
life’s self-motivated activity with an attunement to the complexity and materiality of
technical media, Novalis urges his fellow Romantics to adopt a relational account of
knowledge, one that is recursive and self-reflective while remaining empirically
grounded, able to be traced back to the realm of observable phenomena. The key to
understanding this shift in the Romantic ‘technic of nature,’ for Novalis, can be found by
paying close attention to the ways in which the evolutionary uptick in the complexity of
technical media is reflected in attempts to describe the complexity of organic life in
nature philosophy at the end of the eighteenth century. Urging readers to explore the
development from simple tools to complex machines through the retelling of the Arion
legend in Heinrich von Ofterdingen, Novalis employs the crucial Simondonian shift from
organology to mechanology as a means of drawing attention to the ways in which life
itself (and our understanding of it) becomes imbricated in the operations of technical

162

CJ A 318/B322.

54

media. While appearing in excess of strictly Newtonian considerations of causal
determination, organic life appears in its actuality as a parasitic supplement with regards
to a technical a priori.
In this chapter, we will see how this line of mechanological questioning
undertaken by Novalis is in a certain way reverse-engineered by Friedrich Schelling. In
Schelling’s writings on natural philosophy throughout the 1790s, the composition of
organic life and its spontaneous self-organization take center stage. While Novalis’s
methodology starts with the novice “becoming mechanically adept,” ultimately teasing
out a resonant nomos inherent to both the organism and the operations of technical media,
Schelling’s investigation of the Kantian technics of nature begins and ends with the
exploration of life, that je ne sais quoi of the organism’s autopoetic, self-organizing
activity.163 This is not to say, however, that Schelling presents us with a vision of the
organic that is completely devoid of a priori technical mediation. On the contrary,
Schelling makes it clear in some of his earliest works that he is seeking to arrive at a
point of nondistinction between the realism of natural knowledge and the idealism of
speculative philosophy, a point where the Kantian Kluft between causal mechanism and
spontaneous teleology explored in the third Critique would finally fade away.164 While
searching for this point of non-distinction between organism and mechanism in writings
such as the World Soul, Schelling draws our attention to a more central, often overlooked
conceptual divide between machine and organization. While the machine presents a
vision of a complex whole wherein functionality determines the figuration of every part,
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in the organization of dynamic systems (such as organisms and systems of thought),
function is subordinated to the figurative determination of the part as it relates to the
whole.165 Leaving open the question of whether or not the machine and the speculative
schema of organization can reflexively determine one another through the Kantian
motion of reciprocity, the recursive logic lying at the heart of Schelling’s entire
philosophy during these years, the World Soul puts on full display the difficulty of
avoiding technical media when discussing organic activity. It is only in and through
material exteriorization that the machine’s mechanical repetitions can produce the
spontaneous alterity that is called, for lack of a better term, life. Schelling’s writings thus
serve as a reminder to Romantic poetics of the ongoing centrality of the organism and the
theorization of life for mechanological considerations of technical organization in its
multiple modes.
As a result of Schelling’s rather counterintuitive attitude towards the role played
by the organism in romantic nature philosophy, commentators such as Leif Weatherby
have called attention to a type of organological thinking in his writings, wherein the
human being might be considered as part of a broader network of historical
determinations provided by the material medium of the tool, or organon.166
Supplementing this organological approach to Schelling’s understanding of the tool and
human, this chapter seeks to highlight the numerous ways in which Schelling is led to
thematize the evolutionary shift in technical complexity from tool to the machine as part
of a broader set of natural scientific, aesthetic, and philosophical concerns, matters which
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move Romanticism beyond organology and more fully into the domain of
mechanological thinking proper. This move from organology to mechanology is a
definitive shift in the history of science and technology, according to Simondon.
Presenting what the philosopher Yuk Hui has recently referred to as the first world soul
without a demiurge, Schelling’s natural-philosophical writings can be seen as an early
Romantic attempt to explore a cosmology that overcomes the technocratic, hylomorphic
impulses found in Kantian metaphysics and in uses of instrumental reason, while
presenting a vision of the cosmos as a dynamically self-organizing machine.167 Although
Schelling never appears to respond directly to Novalis’s claim that his World Soul
presents a functional perpetuum mobile, a vision of nature as “eternal,” “maintain[ing]
itself by itself […] according to the law of inertia,” Schelling will go on to explore the
hypothesis that his much-lauded equilibrious “band of forces” presents the possibility of
this negentropic basis for life in the 1809 On the Essence of Human Freedom.168 With the
machine as its material supplement, the technical medium through which the absolute of
nature takes on finite appearance for knowers, “the band of forces that make up life could
equally be insoluble according to their nature,” Schelling writes. 169 This band of forces
itself could constitute a functional “perpetuum mobile.”170 The dynamic equilibrium
lauded here often appears directly inspired by the writings of Schelling’s friend, the
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physician and mystic Franz von Baader. In a notebook entry from 1789, Baader gives
voice to a negentropic mode of organic health that will appear time and again in
Schelling’s own writings. “We are thus seeking, with hope of profit, to work on force and
time at once—i.e. we are seeking the perpetuum mobile,” he writes in a diary entry from
February 25, 1789.171 While exhibiting more direct concern for the role played by organic
life in the project of mechanology than we saw in writings from Novalis, Schelling’s
exploration of life as an infinite process akin to a perptuum mobile in his 1809 essay on
human freedom presents the results of a lifelong attempt at exploring how philosophy can
overcome the divide between mechanics—which Schelling associates with determinative
causality—and the organic spontaneity that constitutes life, both when it finds itself in
balance and during its more disequilibrious moments.
Plato’s Timaeus and the Possibility of Form
Schelling’s attempt to explore what a world soul without a demiurge might look
like for Romantic technics, nature philosophy, and cosmology first takes on concrete
form in the 1798 World Soul essay, before culminating in the 1809 Freedom essay. This
lifelong project, however, can be traced back to two relatively hermetic treatises from
1794, one discussing Platonic cosmology and the other ostensibly exploring the status of
metaphysics after Kant. Both written while Schelling was still a student at the Tübinger
Stift, Schelling’s notes to Plato’s Timaeus and his subsequent essay On the Possibility of
a Form for All Philosophy bear witness to the inextricable link between philosophical
speculation and natural formation for Schelling, even during his earliest years. In the
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notes to Timaeus, Schelling explores what he calls Plato’s “transference [Übertragung] of
the subjective onto the objective” in the myth of the demiurges as related to Socrates by
Timaeus, a traveler from Italy who tells of the cosmic way in which immaterial forms
come to take on material appearance in the finite realm.172 As opposed to earlier
variations of the demiurgic mythology, such as the one penned by Hesiod, wherein the
demiurges are troublemaking agents of chaos released upon the world by Pandora as
punishment for Prometheus’s theft of fire and deception of Zeus, in Plato’s Timaeus, the
demiurges are technical agents of positive creation on a universal scale.173 They are the
cosmic technocrats ultimately responsible for mediation between the Idea (eidos) and its
material manifestation.174
It is here, at the site of mediation between form and matter, eternal ideas and their
temporal manifestation, that Schelling’s exploration of demiurgic technical activity
begins. In his notes to Plato’s dialogue, which are in many ways an attempt to read the
Platonic cosmology as an allegory for the Kantian architecture of the understanding,
Schelling has two primary aims: first and foremost, these notes attempt to explore the
possibility that the “technic of the demiurge,” which Schelling also refers to as a singular
Baumeister, might be envisioned as an early exploration of the Kantian ‘technic of
Nature.’175 The Timaeus thus provides Schelling with what he calls a ‘true myth,’ aiding
philosophy in exploring the complex relationship between concepts of reason, sense
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intuitions, and judgment in Kant’s metaphysics, aesthetics, and nature philosophy.176 As
the beings responsible for the creation of all visible forms, even including the earth itself,
the demiurges function as ‘divine craftsmen,’ or ‘engineers’ as one commentator has
recently described.177 The demiurges’ role in Platonic creation mythology is deceptively
simple: they are responsible for making copies of the Ideas and distributing them
throughout the khôra, a sort of primordial receptive flux.178 As mediators between the
divine and the everyday, however, the demiurges’ existence raise a number of questions:
how can we be sure that the visible copies of the forms produced by the demiurges are
true to the originals, which remain completely hidden from sight? How is it possible that
the chaotic flux of the khôra presents a third between being and becoming, while the
activity of the demiurges is also presented as the only way to overcome the gap between
the atemporal realm of forms and the world of finite appearances? What role does the
khôra in fact play in giving shape to the world, of the in-formation of forms of
appearance, as Derrida puts it?179 Are the demiurges even ultimately necessary? If so,
where do these cosmic engineers come from? Do they exist in the realm of appearance, or
of unchanging being?
This set of problems, Schelling realizes, is not just a Platonic one, but is endemic
to all of philosophy including Kant. Refracting the demiurgic myth through the prism of
the architecture of the understanding, Schelling argues that the originary forms of
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judgment and intuition in fact present the same sort of confusion as the Timaeus did for
Plato, with no way of providing coherence to the faculties in their interrelation.180 In
response to this epistemological problem, Schelling offers what he refers to as an “a
priori determination through the causality of the concept [Begriff],” in which the idea
unfolds as its own end, akin to the living organism. Like it does for Blumenbach in the
Bildungstrieb, this slow coming into appearance of the cosmos would in effect bypass the
demiurges by directly combining the fluid medium of khôra with the figurative activity
of technē.181 While this suggestion is not articulated at length by Schelling in his notes to
Timaeus, this intuition sets Schelling on a path that will shape his nature philosophy for
years to come. Seeking to overcome the opposition of form and matter, both in its
Platonic and hylomorphic forms, Schelling will suggest that the technic of nature is only
able to be articulated in the activity of a third, in the externalization of the concept.182
While Schelling’s notes to the Timaeus often raise more questions than they
answer with regards to this relationship between formal concepts, technical mediation,
and the world-soul as it exists in actuality, his next writings turn more directly to the
relationship between the originary forms of the absolute and their sensuous
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materialization. Schelling’s 1794 On the Possibility of a Form for Philosophy further
explores the medial relations between the Idea and its temporal, material manifestation,
while emphasizing the continued importance of post-Kantian philosophical themes for
many of the formal concerns that are often seen as endogenous to Romantic poetics.183
While not quite exhibiting the innovative panache and theoretical insight of the writings
Schelling will produce in subsequent years, On the Possibility of Form presents a helpful
presentation of the impasse inherent to Fichtean idealism that will lead Schelling away
from formal explorations of a metaphysical articulation of the absolute and back to living
appearance in nature and aesthetic activity. It is, of course, important not to overstate the
importance of Fichte’s transcendental philosophy on Schelling’s writings during this
time. However, it is also important to appreciate the ways in which this text does provide
an early commentary on Fichte, experimenting with a systematic distinction between
material form and formal form that he develops throughout his writings.184 No one
writing after Kant seems to have gone beyond Kant, on the one hand. But Fichte’s
Wissenschaftslehre raises the question of a necessary point of unification for theoretical
and practical philosophy, a mediating third that Kant was unable to provide in the
Critique of Judgment.185 It is this unavoidable third, however, that will lead Schelling
away from Fichte and towards the philosophy of nature.
Collapsing Technics into Mechanics? Schelling’s On the I
While the Kantian outlook on Platonic cosmology provided by Schelling in his
1794 notes on Timaeus present a revealing initial attempt to illustrate what a world soul
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without a demiurge might look like, it is not until the following year, while penning the
treatise On the I as Principle of Philosophy, that Schelling begins truly developing the
radical attitude towards nature and technical media such a new cosmology would require.
Written during Schelling’s final year as a student at the theological seminary in
Tübingen, On the I outlines what appears to be a Fichtean response to some of the most
pressing issues of late eighteenth century theoretical discourse. In a letter to Hegel written
while composing the essay, Schelling announced to his childhood friend that he was
working on a “counterpart [Gegenstück] to Spinoza’s Ethics,” in which the I reveals itself
as the one true substance and subject of philosophy.186 Just over a month later, this
phrasing would appear verbatim in the foreword that Schelling published for On the I.187
Turning again to the self-positing I of Fichte’s practical philosophy, On the I also takes
pains to separate its aims from that of Kant’s student and popularizer Carl Leonhard
Reinhold. While criticizing the one-sided empiricism of Reinhold’s reading of Kant, in
which the grounds for the unity of consciousness are provided by the faculty of
representation [Vorstellungsvermögen] by virtue of its mediating role of subsuming the
manifold of sense data under unified concepts of the understanding, Schelling argues that
is it solely through the I’s self-assertion as reflective consciousness that the unification of
ideas and their temporal, material appearance can be assured.188
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Despite his initial avowal of the self-positing I as put forward by Fichte in the
1794 Wissenschaftslehre, Schelling discovers over the course of writing On the I that the
formalist metaphysics of Fichte’s methodology results in the content of thought being
completely torn asunder from any concrete form of artistic, natural-scientific, and ethical
practice. It is only as a result of the formal unity of the subject’s consciousnesses, for
Fichte, that the human being can ever be led to posit itself practically in an act of selfcreation.189 While all knowledge must ultimately result from this self-positing, it remains
extremely unclear for Schelling exactly how this self-coherent absolute I would present
itself in a way that is non-contingent and unmired by appearance. As Schelling astutely
summarizes towards the end of On the I, the neurotic self-reflective consciousness of
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre is entirely cut off from the possibility of material expression.
The gap between ultimate metaphysical reality [Realität] and actuality [Wirklichkeit] can
only be traversed by the presentation [Darstellung] of finite entities.190 As Hegel would
put it in On the Difference Between Fichte’s and Schelling’s Systems of Philosophy,
Fichte provides a “mere subjective unification of subject and object” that leaves much to
be desired for Schelling.191 This unresolved metaphysical conflict between the idea and
its material appearance will necessitate the creation of a more creative, materialist
epistemology for Schelling in the coming years, what he calls a ‘new schema’ that is not
just transcendental and atemporal but is immanently accessible to finite subjects bound
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by the constraints of “temporal production.”192 The incessant “conflict between morality
and finite natural laws,” for Schelling,
can only be mediated by means of a new schema, namely, that of temporal
production, so that law, which is based on a requirement of Being,
becomes a requirement of Becoming.193
Like the khôra in Plato’s Timaeus, this new schema would mediate between being and
becoming, creating a new flexible understanding of the nomos. In the end, however, it is
not the atemporal absolute of self-positing identity that provides the foundational for
philosophical contact with the material world, Schelling realizes. It is the technical act of
complex organization, of the temporal production of “Hervorbringen in der Zeit,”
occurring via self-achieved intuition, that will provide this point of contact.
Over the course of writing On the I, Schelling begins to articulate more clearly the
limitations he sees in Fichte’s brand of transcendental idealism, particularly as these
limitations relate to what will become the driving concern of his writings in the coming
years: conjoining the material reality of natural and aesthetic production to the
metaphysical desire for coherence in the creative presentation of ideas. First and
foremost, On the I seeks to overcome the limits that had been placed by Kant on
metaphysical speculation, poetic activity, and natural knowledge as a result of the
categorical denial of the existence of things in themselves, of any entity “that is only
conceivable through itself, i.e. through its Being” alone.194 The articulation of such an
entity, of this particular “something” [etwas] that Schelling and other Idealist
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philosophers would call the Grund and then the Urgrund, would yield a theoretical
purview that precedes all metaphysical distinction between an Idea and its manifestation,
between beings and their appearance. It is vitally important for aesthetics, natural
philosophy, and politics that such a point of nondistinction be taken seriously, Schelling
believes. Without this originary moment of speculative disclosure, there can be no
meaningful production of poetic beauty, nor can there be any access granted to the hidden
mechanisms behind natural phenomena. Providing a unifying force for disparate modes
of philosophical enquiry, this speculative philosophy serves to undo the constraints of
what Hölderlin calls the “Kantian boundary” that severs empirical reality from Idealist
aims.195 This project thus puts Schelling’s project squarely in line with that of Novalis
and other Romantic readers of Kant during the years following the release of the third
Critique. While Kant’s critical philosophy proves helpful for delineating the boundaries
of philosophical enquiry in its various modes, Kant himself proves unable to ascribe any
reality to such a position beyond the subjective validity of a regulative ideal, an as if
statement that is only tentatively useful for knowledge.196
This does not mean that Schelling is completely departing from Kant, however.
As Schelling would explain fourteen years later in a reflection on his earlier essay written
in 1809, On the I presents an important “attempt[…] to show [darstellen] how the results
of critical philosophy return us to last principles of all knowledge.”197 Instead of
completely barring humans from the telos of ends, the clarity and definition of Kant’s
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critical method reveals the unexpected contours of an unforeseen ground, recruiting
metaphysics, aesthetics, and natural philosophy in the development of new speculative
practices. While “Kant gave the results,” it is “the premises” which “are still missing,”
for Schelling.198 While for Kant, the expression of a unifying perspective entails nothing
more than regression into dogmatism or a turn to utter mysticism, for Schelling,
achieving this “unity of willing and action” is as necessary and natural as “the mechanism
of the body and the unity of consciousness” is for the human.199 As the telos provided by
the Grund is neither completely real nor wholly ideal, its exploration in On the I presents
an initial attempt to articulate what Schelling will come to call the ‘band of forces’ in
later writings.200 Connecting the organic vitality of living beings with the mechanical
causality that determines their interactions with empirical reality, the Grund presents a
sense of natural purpose that is both wildly speculative and definitively material,
breathing further life back into the technics of nature after Kant.
The first place Schelling explores in his search for this third position, however, is
not in the organic forms of nature but in the higher-order function of human
consciousness that Fichte believes to be completely unmired by the contingencies of
matter. This Absolute I, on Fichte’s account, is also somehow unsullied by the
imperfections of perception and linguistic mediation. The I presents nothing less than a
vision of an “absolute in us, that will not be bound by any mere word of human
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language.”201 Throughout On the I, Schelling investigates two possible means of
accessing such a purified form of self-knowledge. The first and most obvious of these is
accessed through what Kant calls the intellectual intuition, a higher-order form of what
Schelling refers to as “self-achieved intuition” [selbsterrungenes Anschauen].202 Whereas
Kant vigorously denied the possibility of such forms of intuition, since intellectual
intuition bypasses the senses and leaves its products unconfirmable and noncommunicable for members of the sensus communis, Fichte had begun arguing in the first
installment of the Wissenschaftslehre that the only way to provide a stable starting point
for knowledge was in this “nonmediated consciousness, that I act.”203 In his description of
this possible unity for consciousness achieved through nothing more than the act of the
subject asserting its own capacity for self-reflection, however, Schelling begins casting
doubt on the ability of this transcendental method to establish meaningful relationship to
the world around it. In fact, the method of intellectual intuition proposed by Fichte does
little more than defer and deflect the motivating question of Kantian critique: “How are
synthetic a priori judgments possible = the question, how does the absolute I come to
depart from itself and to oppose a not-I” to itself, Schelling explains.204 Whereas Kant
leaves this ontological chasm intact, Fichte simply pretends it doesn’t exist: “for the
absolute I, there is no possibility, actuality and necessity.”205 As Fichtean reflective
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consciousness necessarily exists outside of all forms of modality and temporal constructs,
“what it posits, is fixed [bestimmt] through the mere form of its pure being.”206
From within the Kantian forms of modality, however, Schelling notices a second,
more fruitful possibility for overcoming the divide established between empirical and
transcendental modes of philosophical activity . Through the collapse of the modes of
possibility [Möglichkeit] and actuality [Wirklichkeit] into one another, Schelling sees the
contours of a naturalized method of speculation that is both scientifically viable and
philosophically vigorous, provided by what Kant refers to as the intuitive understanding
[intuitiver Verstand].207 While Kant, for his part, saw the intuitive understanding as
analogous to the false (because non-falsifiable) transcendental method of intellectual
intuition (since intuitive understanding bypasses the important distinction between what
is conceptually possible for thought and what is actual, that is, what is verifiable in and
through the senses), Schelling sees in the collapse of possibility into actuality the starting
point of a new methodology that would define his nature philosophy and aesthetics for
years to come. In collapsing possibility and actuality into a unified approach towards
sensuous production, a production which in effect combines the creative potentiality of
that which is possible with an unwavering commitment to material actuality, Schelling is
arguing for a quite radical revision of the technic of nature. Nature is not just defined by
the receptivity of forms. It is a dynamic theater of temporal, material production. Rather
than forcing judgment into a corner when deciding if the autotelic activity of biotic matter
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is verifiable and thereby actual, or if such perceived autopoietic spontaneity is not instead
just a projection of the observer’s felt possibility of subjective freedom, this new technic
seeks to actualize the possible through what Schelling dubs Hervorbringung in der
Zeit:208
a new question introduces itself: how the transcendental (defined through
Absolute causality) causality of the empirical I could be brought into
agreement [überinstimmen] with the natural causality of the same I?209
Any sort of post-Kantian agreement between natural observation and transcendental
speculation must show how the spontaneity of the I is reflected in the spontaneity of the
organism, as Schelling will describe in the coming years. The I is always already a player
onstage in the theater of nature, he realizes. The question of ends and the technic of
nature, however, also leads Schelling back to the question of the mechanism and its role
in co-determining the organic process:
And so the finite I should strive to bring about in the world, that which is
actual [wirklich] in infinity, and the highest vocation of the human is
this—to make the unity of ends into mechanism and mechanism into the
unity of ends.210
Mechanism, in effect, cannot be properly understood without asking the question of ends.
Yet this does not mean that we are embracing a view of nature as completely determined
by mechanistic forces. After all, it is the spontaneity of the I that has initially introduced
this division of organism and mechanism in the first place. It is this activity of
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spontaneous striving, we will see, that will lead Schelling to explore the synergistic ideal
of a Perpetuum mobile as the most radical product of this new stagecraft of nature, as it
was for Novalis. But for Schelling, the question of life and organic motion also poses the
question of the organization of the Idea and its fuller presentation beyond the divide
between practical and theoretical philosophy. In order to arrive at this more complete
expression, however, Schelling first must begin articulating the collapse of mechanics
into technics, providing grounds for the flexible understanding of nomos we have been
calling mechanology:
If there were mechanism or technic of nature for the infinite I, technic
would be mechanism for it and mechanism, technic, that is, both would
collapse in its absolute being.211
This collapse of technics and mechanics does not mean leaving the organic behind, but
spontaneously creating these concepts and overcoming unnecessary conceptual divisions
inherited from philosophers like Kant. The point is to bring technics and mechanics
together under a common aim: the production and exploration of the organism, which
elicits a strange reflection on the relationship between the machine and organization in
the World Soul.212
Mental Health Between Figure and Function: from the Ideas to the World Soul
Schelling’s first attempt at fleshing out the role this type of organic spontaneity
plays in the technical arrangement of the idea, which serves to show how the realist
sphere of the not-I, of mechanical causality, becomes attached to the self-revealing ends
of Kant’s ‘technics of nature,’ can be found in the 1797 Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature.
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The Ideas was written just a year after Schelling first met the poet Goethe, whose
profound and often overlooked reflections on Kant in his writings on morphology will
prove an enormous source of inspiration for Schelling’s subsequent work.213 The Ideas
presents for the first time a philosophy of nature that seeks to show how knowledge
might be arranged as a result of the schema of temporal production Schelling outlined in
On the I, the schema of immanent ‘Hervorbringung in der Zeit.’214 The professed aim of
this new methodology, which seeks to arrive at a point of non-distinction between
empirical knowledge and the transcendental ends of speculative philosophy, is to “let
natural science itself arise philosophically,“ as Schelling describes in the preface.215 A
true philosophy of nature cannot impose exogenous principles onto its object of study,
Schelling realizes. We must instead exorcise nature philosophy of these technocratic
impulses and heal our thinking of these metaphysical “mental illnesses.”216 Natural
observation should not seek to project the pathologies of metaphysics onto nature by
assuming the universe to be passive, compliant, and ready to conform itself to the
observer’s ends.217 Instead, philosophy itself must become organic, proceeding step by
step and unfolding “genetically.”218 Letting nature arise in this temporal fashion and
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recording the process of material unfolding, Schelling suggests, may teach speculative
philosophy a thing or two about itself and its aim of materializing the type of freedom
that remained unactualizable for Fichte’s “subjective synthesis of the I and not-I,” and for
Reinhold in his empirically motivated presentation of the Vorstellungsvermögen.219
Through the technique of the unobstructed recording of the Absolute in its temporal,
material manifestations, the Ideas hopes to articulate a “foundational science of natural
philosophy” which Schelling refers to, after Kant, as a dynamic system.220 The Ideas thus
follows closely on the heels of Kant’s methodology as laid out in in the 1780
Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Sciences. However, while Kant’s nature
philosophy proceeds schematically in its approach to material forms and their relation to
the table of categories, Schelling, on the other hand, makes clear that his method of
construction is intended to be a mental reconstruction that keeps sensuous experience in
the loop. Schelling thus aims to establish a dynamic equilibrium between speculation and
materiality:
Originally there is an absolute equilibrium of forces and consciousness in
the human. But one can abolish [aufheben] this equilibrium through
freedom, in order to reestablish it through freedom. And health rests only
in the equilibrium of forces.221
This dynamic interplay of the disruption and re-establishment of equilibrium for the
human becomes a model for thinking through the relationship between lawfulness and
spontaneity in natural systems, a type of metaequilibrium Schelling will articulate more
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fully in writings such as the World Soul and On the Essence of Human Freedom. For
now, it is important to appreciate the ways in which Schelling is already trying to mark
out a sphere of natural experience that surpasses the limits of causal determination and
mechanical laws:
as soon as we cross over into the realm of organic nature, every
mechanical connection between cause and effect ceases for us. Every
product exists for its own self, its existence is not dependent on any other
existence.222
While not yet fully embracing the Kantian logic of recursivity as a means of
understanding this realm of organic nature, which, in a strange plot twist for the
unfolding story of Romantic mechanology, will actually reintroduce the very possibility
of machinic activity in nature, Schelling here presents an understanding of life that is far
more complex and material, far less metaphysical, than that which we find in Kant or any
of his predecessors. Whereas life, for Kant, presents an undecidable antinomy for the
faculty of judgment, like the ineffable vis viva debated by Leibniz and Cartesian
philosophers a century earlier, for Schelling, life is simply a matter of heightened
complexity in the organization of matter: “life is to be found in mere organized matter,”
he writes in the World Soul.223 Bypassing metaphysical debate about the distinction
between biotic and biotic matter or the nature of what Mephistopheles calls that “special
sap of life” in Faust, Schelling reroutes the metaphysical tendencies of philosophical
approaches to natural knowledge into a conversation about philosophy’s own
pathological desire for unbridled freedom. What is at stake, more than anything else, is an
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analysis of how equilibrium is lost and re-established for the complex material
organizations we call organisms, and of thereby determining the relationship between
absolute and relative equilibrium in our determination of systemic health for nature and
the individual.224 It is here, at the conjuncture of metaequilibrious stability and dynamic
motion, we will see, that the question of the possibility of the perpetuum mobile is posed
at the culminating moment of Schelling’s nature philosophy. Right when the technic of
nature externalizes itself as a third, materializing the operationality of the synthetic
judgment a priori, the negentropic aims of romantic mechanology become clearly visible
once again. But the possibility of this new technique of nature is not fully outlined in the
Ideas. Instead, it is posed at the end of the essay as a project to be taken on in at some
point the future: “In the intuition itself there was a constant exchange and coming
together of opposing activity. This exchange was ended by spirit by returning to itself,
through its freedom, as it is.”225 But what does the actuality of material phenomena, the
ostensible stuff of the natural world, have to do with this constant possibility of spirit’s
return to itself and its own freedom in this dualism of polarity? How is this possible
without making forays into the material world?
The following year, in 1798, Schelling realizes that the presentation of nature
provided in the Ideas is too bogged down by concerns that are not endemic to natural life,
but are symptomatic of unnecessary metaphysical strictures and philosophical schemas.
“The schema of completion for any metaphysical system, be it even nature as a whole, or
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material bodies in particular, is the table of categories,” Kant insisted.226 The process of
healing from that pathology whose symptom appears as a product of the Kantian
boundary, Schelling admits, has only just begun. While the Ideas provides a productive
initial reflection on the role played by the technic of nature in smoothing over the tension
between the material determination of bodies and their manifest, spontaneous
purposiveness, Schelling discovers at the end of the Ideas that, if he wants to present an
understanding of nature that allows for both empirical reality and creative freedom, he
must shed once more a layer of Kantian clothing that had been obstructing his view of the
universe. In On the World Soul, Schelling makes another attempt at outlining a third
position that would unite realism and idealism, a philosophy of nature which functions
organically in its dynamic presentation of ideas and mechanically in its adherence to the
materiality of sensuous experience. From the very start, On the World Soul presents a
markedly less schematic (and less Kantian) presentation of natural science than Schelling
provided in the Ideas. As he writes in the introduction, this new system is to be
understood as a break from, not a continuation of, his previous essay. Parting from the
technocratic adherence to Kant’s table of categories in the organization of natural
phenomena, which Schelling had directly adapted from the Metaphysical Foundations in
the Ideas, On the World Soul seeks to purge philosophy more thoroughly of the
demiurgic impulses that haunted the Kantian formulation of the technics of nature. While
presenting a view of the cosmos as a functional perpetuum mobile, as Novalis will note in
his own remarks on the essay, Schelling’s World Soul highlights the undisturbed
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importance of technical mediation for natural philosophy’s stated goal of studying the
universe in its material modes of appearance. 227 Ostensibly a tract on the irreducible
organicity of nature philosophy, as countless commentators have described, On the World
Soul nevertheless outlines an experimental and speculative approach to nature that
achieves full expression in the electrical experiments of Martin Van Marum’s “friction
machines” and the dramaturgic “Theaterblitz” of the eighteenth-century theater.228 It is
technical media after all, which bring nature into the realm of appearance, Schelling
discovers.
What is perhaps most immediately pressing for our reading of the World Soul,
however, is that, from the very start, Schelling argues against any uncritically vitalist
views of organic activity. Despite appearances, Schelling’s On the World Soul is shot
through with a complex, often ambivalent attitude towards the quick and easy distinction
between biotic and abiotic matter that is often associated with his thinking, as
commentators such as Leif Weatherby and Yuk Hui have noted. The divide between
organic life and mechanical causality, in fact, is so troubling for Schelling that he argues
that, “as soon as our gaze elevates itself to the idea of Nature as a Whole, the opposition
between mechanism and organism […] disappears.”229 When we learn to approach nature
as a singular and complex system of organization, as Spinoza urged his readers to do in
the Ethics, we can finally overcome artificial distinctions between subject and object,
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organic and mechanical motion, those divisions which have hindered our understanding
of the natural world for far too long. This does not mean there is no difference at all
between living and non-living matter, however. For Schelling, the point is “not, where
there is no mechanism, lies the organism, but rather the opposite, where no organism is,
lies mechanism.”230 The seemingly transcendental spontaneity often attributed to organic
life arises as a rupture that is actually endemic to mechanical repetition. The organism is
a difference that is produced immanently from within the cosmic machine, rather than
transcendentally. As in Erwin Schroedinger’s famous explanation of life’s selforganizational capabilities, in which entropy is never wholly overcome but simply
restructured, Schelling’s understanding of the organism does not exist at odds with
mechanical determination.231 Organic life appears, rather, as its cosmic byproduct.
It is for this reason that, for Schelling, the antinomy between organic spontaneity
and mechanical determination must be resolved through a more basic unifying principle,
a principle which Schelling refers to as the World Soul, after the vision of Gaia explored
in the foundational mythology of Plato’s Timaeus.232 The challenge Schelling faces in
making this case for this unifying principle, which does not rely on the deus ex machina
of demiurgic cosmology but must provide grounds for its own appearance, is the
following: how might this third, this vanishing point at which the lines of mechanical and
organic thinking converge in the distance, be reflected back onto the natural observer, the
I of transcendental philosophy that finds itself cast to sea, unable to locate its position in
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the midst of all of the chaotic motion of becoming? In order to answer this question,
Schelling suggests that the world soul, far from being understood as a monolithic entity
such as the much-discussed Gaia of Lovelock in recent years, must be viewed as a
recursive organization with very particular mereological coordinates: “Organisation is
for me nothing other than the delayed form of cause and effect.”233 Organisation, in
effect, is nothing but the name Schelling gives to the negentropic complexity of Kant’s
logic of recursivity, the Wechselwirkung underwriting the natural philosophical approach
to life: “Only where nature has not inhibited [gehemmt] the current, does it flow forwards
(in a direct line). Where nature inhibits it, the current returns back to itself (in a circular
line).”234 Deferring what has been referred to as the “tragedy” of the absolute in
Schelling, which would present a vision of nature as necessarily entropic and fated to
decay, the world soul leverages confrontation with Hemmung as a means of selforganizing at ever higher levels of complexity.235 It uses the opportunity of Hemmung to
“spread out,” as Goethe will write in the opening lines of his poem dedicated to the
World Soul. And only here, at the point where we finally see nature as a singular
organization through the self-reflective activity of speculative philosophy, does the world
soul turn back on itself in order to draw a sphere. For it is once we return to this lowerlevel divide between organism and mechanism that we can understand the creation of
systemic spheres and their function. And the creation of spheres, for Schelling, is the key
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to unlocking all forms of natural individuation. Sphereology is the best way to explore
not why there is something rather than nothing, but rather, how there appears to be one
thing and many things all at once:
So the universal mechanism must be inhibited through to the infinite, and
there will be so many individual, singular worlds, as there are spheres,
within which the universal mechanism returns to itself, and so at the end of
the world there is—an Organization, and a universal Organism itself is the
condition (and thereby a positive) of the Mechanism.236
From within the universal mechanism, a plurality of spheres erupts. If we follow nature’s
repetitions long and hard enough, we will gain insight into the production of difference
initiated with the spontaneous eruption of the organic:
Every organization is a self-contained whole, in which everything is
simultaneous, and where the mechanical mode of explanation breaks
down, because in such a whole there can be no before and no after.237
All organization appears as a spheric construction, for Schelling, and an organic
explanation for the vital machine is what nature philosophy needs in order to return to
itself in a moment of self-reflection. Temporal production for Schelling thus presents a
profoundly forward-facing philosophy in a way that is often overlooked in favor of a
metaphysics of tragedy. Pushing back against entropic decline, Schelling’s nature looks
to maintain itself for posterity, as in the line from Seneca used by Schelling as an
epigraph to section two.238
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Here we must turn to the often overlooked and quixotic engagement with the
tentative distinction Schelling starts to employ between machine and organization. While
seeking to articulate a position from which to view nature that is not predetermined by
the overhasty distinction between organism and mechanism, Schelling’s World Soul
seeks to redistribute and remediate all forms of relationality between organic and nonorganic life through the higher-order division between the determinative functionality of
the machine and the figurative activity of ideal organization:
what actually first separates organization from the machine, in which the
function (the property) of each individual part is dependent on its figure, is
that in the organization the figure of each part, conversely, is dependent on
its property.239
The goal of nature philosophy now becomes simply this: how do we invent new ways of
redistributing forms of relationality between organism and mechanism by reflecting on
this dramatic tension between figurative organization and functional machinery? The
construction of spheres is an activity that can be clearly described as an organological
one, as Leif Weatherby has rightly noted.240 The question of individuation posed by
mechanology, however, has not yet been fully explored in Schelling. If there is a point of
nondistinction which leads to the construction of new spheres, like in the I and not I, how
do we understand the interplay of part and whole for nature? Is nature one, or is it many
spheres? Is it more properly understood in its function, or through the figurative activity
so often lauded by vitalists?
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Technics and Health, Evolution and Involution: the First Outline of 1799
After leading nature philosophy to a point of non-distinction between organism
and mechanism in the World Soul, it appears that Schelling was simply drawing our
attention to another insurmountable boundary, this one appearing between the
functionality of the machine and the figurative activity of organization in the cosmos.
Where and how does this gap come about within nature, or, for that matter, for
philosophy? How are we to overcome this new aporia in order to reconjoin realism and
idealism? While it is not until his discussion of the perpetuum mobile in the 1809 On the
Essence of Human Freedom, as we will see, that Schelling directly addresses this set of
concerns, it is important to account for the ways in which, over the next few years,
Schelling begins to take technical mediation more and more seriously as a mode of
activity capable of providing points of contact between the organization and the machine.
“To philosophize about nature,“ Schelling writes in the First Outline of a System of
Nature, is to “create [schaffen] nature”241 Released just one year after On the World Soul,
the First Outline presents a vision of the universe as a set of forces that are capable of
exceeding the bounds of all observable phenomena, while nevertheless referring back to
the figurative activity of Kantian Konstruktion.242 Moving beyond the hylomorphic
strictures of metaphysical thinking, the First Outline puts forward the radical premise that
nature, exceeding all human modes of interaction, simply provides the technical grounds
for its own appearance.243 As ecocritics have so often stressed in recent years, such
environmental explorations of Romanticism neither indulge in the Promethean
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aspirations of creation ex nihilo nor impose metaphysical forms onto a landscape seen as
empty and lying in wait for humans. Schelling’s unfolding technics of nature consists
rather in the production of what Eric Hörl has called the “technoecology of sense.”244
Combining speculation and observation, this mode of technical mediation consists in the
“reciprocal determination of receptivity and activity that is found in everything
organic.”245 Expounding on the non-anthropocentric purview of the World Soul, the First
Outline presents a vision of nature as an all-embracing (yet synthetic) organism.246 As a
product of the recursive motion of the category of relation, the organization of the world
soul presents itself as an ecological communality, grounds for an expanded sensus
communis of all living things upon which a new cosmo-polis might be constructed.
This does not mean, of course, that Schelling is indifferent to the specific makeup
of human beings or other organisms. Just as not all technologies (or ecologies) are
created identically, nature philosophy must attend to specific modes of individuation in
order to gain knowledge of the organization of the universe as a whole and in its parts.
While looking for a purview from which nature might be understood along the lines of
this recursive motion between parts and whole, Schelling aims in the First Outline to
highlight the long-term evolutionary processes at work in nature.247 It is for this reason
that we must study the specificities of organic life in all its appearances, since the whole
of the natural world “follows the same dynamic sequence of steps [dynamische
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Stufenfolge] as the organic.”248 Leading us beyond a view of the individual as a tool
[Werkzeug] that becomes subordinated to the machinic whole, the speculative
methodology presented by the First Outline already contains important intimations of the
aesthetic aims that will define Schelling’s philosophical writings in the coming years. It is
“the possibility of the representation [Darstellung] of the infinite in the finite” that “is the
highest problem of all science.”249 Only in the “absolute activity” of creative speculation
does the “infinite product” make itself (re)presentable.”250
Health and dynamic equilibrium, of course, are key to this process, calling forth
an interplay of part and whole that forces us to consider the evolutionary boundaries of
organology. Leading us beyond the tool (which establishes a merely causal and mimetic
relation between part and whole), the First Outline presents a renewed investigation of
the organizational machine that is the ultimate product of mechanology’s development.
We must remember here that, in discussing the product, we are no longer discussing just
the figuration of (self)-organization, but the functional output of the machine. The
straight line must become gehemmt in order to figure at a higher (more complex) level,
producing a sphere: “if nature is absolute activity, so must this activity appear inhibited
into infinity.”251 A dialectics of recursive motion between the organization and machine is
the only way to provide a philosophy of nature that is actual in its appearance and
speculative in its approach to figurative possibility. “When in organic nature only the
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general organism self-contracts, as it were, so must at least the analogy of the entirety of
nature appear in all organic forces.”252 This technique of analogy, in fact, will be born out
in the entirety of nature in the valediction of Schelling’s natural philosophical project, the
1809 Freedom Essay.
For now, an important question remains, one which cuts to the core of the
recursive interrelation between organization and machine: what exactly are we to make of
individuation, the material field whereupon function and figuration first seem to
bifurcate? Is individuation itself anything more than illusory appearance? If individuation
is to be understood as more than a fleeting illusion, how does this figurative activity
relate to nature as a whole? Schelling poses this question and seeks to answer it,
predictably, in the language of ‘dynamic organization’ he assumes from Franz Baader. As
a symptom of both dynamic activity and disequilibrious instability, the individual, for
Schelling, appears as a strange byproduct of the whole, the origins of which we must now
trace. At the end of the First Outline, Schelling writes, “the dynamic organization of the
universe is deduced” at this point, “but not its framework [Gerüste]” proper. Such an
“organization supposes an evolution of the universe out of a unified originary process.”
We must now make sense of nature as a spontaneous whole, on the one hand, but also its
presentation of “disintegration […] into ever new products.“253 Individuation, like
philosophy, seems to tend inevitably towards sickness and pathology. Now the individual
must be brought back to health:
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It was assumed that nature is the development from one originary
involution. This involution however […] can be nothing real, it can only
be imagined as an Act, an absolute synthesis, which is only ideal, and
marks the turning point of both transcendental philosophy and nature
philosophy at once.254
Freedom through technē: Schelling’s 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism
In his next major work, the 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism, Schelling
returns to the aesthetic and epistemological concerns he had begun exploring in earlier
writings such as the Timaeus notes and On the I. Hoping to show how the immanent
organizational capacity of nature is reflected in what he begins to call the “mechanism of
the I,” the System presents the summary presentation of the recursive loop between
function and figuration that defines Schelling’s views on material individuation.255 In the
System, a treatise which is often viewed as the culmination of Schelling’s efforts to
present a coherent philosophical system accounting for both mechanical determination
and spontaneous freedom, Schelling doubles down on his efforts to explain individuating
consciousness along purely organic lines. Insisting that the organism arises as a sort of
rupture from within determinative causality, philosophy itself presents a “free imitation”
of the mechanical in the System.256 The organic arises as a mode of thought from the “free
repetition of the original series of actions,” Schelling writes, a series “in which the one
act of self-consciousness evolves.”257 Through this notion of free repetition, in which we
begin to see the payoff of Schelling’s incessant engagement with Kantian epistemology,
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the technic of nature externalizes itself, taking on the form of a technical externality that
appears as both “monument and document at once.” Despite the inadequacy of Kant’s
metaphysics of nature, it is the rigid architecture of the understanding that bears organic
fruit in and through such ‘free repetition’ of the I’s mechanism. Only with the production
of a third, a technical mediation between organism and mechanism, can Schelling present
a harmonious “coexistence of mechanism with purposiveness in nature.”258 Between
figuration and function, the I posits itself as unity, only to refract back upon itself the
movement of the whole of nature.
As a result of this spheric activity, it is aesthetics that serves as the third between
organism and mechanism for the System, materializing the technical activity required to
overcome the Kantian boundary. Presenting an a priori set of conditions for the ways in
which Idealist philosophy’s exploration of apperceptive epistemic structures may provide
knowledge of the determining conditions of sense experience, Schelling’s individuated
“mechanism of the I” becomes the bedrock for experimenting with the possibility of
reciprocal relations between the autopoetic activity of organization and the functional
determinacy of the machine.259 Such recursive Wechselwirkung, however, requires the I
to continue taking the object-causality of sense perception seriously. In a reference to
Kant’s “Ideas for a Universal History,” Schelling writes, the temporal unfolding of
succession is a necessary movement in order establish and reestablish dynamic health:
The deduction of history leads to the evidence, that that which we are to
see as the ultimate ground of harmony between subject and object of
action must be thought of as an absolute Identity, which, when imagined
as a substantial or personal entity, would not be better than positing a mere
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abstraction, an opinion which could only be imposed on idealism through
the gravest misunderstanding.260
Establishing harmony between subject and object, in effect, requires moving beyond both
blind individuation and abstraction, since neither are adequate mediators between the real
and the ideal. This new movement between part and whole, Schelling writes, is
established through the balancing act of mechanological activity, as the techne of the
third is externalized in the lever:261
All matter is the mere expression of a balance of opposing activities,
which mutually reduce each other to a mere substrate of activity. (Think of
the lever, both weights act only on the hypomochlion, which is therefore
the common substrate of their activity. Moreover, this substrate does not
arise voluntarily through free production, but completely involuntarily, by
means of a third activity, which is as necessary as the identity of selfconsciousness.262
Equilibrium and Schelling’s Perpetuum mobile in 1802/1809
The goal of collapsing mechanics into the teleological considerations of organic
thinking in Schelling’s nature philosophy, we have seen, has led to the appraisal of
technical media as grounds for the recursive motion linking organization to the machine,
providing hope for the establishment of new relations between figure and function
through the expressive freedom of aesthetic activity. While the 1800 System proves by
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and large to be the valediction of Schelling’s attempts to combine speculative
metaphysics with the concreteness and materiality of natural knowledge, there
nonetheless remain two texts in his oeuvre that continue this strand of thinking which we
have been calling mechanological. Although Schelling was initially hesitant to embrace
the “vital mechanism” that Kielmeyer saw in On the World Soul, he returns two times to
the stated aim of romantic mechanology, as outlined by Novalis, a vision of nature as a
functional, negentropic perpetuum mobile. In two texts from 1802 and 1809, both written
after he had ostensibly left nature philosophy behind, Schelling turns directly to the aim
of exploring a perpetuum mobile.
The first of these texts consists of an often overlooked fragment dating from 1802
called the “Fragment of a Treatise,” a manuscript which was first made available more
than two hundred years after Schelling initially sketched it.263 Bearing unmistakable signs
of the “identity philosophy” that is seen to define Schelling’s work during this period,
wherein the three-act dramaturgical structure of technical activity proposed by the nature
philosophy ends up staging the absolute as an unattainable object, the 1802 “Fragment of
a Treatise” presents a further symptom of the pathology identified in the Ideas which
separates subject and object.264 Despite its melancholic, tragic prose, however, the
“Fragment of a Treatise” also begins revealing the ultimate endgame of Schelling’s
method of ‘temporal production’ between machine and organization. The “Fragment of a
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Treatise” presents the absolute as a restless, vital machine: “an in itself indescribable
essence, since it never stands still, is only ever there in motion. Where you want to grab
the wheel, in order to bring it to a halt, you will just disturb it.”265 The natural world
presents the paradoxical “eternal drifting and tossing about, (perpetuum mobile) in which
eternal freedom is enclosed.”266 Through their disequilibrious motion, the spheres of
nature are drawn and redrawn, framing and reframing the I and the World Soul, as
cosmograms of themselves and of each other.
Seven years later, in the 1809 treatise Philosophical Investigations into the
Essence of Human Freedom, Schelling sets out to explore the dynamic equilibrium
presented by the ‘band of forces’ one last time. Only now, the perpetuum mobile presents
the possibility of negentropic complexity as the organizing principle of all of nature (and
in its expression, as philosophy). Despite his professed aims of discussing the
metaphysics of human freedom and its relation to evil, Schelling takes pain to articulate
how seemingly theological problems concerning the origins of evil (as a necessary
byproduct of individuation) are in fact symptomatic of philosophy’s refusal to take
seriously the alterity of the natural world: “Since its very beginning (in Descartes), all of
modern European philosophy has been prone to this common error, that nature is not
available to it, and it is not seen in its living ground.”267 Without nature being available,
or vorhanden, we can neither know the universe nor engage with it in its irreducible
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technoecological complexity. So how does the sphere of the individual link up to the
World Soul, Schelling asks? Directly by establishing the harmonious “band of forces,”
which constitute life. In effect, individuation is not merely appearance. Its spontaneity
constitutes the defining motion of Romantic nature philosophy and poetics: “the band of
forces constituting life could, according to their nature, just as well be insoluble […],
destined to be a perpetuum mobile.”268 Negentropy consists in the technical ordering of
life, as Schroedinger will explain with reference to both Spinoza’s materialism and the
vitality of Goethe’s poetics. The play of the one and the many is always an exercise in the
theater of technics, Schelling realizes. The world soul is always a cosmogram of itself,
and of its subject-observer.269

268

SW I, 17: 377: “das Band der Kräfte, welche das Leben ausmachen, könnte seiner Natur nach
ebensowohl unauflöslich sein, und wenn irgend etwas, scheint ein Geschöpf, welches das fehlerhaft
Gewordene in sich durch eigne Kräfte wieder ergänzt, dazu bestimmt, ein Perpetuum mobile zu sein.”
269
Tresch, “Technological World-Pictures.”

91

4. Being as Poesis: Hölderlin’s Paratactic Ecology
In the first two chapters, we have explored the ways in which the perpetuum
mobile appears as an organizing principle for the project of romantic mechanology in
writings by Novalis and Schelling. Wavering between an ecstatic, utopian attitude
towards the organizational complexity of technical media and careful concern for the
ways in which such media help account for the alterity and complexity of the natural
world, the call to create a perpetuum mobile expresses the utmost desire for a material
manifestation of Kant’s mode of reciprocity in Romanticism. This mode of reciprocity, or
Wechselwirkung, underwrites both organic complexity and political community in
Kantian philosophy, as we have seen.270 Through the development of a radicalized
version of reciprocity, Romantic writers create for themselves a new set of speculative
tools for describing the evolving modes of interaction between natural knowledge, poetic
inspiration, and political ecology at the turn of the nineteenth century. Understanding the
strange call to both “live from and create” a perpetuum mobile, as Novalis succinctly puts
it in an entry to his Notes for a Romantic Encyclopedia, becomes crucial for appreciating
the ways in which technical media become capable of producing, destabilizing, and
restabilizing relations between humans and the natural environment around this time.271
This exploration of both the ecological limits and the emancipatory potential of technical
media serves as one of the defining aims of mechanology. We have seen this project of
mechanology unfold along the evolutionary lines traced by Gilbert Simondon, whose

270
271

See CJ §8, 216 and lectures 12 and 13 of Arendt’s Das Urteilen, 106-20.
NS III, 296: Nr. 314.

92

overlooked analysis of the importance of technical objects for Romantic literature has
served as a starting point for our undertaking.272 Over the course of Schelling’s nature
philosophy, the perpetuum mobile comes to assume the form of a speculative conduit
between the subject and the universe as a whole. It is not just the singular existence of a
species or a particular ecosystem that is at stake. Indeed, speculation regarding perpetual
motion is meant to circumvent any lower-order distinction nature philosophy might try to
make between organic spontaneity and mechanical determination. The perpetuum mobile
presents the possibility of a new mode of energetic exchange used to explain how the
mysterious ‘band of forces’ constituting life might relate to the universe at large, a
universe which, when taken as a whole, appears eerily indifferent to the plot of finite
(that is, organic) individuated beings.273 The philosophical and poetic project of
mechanology, however, aims to link such stoic speculation about the indifference of the
universe towards the organic back up to the earthly political and ethical demands placed
upon philosophy by the confrontation with life in its many concrete forms. While the
organicity of a particular set of individuals is never assumed in the form of a
metaphysical judgment—indeed life is anything but a stable state, Schelling and the
natural sciences remind us—the continued existence of the World Soul will nevertheless
depend on the ability to reintegrate the physical (and theological) waste of Abfall back
into the recursive operation of spheric systems and their construction.274
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Romantic metaphysics needs biota in order to be initiated. But even more so,
Romantic metaphysics needs the metabolic properties of technical media in order to
move beyond a vision of life that can be reducible to any one preconceived form.275 For
Schelling, this metabolic function of the perpetuum mobile is assumed, rather than
illustrated. His writings nevertheless make it clear that the reintegration of waste into a
technically mediated cosmic system remains a key problem for mechanology, one that
needs to be solved in order for romantics to fully overcome the divide placed by the
Kantian boundary between organic and mechanical modes of poetry and thought. In this
next chapter, we will turn more directly to the role played by waste and its relation to the
unfolding system of mechanology, focusing on Hölderlin, whose work provides
monumental contributions to this political and ecological project. While Hölderlin never
directly invokes the possibility of constructing a perpetuum mobile, his writings elucidate
several key aspects of the central relationship between technical media and political
ecology we have been exploring. For Hölderlin, as it was for Novalis, the uncritical
espousal of the organic as a model for thought is a nonstarter. As scholars such as Rainer
Nägele have noted, Hölderlin’s rather quixotic embrace of what the Greeks called
mechané presents a wholesale refusal of the distinction between organic and nonorganic
categories of thought.276 While rejecting a vitalist attitude towards poetic creation,
Hölderlin espouses the production and exploration of alternative modes of poetry he dubs
inorganic, disorganic, and aorgic throughout his writings.277 Irreducible to both organic
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spontaneity and mechanical determination, this series of conceptual innovations we find
in Hölderlin’s work serves to uncover a contingent and symbiotic interrelationship
between humans, nature, and technics. For Hölderlin, this symbiosis is tasked with
keeping the integrity of singular terms intact, while also revealing new dimensions of the
whole of nature through a synthesis that is intuited rather than signified. This preferred
type of thinking can be understood, with Theodor Adorno, as paratactic rather than
dialectic. Within and throughout the incessant production and integration of new
concepts, we find a dynamic mode of encounter with the natural world that stages a
radical recuperative potential for technical media in Hölderlin’s writings.
Gleaning the aorgic: Hölderlin’s Rivers and the Mechané of Poetry
The privileged location for an energetic exchange between the environmental
khôra and the expansive polis, for Hölderlin, is the river, whose praises are sung
throughout his poems and essays.278 “It is here that we want to build,” Hölderlin writes in
“The Ister,” a hymn devoted to one of Europe’s most important waterways, “because
streams make arable / the land.”279 As the site upon which human history begins to
assume the geological contours associated with the Anthropocene, rivers like the Danube
discussed in this poem serve as crucial points of mediation between ecological processes
and the accelerating pace of cultural and technological production Goethe will later
diagnose as veloziferisch. Just as the ever-evolving subject of Schelling’s World Soul
comes to acquire the status of a geological force while reflecting on itself as a technic of
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nature, Hölderlin’s rivers point to a deeply-rooted Romantic desire to understand how the
investigation of technical media might help produce newer and more stable relations
between humans and environment.280 For Hölderlin, we will see, the geological assumed
by humans during the Anthropocene is articulated as a sort of poetic gleaning of the
natural, which Hölderlin illustrates in the poem “Remembrance” [“Andenken”]. “It is the
sea / That takes and gives remembrance,” Hölderlin writes, suggesting that the archival
capacity and mnemonic function of the written word does not suggest anything singular
about poetry.281 Bodies of water also leave records of events which constitute the archives
of natural history. What is singular about poetry, for Hölderlin, is its capacity to glean the
aorgic remains from these shores: “And love no less keeps eyes attentively fixed / But
what is lasting is formed by the poets.”282 It is the ability of technical media such as the
written word to move speculatively towards the future that lies at the core of Hölderlin’s
thinking. Even his writings on tragedy, we will see, are composed with an eye towards
catastrophic possibilities endemic to the present.
To begin grasping these central features of Hölderlin’s ontopoetics, let us first
examine how the river takes the form of a complex palimpsest of cultural and geographic
properties, collapsing previously constructed boundaries between human and natural
history. In “The Ister,” Hölderlin describes the Danube as “appearing almost / to move
backwards” due to its unusual flow eastward, from the Black Forest in Central Europe to
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the Black Sea at the edge of the continent.283 “I mean,” the poem continues, “it must
come / From the east. / There would be / Much could be said about this.”284 Baffled by
the river’s ability to subvert the expected direction of flow, Hölderlin adds, “Not for
nothing rivers flow / Through dry land. But how?”285 How would such a body of water
maintain a symbiotic relationship to the landscape through which it so violently carves an
unexpected path? How does the riverbed’s activity maintain a dynamic equilibrium such
that every bit of waste is reintegrated back into the ecosystem? It seems nothing here
occurs without reason, no motion is umsonst. And yet, “[a] sign is needed,” the poem
adds, pointing towards a need for semiotic mediation in poetic reflections on natural
motion. 286 This need for mediation, however, is not to be confused with the colonizing
force of anthropocentric forms of reason. “The Ister” does not seek to illustrate the
subsumption of the natural world to human systems of knowledge. Rather than relying on
these unidirectional flows between observer and observed nature, Hölderlin seeks to
provide an awareness of the ways in which rivers can subvert human attempts to colonize
the earth: “But the rock needs incisions / And the earth needs furrows, / Would be
desolate else, unabiding” reads the antepenultimate line, before the poem concludes, “Yet
what that one does, the river, / Nobody knows.”287 Transcendent and mysterious, the
river’s flow cannot be reduced to a priori forms of aesthesis or grasped with a priori
forms of judgments. No matter how developed systems of thought might become, they
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are ultimately inadequate for achieving a real understanding of natural activity.
Acknowledging that the river cannot be subsumed to any of these processes, Hölderlin
ascribes to the river the creative capacities of a Fichtean Tat.
The cultural production of poetry, meanwhile, is always already a sort of
agriculture requiring a material substrate, a Grund Hölderlin locates in a variety of
ecological processes. The rivers found throughout Hölderlin’s poems become cognized
by human subjects only indirectly and from oblique angles, a feature of his writings that
has long puzzled many commentators.288 This relationship between humans and nature in
Hölderlin’s poetics might be properly understood as a form of “parataxis” or
“aconceptual synthesis,” as Theodor Adorno recommends.289 Comparing Hölderlin’s
poems to Beethoven’s late works, wherein contrapuntal resolution is often expected for
the listener but almost always deferred, Adorno writes that the “prototype for Hölderlin’s
late poetry” is the “aconceptual synthesis” one finds in “great music” such as
Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony.290 This vision of natural life presents “an abandoned,
flowing nature that transcends itself precisely through having escaped from the spell of
the domination of nature.”291
The river, for Hölderlin, comes to assume a new form of ecological agency,
hinting at a mode of autotelic motion in nature that refuses any a priori distinction
between mechanism and teleology in natural philosophy. At this point, we can begin
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appreciating the centrality of the river for the broader ontopoetic aim of overcoming the
Kantian boundary, the artificial divide Kant created between the rigid architecture of the
understanding and the manifold forms of sense experience available to the subject. In the
third Critique, Kant himself makes the river a privileged site for discussing a perceived
tension between autotelic organisms and mechanistic forces in nature. The flow of a
river, Kant explains in the Critique of Judgment, exemplifies the ways in which nature
can deceive human observers into thinking there are teleological forces at work in
phenomena which ultimately possess no such self-determining agency.292 These natural
phenomena are not ends-in-themselves, even if they do appear free and spontaneous.
Rivers serve as a useful illustration of how “extrinsic purposiveness of natural things”
provides no proof of “the principle of final causes. […],” the telos that ultimately
underwrites the Kantian technic of nature.”293 Kant explains:
For although these features of the earth's surface were very necessary, in
order that the vegetable and animal kingdoms could arise and be sustained,
[…] still there is nothing about these features that forces us to assume a
causality in terms of purposes so as to account for their possibility.294
The river, in effect, is pure mechanism without teleology. Although the river’s flows
might seem to promote organic growth in many ways, its own movements are wholly
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shaped by exogenous mechanistic causalities. While in the preceding section, the
“Dialectic of Teleological Judgment,” Kant hopes to show some degree of overlap
between organism and mechanism by combining regulative and reflective modes of
judgments, these new forms of judgments possess only the tentative validity of as if
statements.295 While this point of criticism is taken up by Hölderlin directly in the
fragment “Being and Judgment,” which we will discuss in the next section, for now, it is
sufficient to say that Hölderlin, unlike Kant, is dissatisfied with the ways in which
philosophy attempts to use the organism as a screen upon which to project reason’s own
perceived agency, to the exclusion of appreciating the complexity of other phenomena.
As Martin Heidegger would summarize one and a half centuries later, such an uncritical
adherence to an organic ideology presents nothing more than early signs of a
“mechanistic-technological ‘triumph’ of modernity over the domain of growth.”296 If
nature “transcends itself” in the river, as Adorno puts it, philosophies of nature must
overcome the divide put in place between biotic and abiotic matter in order to properly
understand its flows.297
In order to appreciate how this ‘aconceptual synthesis’ functions for Hölderlin, we
must look more fully to how the river subverts this growing tension between organic
spontaneity and mechanical determination experienced at the end of the eighteenth
century, a tension which had found its fullest expression in Kant’s “Critique of
Teleological Judgment.” Of course, Hölderlin’s embrace of what he calls the aorgic and
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disorganic suggests a much more complicated view of the natural world, one that does
not give epistemic priority to organic growth in any way. Rainer Nägele has gone so far
as to suggest that a certain type of mechanical repetition is a precondition for poetics
more generally, according to Hölderlin. Mechané, for Hölderlin, “is the machine of
phenomenalization,“ Nägele explains “and the theatrical machine is in a certain sense the
model of presentation per se.“298 Poetry presents a form of what the Greeks called
mechané (μηχανη), which Hölderlin likens to a “lawlike calculation.”299 It is one of
numerous “other modes of operation, through which the beautiful is brought forth,”
modes which subvert the spontaneous interiority of organic models of poetry and human
self-understanding.300 Hölderlin devotes numerous passages to explaining how this
embrace of mechané might help bring the lofty, transcendental attitude often assumed by
poetry back down to earth. Contributing to what Nägele refers to as a wholesale ‘Critique
of Poetic Reason,’ Hölderlin writes in his “Comments on Sophocles” that this “law of
calculation” seeks to describe “how the human, as a sensing system […] develops itself
under the influence” of disparate elements in a long series.”301 Rather than being
produced as fully autonomous functions, human modes of aesthesis “always proceed
according to a secure rule,” finding more “equilibrium in the tragic than in pure
succession.”302 Unseating the primacy of the organic, the repetitive force of mechané
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presents the opportunity for a new sort of Wechselwirkung to establish itself as a flexible
series, overcoming the sharp divide between a rule-bound technics and “pure
succession.”303
Articulating a form of flexible reciprocity that can be found in the mechanical
series comprises one of Hölderlin’s foremost contributions to Romantic mechanology. In
this way, Hölderlin hopes to link politics with a new sort of ecological thinking, creating
a sensus communis that is no longer tied to anthropocentric forms of reason, an ambition
which ecocritics such as Kate Rigby have recently identified with Romanticism.304 The
mnemonic and self-creating operations of nature provide one example of this project, as
bodies of water such as the river assume a force that is both technical and geological, as
Burckhardt Wolf has stressed.305 But how does Hölderlin deal with the ethical questions
introduced with the presence of living beings, beings which, despite their lack of
metaphysical priority per se, are of foremost concern for mechanology when it seeks to
outline a political ecology? How does Hölderlin deal with the question of biological life,
and of what makes life move?
In a commentary from his late “Pindar Odes” project, the river appears as the very
site upon which these questions are both posed and answered. While rivers themselves
are inorganic, these bodies of water make way for organisms while also occurring prior
to, and even as a condition of, diverse conceptions of life. In a recent essay, Rochelle
Tobias explains:
Hölderlin’s […] commentary culminates in the paradox that rivers are
determined to be a determining force; they are shaped to shape the earth.
303
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Their form and tempo come from the land they are charged with engraving
in a circular process. Thanks to this circle, however, they also make the
earth legible for the first time as a living organism instead of a blank slate,
die ewig lebende ungeschriebene Wildniß.306
While creating the conditions of life, the river is not exactly life itself. Neither wholly
organic nor whole inorganic, the ‘eternally living unwritten wilderness’ presented by the
river suggests a striking alternative to the organic/mechanical divide as it was found in
Kant. This central feature of Hölderlin’s thinking on rivers is made especially clear in the
ninth and final of the “Pindar Odes.” Not only is this piece titled “Das Belebende,” that
which animates or gives life, the text deals with one of the very first uses of the
automaton concept in ancient Greek, commentators have pointed out.307 The automaton
represents the energetic motion of drunken centaurs, and Hölderlin’s translation and
commentary of Pindar’s 166th Ode tells the story of the centaurs crashing the wedding
feast of Pirithous in a wild bacchanalian display.308 Not only were the centaurs described
by Pindar as originary automata, however, they are also some of the earliest “teachers of
the natural sciences,” as Hölderlin’s commentary describes:
Its image is […] in places within nature where the shore is rich in rocks
and grottoes, especially in places where originally the river had to leave
the chain of mountains in order to tear through the land in their course.
Centaurs are also therefore originally teachers of natural science, because
it is from that point of view which nature can best be viewed.309
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In addition to veiled references to early thinking about technical media and their relation
to myth, the ninth and final of Hölderlin’s “Pindar Odes” makes a reference to the
punishment endured by Prometheus for introducing technics to humans. Towards the end
of the ode, we see a connection established between rivers and the learned centaur
Chiron, whose life is exchanged for the god Prometheus, according to Aeschylus.310 “The
songs of Ossian in particular are true songs of the Centaur,” Hölderlin’s commentary
concludes.311 They are “sung with the spirit of the river, and are like the Greek Chiron,
who also taught Achilles to play strings.”312 Chiron is celebrated by Hölderlin not only as
a centaur whose river-like spirit leads to true nature philosophy, but also as a noble hero
who exchanged his immortality for the life of the eternally damned Prometheus. The
introduction of technics by this Titan, whose spirit serves as a “prox[y] of the aorgic” in
Hölderlin, enters into a complex system of Wechselwirkung with the river.313
Poesis at the Kantian Boundary: “Being and Judgment” and the “Thalia Fragment”
The Fichtean Tat ascribed to the river in the poem “The Ister,” we have seen,
requires a wholescale reconsideration of several aspects of the reception of Kantian
aesthetics and nature philosophy in Hölderlin. As was the case in our investigation of
both Novalis and Schelling, understanding Hölderlin’s reaction to Kant requires moving
carefully through the theory of judgment and making our way out to the other side. For
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Hölderlin, as it was for Schelling and Novalis, part of the problem with Kant’s theory of
judgment is the mere tentative validity Kant ascribes to the teleological aspects associated
with the technic of nature, which essentially leaves no way of determining whether
organic spontaneity is a mere projection of human freedom by reason or if it presents an
actual product of a self-determining external agent. In order to appreciate the ways in
which Hölderlin’s ontopoetic considerations of the river aim to move beyond the
boundary Kant puts in place between intrinsic and extrinsic purposiveness in our relation
to nature, it will prove useful to turn directly to Hölderlin’s own reactions to Kant’s
theory of judgment. These reactions can be gleaned from many of Hölderlin’s theoretical
writings dating from the first half of the 1790s. In numerous fragments and letters, such
as “Being and Judgment,” the “Thalia Fragment,” and the now-famous letter to Christian
Neuffer, in which Hölderlin discusses his aim of overcoming what he coins the ‘Kantian
Boundary,’ we see Hölderlin laying the groundwork for the metabolic exchange between
polis and khôra that will be staged by a new material form of recursivity organized
around the concept of Energie.314
The goal of exploring the negentropic potential of a perpetuum mobile which can
retool human relations to the environment is staged once more for Romanticism as a sort
of reciprocal exchange that undermines the traditional distinction between physis and
nomos. As we have seen time and again, the Romantic effort to overcome the strictures of
Kant’s vision for a fixed, a priori architecture of the understanding is paradigmatic for
much of early Romantic philosophy and poetry. Not just in Hölderlin, but in a wide
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number of Romantic writings from the end of the eighteenth century, we see the
speculative ambitions of Romantic mechanology expressed in the desire to experiment
with new forms such as the fragment, which is deemed capable of producing unforeseen
relations between part and whole for members of a post-Kantian sensus communis. In
order to retool the mode of reciprocity, the category whose function it is to mediate
between part and whole for the community of knowers as well as explain the complex
organization of organic entities, Novalis suggested searching for an a priori technics that
would provide a material point of externality for concepts of the understanding.315 Rather
than remaining transcendent and fixed, concepts themselves must participate in these
complex modes of exchange between humans and the lifeworld. Schelling’s vision of
conjoining mechanics to technics in On the I and in his notes to Plato’s Timaeus has
pointed to the need for a more functional apparatus of exchange between ideal concepts
and the contingent reality of the world as it is experienced for knowers.316 For Hölderlin,
the apparatus of exchange between forms of thought and the content of experience is
given a deceptively simple name: poesis. The process of technical making, for Hölderlin,
highlights the importance of technical mediation in the energetic exchange between
humans and nature, an exchange through which being becomes bound to modes of
material making.
One of Hölderlin’s earliest and most significant encounters with Kant’s theory of
judgment can be found in a now-famous letter to his friend Christian Neuffer. Dated
November 10, 1794, the letter states that Hölderlin has begun working on an essay
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concerning “aesthetic ideas” in the tradition of Schiller’s 1792 treatise On Grace and
Dignity.317 In this essay, Schiller argues that it is the free play of beauty which provides a
point of mediation between human freedom and the determining force of natural law: “if
the human were merely a sensuous creature, nature would both give laws and determine
how they are applied,” he writes.318 When we consider such free play of beauty, Schiller
continues, nature comes to “share dominion with freedom, and although her law endures,
it is spirit from now on which decides each case.”319 Nature and human freedom, on this
view, would enter a sort of power-sharing agreement, where any dispute between physis
and nomos would be somehow resolved by a mysterious force Schiller simply refers to as
‘spirit.’ While full of praise for this initial attempt to overcome the Kluft between sense
experience and the understanding, Hölderlin suggests that Schiller’s proposal of a free
play of beauty, a proposal which foreshadows the later development of the Spieltrieb in
the Aesthetic Education of Man, ultimately falls short of accomplishing what Schiller sets
out to achieve. On Grace and Dignity, in Hölderlin’s view, “wagered one step fewer over
the Kantian boundary than he should have,” he explains to Neuffer.320 While hinting at
the possibility that a point of contact may yet exist which allows for meaningful exchange
between aesthetics, politics, and nature knowledge, Hölderlin seems dissatisfied with
Schiller’s reliance on the deus ex machina of ‘spirit’ and the spontaneous play of
freedom, a concept of play that open up more questions than it could possibly answer.
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Hölderlin, at the time he writes to Neuffer, is working on a piece that directly
addresses this complex set of issues. While it is difficult to discern exactly which piece of
writing Hölderlin may be referring to in his letter, “Being and Judgment” is often
assumed to represent Hölderlin’s own initial attempt at overcoming the “Kantian
Boundary.”321 In two dense paragraphs, “Being and Judgment” describes the crucial
opposition between unmediated “Being,” which presumably lies beyond the realm of
human cognition, and the faculty of judgment, which necessarily forecloses access to the
ontological realm of unadulterated Being for philosophy. Whether the product of
Fichtean intellectual intuition or Spinoza’s famous ‘third kind of knowledge,’ any claims
to knowledge regarding this realm of Being, according to Kant, must be arrived at the
through the operations of reflexive judgment. Any experience of ‘Being’ is always
already mediated by judgment. Even reflexive judgment, which provides systemic
coherence to ideas through a series of algorithmic loops for consciousness, subsuming
ever greater sets of experience under its singular law, never provides a wholescale
unification of thought. Claims to such a unification essentially do not fully appreciate the
mediating role played by judgment, Kant explains time and again throughout the three
Critiques. Although unificatory coherence can be posited as a regulatory ideal for guiding
ethical or political action in an individual case, such coherence will never constitute a
stable transcendental state for the subject over time. The operations of judgment thus
present an originary separation for ontology, representing an unmendable tear into the
fabric of being that seems to completely foreclose the possibility of coherent self-
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knowledge. Judgment is thus “in the highest and strictest sense the originary separation of
the object and subject,” Hölderlin writes, an object and a subject which seemed to be
“intimately united in the intellectual intuition,” but in fact come into appearance through
the immanent workings of judgment. Hölderlin playfully refers to this set of operations as
an Ur-separation, “Ur-Teilung.”322 Seeking a way out of this bind presented by Kantian
judgment, Hölderlin makes a surprising suggestion: perhaps we should try instead to
reverse the assumed temporal flow of the relationship between possibility and actuality.
Unlike Schelling and Goethe, Hölderlin does not propose collapsing these modes into
each other and embracing the intuitive understanding directly.323 Instead, he suggests that
“[a]ctuality and possibility are distinguished, like mediated and immediate
consciousness.”324 “When I think of an object as possible,” he continues, “I just repeat the
previous [state of] consciousness, through which it is actual. There is for us no
conceivable possibility, that was not an actuality.”325 Rather than seeing possibility as a
theoretical prospect which precedes actuality, Hölderlin suggests that the opposite may be
the case. Possibility, for Hölderlin, is relayed into the past as a means of bypassing the
separating function of judgment. Rather than projecting onto the future, possibility points
to a layer of actuality that already existed beforehand, lying just beneath the surface and
waiting to be uncovered.
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By reversing the temporal flow between these two modes, Hölderlin suggests that
self-coherence is not to be viewed as a type of reflective coherence foreclosed by the
past. Self-coherence presents an emancipatory ideal towards which Romanticism should
strive. Here we begin to see how the poetic activity of gleaning nature’s ‘remains’ begins
to link up to the Kantian theory of judgment. While it is difficult to make out much more
detail regarding Hölderlin’s plans for this rather cryptic, unpublished fragment, “Being
and Judgment” nevertheless serves to reveal the importance for Hölderlin of navigating
the internal pathways of judgment until making it out to the other side. This, for
Hölderlin, means achieving an understanding of Being that encompasses the natural
world in all its complexity and alterity. Although Kantian judgment forecloses all
meaningful pathways between possibility and actuality and back again, Hölderlin’s
fragment suggests that “Being expresses the connection between subject and object,” the
connection that is found when we move beyond the Kantian boundary.326 Rather than
embracing a form of intellectual intuition where there is no longer any possible
separation between possibility and actuality, Hölderlin suggests that a new form of
connection might be made when we consider the ways in which nature itself reveals a
host of possibilities that were previously actualized. Nature, too, has a present, past, and a
future. Instead of tracing a straight line from present actuality back to historical past,
Hölderlin suggests that we need more combinatory sets of practices that recuperate the
emancipatory possibilities that are lost when we turn away from nature in its actuality.
Through these practices, Romanticism seeks to unite ethics, aesthetics, and politics into a
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“complete system of all ideas” as Hölderlin puts it in the “Earliest System Fragment of
Idealism,” a manifesto he co-authored with Hegel and Schelling while the three were
roommates in Tübingen.327 While the energetic exchange constituting this activity for
Romanticism will be more fully articulated in the much later essay “The Modes of
Operations of the Poetic Spirit,” it is already clear during his early student years that
Hölderlin recognizes the need for an interrogation of the technics of nature, particularly
as it relates to the temporal and figurative process of Bildung. As the deferral of the
possibility of environmental tragedy, this process of Bildung is key to establishing
negentropic forms of interaction through the maintenance of paratactic difference.
Initiated by the poetic gleaning of the river, Bildung marks the “eccentric path” that
comprises Hölderlin’s contribution to mechanology, carving a mode of co-existence
between realist and idealist modes of ontopoetic production.328
This suggested mode of co-existence between Realism and Idealism allows for
both the givenness of the natural world and the free production of art and politics. Such
co-existence is illustrated quite clearly in the “Thalia Fragment,” an early study for the
incomplete epistolary novel Hyperion. In this piece, Hölderlin turns directly to this
relationship between the poetic activity of Kunst—constituting the material process of
technē—and the sensuous givenness of the natural world. From the very first lines, the
“Thalia Fragment” reads more like a theoretical treatise than a work of epistolary fiction.
In dense, philosophical prose, the protagonist describes what he refers to as the “two
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ideals of human existence.”329 Each of these two ideals corresponds to a possible
comportment human beings might assume in relation to nature. Regulative and
constitutive at once, the first of these ideals constitutes an idyllic “state of highest
simplicity” for humankind.330 In this Edenic state, human needs are met not through
sweat and hard labor, but “through the mere organization of Nature.”331 In a strange
reversal, the purposiveness that is attributed by Kantian philosophy to the activity of
reason is presented as a small, passive part of a much broader system of environmental
self-organization. Without direct, conscious intervention in this metabolic exchange,
humans are nevertheless presented as necessary aspects of these broader interactions. The
other state presented by Hyperion introduces the work of Bildung into the realm of
human existence. This ideal represents a “state of highest cultivation,” wherein the same
exchange “would take place via infinitely manifold and reinforced needs and forces,” that
is, “through the organization, that we are capable of providing to ourselves.”332 Humans
can provide themselves with tools for creating their own unique types of metabolic
exchange, Hölderlin seems to suggest. Such exchange is achieved through introducing
technical media to the world-making activity of romantic poetics. The two paths,
ultimately, are two sides of the same coin:
The eccentric path, that the human […] runs through from one point (of
more or less simplicity) to the other (of more or less complete Bildung)
appears, according to its essential tendencies, to be always self-same.“333
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This surprising collapse of self-determination into natural development, however, also
reveals a hidden danger for human ambitions. While we might desire to ”be in and above
everything“ in nature, the letter continues, Hyperion cites the famous inscription on the
grave of the Jesuit priest Ignatius Loyola as a dire warning against the exploitation of the
natural environment: “non coerceri maximo, contineri tamen a minimo.”334 It is up to
humans to decide if the twin ideals of human existence will develop into an “all-desiring,
all-subsuming dangerous side of the human” or into “the highest and most beautiful states
achievable for humans.”335 “In which sense these should apply specifically,” the passage
concludes, “must be decided by the free will of each person.”336
Expressing hatred of the death-like intermediary things, the Mitteldinge that
muddy our vision of these two ideals of existence, Hyperion’s letter goes on to suggest
that the approach taken to the natural world by Romantic mechanology must be careful
and measured, a relation that might be understand as analogous to Goethe’s tender
empiricism. Both Realism and Idealism present different sides of actual processes in
nature, processes which can exist simultaneously without a synthesizing term
overdetermining their co-relation. But this paratactic interrelation is only made possible
when humans do not become a colonizing force standing over and above nature,
subsuming the environment under the operations of human reason. The narcissistic,
expansive desires of anthropocentric reason must be reined in, Hölderlin suggests, while
the temporal figuration of Bildung must be recognized as the result of a cross-pollination
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of ideal and real technics of nature. If we do not see this, it is because “[w]e dream of
Bildung but possess none,” as Hölderlin writes elsewhere.”337 In this piece, Hölderlin
urges his friend to appreciate the force of Bildung not as a universalizing activity but as a
local cultural product that can be grasped consciously and with full awareness of its
situatedness: “It indeed makes a difference” he continues, “if the Bildungstrieb operates
blindly or consciously, if it knows where it comes from and where it’s heading.”338 As the
“free unfolding of the national,” Bildung presents a sort of geological force through
which the earth acts in the form of human subjects.339 While at first glance, this portrayal
of Bildung in the “Thalia Fragment” and the Gesichtspunct seem to map neatly onto the
distinction between natura naturata and natura naturans that Schelling inherited from
Spinoza, the vis formative associated with the term since its introduction into nature
philosophy by Blumenbach in 1781 has now become a composite of the ideal and real,
consisting in organic and mechanic features.340 While Leif Weatherby has referred to this
synthetic characteristic as an organological aspect of Hölderlin’s thought, the ethical and
environmental aspects of this exchange suggest that a step is even being made beyond
organology towards the mode of investigation Gilbert Simondon called mechanology.
Highlighting the role played by technical media in the reciprocal exchange between
humans and nature, mechanology is articulated as worldmaking poesis and as an
environmental ethics.
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The Death of Empedocles: Tragedy as/of Externalization
In order to appreciate fully the contributions made by this idea of a combinatory
and material ontopoetics towards articulating the ethical aims of Romantic mechanology,
we must turn to Hölderlin’s unique concept of tragedy, which is central to his thinking on
organic finitude and its importance for political ecology.341 In Hölderlin’s numerous
writings on Greek tragedy, particularly in the Empedokles drama and his related essays,
we find the staging of a tension between the desire for connection to a metaphysical
absolute that transcends any finite boundaries of judgment, and the pitfalls of such desire,
particularly when it leads human beings to exert themselves as a colonizing force over
and above the natural environment.342 In this way, tragedy cuts both ways, for Hölderlin.
It appears as a politically neutral “empty vessel” without content when examined side by
side with the relational potential of Kantian Wechselwirkung, on the one hand. 343 On the
other hand, however, tragedy serves as a dire warning for inhabitants of the
Anthropocene. It appears as a mode of poetic production that is capable of bypassing
judgment, like the intellectual intuition lauded by Fichte and the mechané underwriting
poetic production.344 Yet, “[i]t is the deepest interiority that expresses itself in the tragic
dramatic poem,” Hölderlin writes in the Allgemeiner Grund.345 “The tragic ode also
represents the inner in positive differentiation” while “expressing an infinite divinity.”346
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The worldmaking capabilities of tragedy serve as a speculative reminder of the many
worlds that can be made and unmade for mechanology. While technical mediation
provides a model of complexity and “positive differentiation” that can assist humans in
understanding the recursive reciprocity of natural life, as Kant and others emphasized,
such technicity must allow for the self-creating Tat of the environment in order to
continue to thrive.
Rather than placing emphasis on past worlds and the mnemonic capacity of
tragedy to record history, Hölderlin’s vision for tragedy is organized around a more
speculation vision for poesis and the Wechselwirkung established between material
creation and the natural world. Tragedy, on this view, seeks to present catastrophes that
are yet to come, dealing in possible futures that may be rapidly approaching but which
have not yet been experienced. “There is no conceivable possibility,” Hölderlin reminds
us, “that was not actuality.” 347 Tragedy represents a preventative sort of care for the
environment, amplifying calls for the creation of a new political ecology organized
around the energetic principle of perpetual motion, also laying the groundwork for a more
positive role assumed by technical media. While highlighting the inadequacies of the
Kantian architecture of the understanding in responding to the set of challenges posed by
the Anthropocene, Hölderlin’s writings on tragedy echo Novalis’s call to establish a
“prior technics” by encouraging a more reflective approach to technical media, looking
towards their organizational capacity to establish more negentropic relations to the
environment.348 “The tragic ode begins in supernal fire; pure spirit pure intensity has
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overstepped its boundaries […]“ Hölderlin writes in the first lines of the Grund zum
Empedokles.349 Hölderlin suggests that the suffering and temporal finitude associated
with tragedy since the Greeks can only properly be understood when they are explored as
a reaction to the introduction of Promethean fire, of technics, to the human world. He
continues:
pure spirit pure intensity […] has failed to moderate sufficiently those
alliances in life that necessarily and thus even without fire incline to
contact, as it were, alliances that through their quite intense attunement
tend to excess rather than moderation when it comes to consciousness,
reflection, or physical sensuality; through excess of intensity, therefore,
conflict has arisen, a conflict that the tragic ode conjures up at the very
outset in order to depict what is pure.350
While refusing to be contained by boundaries separating the divine and the human, this
drive to ‘present the pure’ produces nothing less than the paradoxical, tragic situation of
technical media in attempts to overcome the Kantian boundary. While producing a
longing for immediacy, this desire to ‘present the pure’ results in the loss of a
“harmonious opposition” between nature and art, an equilibrium that seemed to have
been established at one point in time.351 Resulting in a tragic inability for human thought
to reconcile mechanical and organic modes of organizing natural motion, the introduction
of technical media into human (and natural) history initiates a struggle that can only be
overcome when we consider a new perspective embodied by the aorgic:
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At the midpoint lies the death of the individual, namely, the moment when
the organic dispenses with its ego, its particularized existence, which went
to the extreme; the aorgic dispenses with its universality, not in ideal
mixture, as it was at the commencement, but in its real supreme struggle;
such dispensings occur when the particular, having gone to its extreme,
increasingly universalizes itself and becomes active against the extreme of
the aorgic; the particular has to tear itself away from its midpoint more and
more, while the aorgic, acting against the extreme of the particular, has to
concentrate itself more and more; it achieves for itself with ever greater
success a midpoint, thus becoming something superlatively particular, at
which point the organizational that has become aorgic appears to find itself
again and to revert to itself by fastening onto the individuality of the
aorgic, and the object, the aorgic, appears to find itself when, at the very
moment it takes on individuality, the organic too finds itself at the
uttermost extreme of the aorgic […]352
Presenting what Hölderlin tellingly refers to as ‘a third’ term between organism and
mechanism, this concept of the aorgic presents a novel mediating force between whole
and part, capable of providing balance to a world in which humans have become
expansive geological agents with far-reaching consequences for their actions. Humans
are autonomous in a new way; they are ailingly so [“leidende selbsttätig”], Hölderlin
describes.353 Irreducible to nature and culture as distinct categories, the aorgic presents a
strange substance, a [Stoff] that “differs from the poets own mind” as well as to the
natural environment.354 The aorgic presents a proxy for Romantic mechanology and its
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aim of finding a new sense of Wechselwirkung which can function materially and in the
plural—paratactically, rather than synthetically.
The tragic potential for this paratactic mode of the aorgic is played out in the
numerous drafts of The Death of Empedocles that Hölderlin penned from 1797 to 1800.
Narrating the infamous death of the presocratic philosopher Empedocles, who throws
himself into the fires of Mount Aetna in order to be remembered by posterity, The Death
of Empedocles draws on accounts found in Diogenes Laërtius’s Lives of the Philosophers
and Horace’s Ars Poetica, focusing on Empedocles’s exile from the ancient community
of Akragas.355 In Hölderlin’s Empedocles, we read the story of the presocratic
philosopher as he is cast out of his community for climbing up to Mount Olympus,
showing utter disregard for the divide between humans and the divine. While
exemplifying, on the one hand, the Romantic longing for a transcendent beyond that
cannot be contained by any human boundaries, the play, on the other hand, subtly
portrays the danger of passing over into what Hölderlin calls the “all-desiring, allsubsuming and dangerous side of humanity.”356 The Death of Empedocles is in fact full of
subtle warnings from characters hinting at the possibility that Empedocles’s desire for a
certain sort of transcendence might be deeply problematic, presenting symptoms of a
more manic colonizing tendency than the philosopher is ready to admit: “do you not
know the forces of nature,” asks Pausanius in the first act of Hölderlin’s first draft, “with
which you are familiar, as no other mortal, / and can channel, as you wish, in quiet

355
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domination?”357 Empedokles, in fact, is quick to respond in the affirmative here, proudly
claiming that everything can be fit within the grasp he holds over nature: “Right! I know
everything, and can master everything / As the work of my own hands, I know it /
Through and through […] Mine is the world, and subservient and servile / are its forces
to me / a maiden / becomes nature, needing a master.”358 Empedocles’s eventual fate, as
he throws himself into volcanic fire, is the direct result of this more troubling sort of
tragedy, wherein nature is perceived to be lacking and requiring domination, never seen
in its alterity.359 Tragedy becomes antithetical to the tie between nature and technical
media constituted by the aorgic, as the revealed finitude of Empedocles’s knowledge is
tied closely to the tragic mortality of all organic beings.
Over the course of multiple drafts, Hölderlin portrays the eponymous hero of The
Death of Empedocles in moments as less heroic than one might expect. Empedocles cuts
an often-lonely figure whose refusal to accept parataxis borders on the neurotic. Already
in the first draft, the need to exercise power and control over nature results in a hard split
between technical and epistemic labor, a split that is expressed in Empedocles’s
interactions with his servants. Before Empedocles decides to leave human society and
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walk up to the top of Mount Aetna, his servant is requested to pick up the Reisegerät for
him before he continues on his own. The manual labor of picking up this tool for his
master is the “last service” of Empedocles’s slaves.360 Maintaining a separation between
physical and mental labor for his brand of presocratic philosophy, Empedocles becomes
an image of what Hegel would later call unhappy consciousness in the Phenomenology of
Spirit.361 Alienated from the material tools of meaning-making that are forged in the
relation between humans and the earth, Empedocles finds himself torn asunder from the
polis as a result. In the end, he cannot bear the thought of inhabiting the khôra lying
outside the city limits. Unable to impose his own law on the physis of nature, Empedocles
sees no choice but to kill himself. Rather than experimenting with a new, flexible nomos,
he decides to end his life in a tragic leap into flames.362
Hylomorphism and its Discontents: Kantian Aesthesis and Hölderlin’s “Operations
of the Poetic Spirit”
Hölderlin deals directly with issues concerning nonequilibrious flow and
metabolic exchange between ontopoetic system and the natural environment in what is
perhaps his most sustained reflection on the role played by nature and sense experience
for his speculative poetics. In the 1800 “On the Operations of Poetic Spirit,” Hölderlin
addresses the issue of poesis as it relates to the two key operations of Kantian judgment,
reflective synthesis and concrete analysis, as well as the need to move beyond judgment
entirely when discussing the Tat of natural beings like the river. While the river presents
a form of what Hölderlin calls a “living unity,” it nevertheless embodies what is a
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prosethetic sort of life. While the tragic mode serves to highlight the colonizing dangers
of anthropocentric reason, the ability of poetics to materialize the reciprocal functionality
of Wechselwirkung presents for Hölderlin new opportunities for exchange between the
environmental khôra and the extended polis. At stake for Hölderlin is nothing less than
the production of being through poesis, where the mechané of poetic production
establishes the contours of a novel political ecology. An unlikely interrogation of the
concept of Energie, in Hölderlin, here becomes central for overcoming the Kantian
boundary and healing the resultant split of sense experience into form and matter.363
In “Operations of the Poetic Spirit,” Hölderlin discusses the creative, worldmaking capacities of the two primary operations of Kantian judgment: reflective and
determinative forms of judgment. Instead of forcing an impossible decision between the
two when the understanding attempts to process sense data, Hölderlin suggests that we
remain focused on the relational capacities of Wechselwirkung in a metabolic exchange.
The poetic spirit is only able to achieve this state of complexity “when it is not lacking in
harmonious unity, meaning and energy.”364 As we have seen in the case of Novalis and
Schelling, the separation of extensive and non-extensive types of spatial relations is
symptomatic of a technocratic neuroticism in which individuals attempt to bend nature to
their will, rather than working at the development of more relational understandings of
experience through which polis and khôra might be conjoined. For Novalis, this need for
a deeper mode of relationality leads to the exploration of a material nomos of resonance
that could be established by humans through careful attention to technical mediation.
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Hölderlin’s focus, tellingly, lies on the conceptual labor performed by the term Energie.
While Hölderlin was writing some decades before the disciplinary development of
thermodynamics and energy science throughout the nineteenth century, his use of the
term stages the exact collapse of the non-extensive environmental khôra into the polis
that we have been outlining. As Johannes Lehmann has shown, the Energie concept at the
time was employed to forge new relationships between Cartesian extension and
Newtonian law by collapsing extensive and nonextensive modes of spatial experience
into one another.365 Leading to the experiment with more relational conceptions of nomos
and physis, Hölderlin’s poetics suggest that a more negentropic meaning-making system
might be created for political ecology. The creation of this new negentropic political
ecology, however, must be met with a sensitivity towards the selection and development
of individuated beings. Moving from the abstract towards the concrete, Hölderlin
highlights what it is about the poetic act that Wechselwirkung in Kant seems to be
lacking: “brought to free individuality, to unity and identity in itself, the pure subjective
life is first made available through the selection of its object.”366 Rejecting monistic
abstraction, this operation of selection becomes crucial for the establishment of a new
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sensus communis that takes into account the politics of thinking environmentally.367
Reintegrating the theoretical Abfall lying beyond the Kantian boundary, Hölderlin’s
“Modes of Operations” are “led by judgment,” but in a different form:
grasped in their totality, those three qualities might express themselves as
efforts to recognize the harmonically-opposed in the living unity, and the
living unity in the harmonically-opposed, i.e. in the more subjective or
more objective state. For it is exactly these different states that emerge
from them as a unification of the same.368
Poesis is a question of life, for Hölderlin. Life, on the other hand, is a question of techne,
of the process of Bildung underlying the Wechselwirkung of Kantian and post-Kantian
nature philosophy.
Just as Novalis attempted to rewrite the transcendental aesthetic along the lines of
an a priori technical mediation he referred to as ‘mechanical,’ Hölderlin’s employment of
the Energie concept presents the possibility that a sustainable metabolic exchange
between humans and the environment might be established through the collapse of the
polis and khôra into a more collaborate spatial ecology. Through this relational
understanding of modes of aesthetic experience, the exploration of technical media
becomes itself a form of poesis for Hölderlin, much like it would be for later philosophers
such as Martin Heidegger and Bernard Stiegler. In light of this, the energetic ideal of a
perpetuum mobile becomes a constitutive feature of nature and a regulatory ideal for
judgment, both of which relate to each other through parataxis. Rather than an all-
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consuming ecological machine subordinating all purposes to its functionality, the
negentropic exchange of Romantic mechanology helps link judgment to being without
reducing either to a priori technocratic processes. Recursive operations require the
eccentric Bahn linking Kunst and Natur, though we may not always foresee the ways in
which this route returns to itself. Nor are we always present at the moments in which this
figurative activity takes place, Hölderlin acknowledges. Neither Natur nor Kunst gets
ultimate priority over the other. Instead, the two exist in a dynamic and non-equilibriuous
exchange through Hölderlin’s ontopoetic contributions to mechanology.
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5. Goethe’s Technics of Antizipation: Negentropy and Futurity
* Parts of this chapter have been published as Bryan Norton. “Veloziferisch
(Velociferian).” Goethe-Lexicon of Philosophical Concepts 1, no. 1 (January 31,
2021): 113–20. https://doi.org/10.5195/glpc.2021.25.
Over the last three chapters, we have seen time and again how the technical
imagination of German Romanticism presents a materialized and externalized version of
what Kant called the “technic of nature” in the Critique of Judgment.369 For Kant, the
technic of nature presents a mere thought experiment, postulating a theoretical boundary
between the spontaneous, recursive rhythms of organic life’s self-organization and nonliving phenomena that are determined solely by linear causal chains.370 While it is
ultimately impossible to tell if this division corresponds to any deeper sense of reality,
which Kant refers to as the noumenal realm of things in themselves, it is nevertheless
important, on Kant’s view, to explore the tentative hypothesis that life provides itself
with its own form of teleological motivation. This spontaneous path of organic
development possesses hidden affinities with the freedom of the subject through its use of
reason, for Kant.371 For his Romantic readers, however, the technic of nature provides the
foundation for a much more radical, material understanding of the relationship between
thought and world. While Kant only attributes tentative validity to the possibility that
organic systems might present a sort of purposiveness without a purpose, Romantics like
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Novalis, Schelling, and Hölderlin respond not with an immediate embrace of the autotelic
nature of the organism, but with an attempt to come to terms with the role played by
technical media in teleology, revealing a broad impact for the way life is understood and
encountered for poetry and philosophy. Rather than uncritically accepting the
Aristotelean presuppositions informing the Kantian understanding of technics, a
metaphysics that Martin Heidegger would urge modern readers to revive in his seminal
“Question Concerning Technology,” Romanticism asks after what Novalis refers to as a
“prior technic” for reason, a mode of technical externality that might serve as a material
substrate for the rigid architecture of the understanding.372 Rather than creating and
enforcing an insurmountable boundary between organism and mechanism, the project of
Romanticism appears as an attempt to explore the ways in which technical media
ultimately lend coherence to categories such as ‘organic’ and ‘mechanical’ in the first
place. But that is not to say that Romantics are completely indifferent to the fate of the
environment and its colonization through modern technology and other externalized
forms of instrumental reason. As Novalis urges us to take seriously the ways in which the
recursive figuration often attributed by natural philosophy to organic systems is itself a
projection of the increasing complexity of technical media, the example of a boat’s
rudder and its reciprocal interactions with the ocean’s currents in Heinrich von
Ofterdingen have served as an initial reminder that Romantic mechanology is always
already an investigation of the role played by technical media in political ecology.373
Mechanology investigates the relation between technē, physis, and nomos, as revealed by
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Novalis’s employment of the verb regieren in his retelling of the Arion legend from
Herodotus’s Histories.374 For the Naturphilosoph Schelling, the set of epistemological,
political, and environmental concerns brought about by technical media leads to the
creation of a new tentative boundary between organization and system, one which would
supplant the “Kantian boundary” between organism and mechanism as it is articulated in
Kant’s theory of judgment.375 While this boundary remains theoretical and tentative—
indeed it remains unclear if Schelling believes we might discover a higher unity that
combines the figurative spontaneity of organization with the functionality of the
system—Schelling nevertheless reminds readers that the figurative activity of life and its
temporal Bildung necessarily possesses an undeniable ethical and political dimension.
For Hölderlin, this possibility for figuration is understood as a form of metabolic
exchange, of Energie, as he puts it in “The Modes of Operation of the Poetic Spirit.”
It is at this juncture that we must turn to Goethe, whose poetic writings are used
by the twentieth century physicist and philosopher Erwin Schroedinger as a means of
illustrating the energetic complexity of living things as temporally and temporarily
distinct from that of abiotic matter. Referring to the energetic capacities of life as a form
of negative or free entropy, Schroedinger turns to several poems by Goethe in his 1944
lectures What is Life? to illustrate how organisms can defer the increase of entropy over
time by redistributing it spatially throughout their milieu.376 In this way, Goethe serves as
an important cross point for theorizations of complexity in biological life and
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explorations of individuation in technical objects as examined by Simondon, an overlap
that has come to the fore in recent decades through the work of Bernard Stiegler.377 Not
only does Goethe provide one of the central literary references throughout Simondon’s
presentation of a ‘general technology,’ or mechanology, with Faust presenting a warning
against colonizing abuses of technical media, Goethe is himself quick to respond to the
crisis of Kantian judgment as it is understood by Novalis, Schelling, and Hölderlin.378
While refusing to adhere to an uncritical embrace of organic vitality, a feature of his
writing that has been recently highlighted by Amanda Jo Goldstein, Goethe provides a
warning against sacrificing the ‘special sap’ constituting life to an unnecessary divide
between realism and idealism, organism and mechanism.379 The Romantic technical
imagination is not a fantasy aimed at colonizing the lifeworld through tools or complex
machinery. It aims to produce new forms of synergistic co-existence for technical media
and the lifeworld, which serves as the technical object’s own milieu and material support.
Goethean Individuation between the Urpflanze and the Technical Object
At the very beginning of Elective Affinities, the character Eduard’s practice of
grafting in a garden provides a point of entry for understanding how Romantic reactions
to Kant call for an external and material understanding of Kant’s mode of reciprocity:
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Eduard—so we are calling a rich baron of the best age—Eduard had spent
the most pleasant hours of an April afternoon in his nursery, grafting
freshly obtained slips onto young stems.380
While rejecting the givenness of organic individuation, the practice of grafting illustrates
the all-important movement between individuation and transindividuation that is so
central for Simondonian mechanology and Romantic theories of Wechselwirkung.381 In
On the Modes of Existence of Technical Objects, Simondon also makes a crucial
distinction between organology and mechanology, one which is already operative, we
have seen, in the technical imagination of Romanticism and Idealism. Whereas
organology provides a philosophical and historical context for thinking about how tools
evolve coevally to processes of hominization and speciation, mechanology is developed
partially as an early response to what Thomas Carlyle refers to as the “age of the
machines,” where technical media exercise a new extended form of agency over society
and nature. Such media come to determine the contours of organic individuals and entire
social configurations.382 While criticizing the colonial tendencies that present themselves
as a result of this shift, the conceptual apparatus of mechanology allows thinkers like
Goethe and Hölderlin to view ecological concerns more clearly as they relate to technical
media. Goethe’s Faust, for example, provides an important reference point in Simondon
when he discusses the ethical and political dimensions of the shift from organology to
mechanology. As Faust presents an allegory of modernity’s simultaneous embrace and

380

Author trans. Cf. HU 6, 242: “Eduard – so nennen wir einen reichen Baron im besten Mannesalter –
Eduard hatte in seiner Baumschule die schönste Stunde eines Aprilnachmittags zugebracht, um frisch
erhaltene Pfropfreiser auf junge Stämme zu bringen.”
381
Siahrei Biareishyk has taken important steps in this direction. See “Rethinking Romanticism with
Spinoza: Encounter and Individuation in Novalis, Ritter, and Baader,” The Germanic Review: Literature,
Culture, Theory 94, no. 4 (October 2, 2019): 271–98, https://doi.org/10.1080/00168890.2019.1659223.
382
Cf. Thomas Carlyle, “Signs of the Times,” in A Carlyle Reader. Selections from the Writings of Thomas
Carlyle, ed. G. B. Tennyson, 31 - 54 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1969), 34.

130

sacrifice of the organic ‘special sap of life,’ Goethe’s work serves as an ongoing reminder
of the importance of individuation and Bildung for the reciprocal exchange required by
mechanology between technical media and political ecology. As “[a] hot cathode lamp is
a technical element much more than a complete technical individual,” Simondon writes
in Modes of Existence,
[o]ne can compare it to the organ of a living body. It would be possible in
this sense to define a general organology, which studies technical objects
at the level of the element, and that which would be part of technology,
with mechanology, which studies completed technical individuals.383
Goethe’s contribution to an ethics of mechanology is to be understood insofar as Goethe
himself is a thinker of the milieu and of individuation. While Schroedinger may have
refrained from directly examining the role played by technical media in navigating a
relationship between interiority and exteriority in figurative processes of Bildung,
writings from Bernard Stiegler have emphasized exactly this aspect of technical media
and its development in response to Kantian judgment.384 The externality of Bildung, in
effect, assumes the contours of what Stiegler refers to as a “theater of individuation.”385
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The methodology of intuitive understanding developed within Goethe’s
morphology makes nature philosophy into exactly such a ‘theater of individuations.’
Whereas intellectual intuition bypasses the senses and makes no attempt to connect back
to external reality, the collapse of actuality and possibility in intuitive understanding
highlights the reciprocity and recursivity of knowledge production through poetics and
nature philosophy.386 Over the course of developing this participatory methodology,
Goethe forgoes the ideality of his Urpflanze in order to focus on the materiality and
externality of Bildung. This focus on materiality and externality, however, requires
overcoming the rift between Wort and Tat identified by Götz at the end of Act IV in Götz
von Berlichingen:387
Ach! Writing is busy idleness, it irritates me so. By writing, what I’ve
done, I become resentful of the loss of time, during which I could be doing
something.388
Understanding this process of reconjoining Wort and Tat, for Goethe, does not just mean
breaking with the angsty pessimism of the Storm and Stress movement, however.
Reconnecting Wort and Tat means breaking with the inherently conservative attitude
towards technical media scholars have so often associated with Goethe in the past. Even
Ernst Kapp’s groundbreaking Elements of a Philosophy of Technology, while providing a
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useful analysis of Götz’s prosthetic hand, seems implicitly to endorse Götz’s realist ethos
and cynicism about the true figurative possibilities of new media.389
While Goethe was by no means a protofuturist when it came to new technology, it
needs to be emphasized that what he refers to as ‘tender empiricism’ also entails a
forward-facing understanding of technical media, an understanding that is exhibited
throughout Goethe’s morphology. A complex approach to technical media can be seen if
we look forward to the neologism veloziferisch Goethe developed during the 1820s. At
the end of book two of Wilhelm Meister’s Journeyman Years, in the excursus titled
“Observations in the Mindset of the Wanderers” (“Betrachtungen im Sinne der
Wanderer”), Goethe decries his age as one which “lets nothing ripen.”390 It is a time of
accelerated intensity in which “one lives from hand to mouth, each moment consuming
the previous moment, wasting day after day without producing anything lasting.”391
Scathingly, Goethe continues:
Do we not already have enough pages for all the daily papers! A good
head can surely intercalate one and the other. In this way everything that
anybody goes about doing, writing, even what one intends to do in the
future, it is all dragged before the public eye. No one can suffer or enjoy
themselves for a moment except as a means of mere entertainment for
others; and so it springs from house to house, city to city, from domain to
domain and ultimately from corner to corner of the globe, everything
veloziferisch.392
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This fragment, a verbatim transcription of an unsent letter from four years prior, has
caught the critical imagination of a number of theorists who have taken inspiration from
this early diagnosis of modernity they find in Goethe’s oeuvre. The term is seen as an
expression of Goethe’s “discovery of slowness,” which presents a precursor of sorts to
the contemporary interest in “slow thinking” in a number of fields.393 Yet, veloziferisch is
also a surprisingly plastic and dynamic concept that interfaces with Goethe’s lifelong
reflection on organic growth and the work of figuration in nature and thought. The
construction of the term even presents an imaginative product of figuration itself, as
veloziferisch is a portmanteau of the Italian term velocità, signifying speed, and the
German luziferisch, that which concerns the devil, Lucifer. The term veloziferisch marks
a hurried pace of motion, at which point nothing can ripen or reach its full potential. Even
more fittingly, Goethe’s term suggests a boundary or a limit point for modern growth and
technological acceleration. Veloziferisch describes motion at a speed that has surpassed
that of Bildung—of organic, healthy motion.394 Technical media must take the
individuation of life’s diverse forms into account if it is to sustain its own range of
morphological evolutions. There are upper and lower limits for such evolution, in fact.
Negation and Individuation: Negentropy and the Energetics of Bildung
While Goethe would have been hesitant to define in detail or quantify the limit
posed on the speed of Bildung by the activity he would refer to as das Veloziferische, it is
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equally important to reflect on the work performed by the “luciferian” element, which in
the Goethean imaginary is integrally connected to the dialectical work of negation. While
the work of negation has been hinted at by Novalis, and by Schelling in his writings on
the productive work of Hemmung, it is Goethe who most fully appreciates the figurative
potential of negativity in this regard. At the center of this set of concerns lies the question
of individuation as it is posed by Kantian aesthesis: how does a substance receive its
contours without positing a thing in itself?395 Negativity, seen in this light, is about
forming boundaries between a system and its environment, while also maintaining
channels of communication between inside and outside. The negative enclosure presented
by boundary formation is a necessary feature of individuation, its production, and its
decomposition. In Goethe’s Faust, for example, it is the demonic figure Mephistopheles
who refers to himself as “the spirit who constantly negates.”396 While it may be tempting
to understand the Faust tragedy as the work of pure negation alone, let us not forget that
Faust’s fate is tied to his “Ungeduld,” to his impatient desire to throw himself into the
torrents of modern life and forgo his previous existence of scholarly reflection, the
Mephistophelean pronouncement linking the luciferian to negation may also serve as a
reminder of the productive, even necessary role of negation, for Goethe, when it is not
coupled with breakneck speeds. The connection between productivity and luciferian
negation is playfully pushed to the allegorical limit in book eight of Goethe’s
autobiography, Poetry and Truth, where he discusses the creation of the devil Lucifer as a
result of the productive drive’s need for incessant cosmological activity:
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Let me imagine, if I may, a deity which has produced itself from eternity;
because production itself cannot be thought without diversity, so it must
necessarily appear to itself as a second, which we recognize under the
name of the Son.397
This mitotic process of reproduction through self-division repeats itself once more until
all three members of the holy trinity have come into appearance. Although this
effectively closes the circle of the Christian godhead, creation does not stop there. It must
continue further outward on its path of autopoetic expansion: “Because the productive
drive must always push onwards, so a fourth was created [. . .] And this was Lucifer, to
whom the entire force of creation was thus conferred.”398 Even the godhead must submit
to the demands of the productive drive, which becomes bound to the negativity of Lucifer
while passing from the infinite into the finite realm.
The connection that Goethe draws between the bifurcations of the productive
drive and Lucifer’s reign over creation in Judeo-Christian mythology serves to put an
organic, productive spin on the idea, initially outlined by Spinoza in his Ethics, that negation, as a cosmic-ontological force, possesses some form of figurative functionality in
the universe: “Since figure is nothing but determination, and determination is negation,
figure can be nothing other than negation.”399 While Spinoza intended to explain why
negation could never actually exist in a universe that was not finite, but composed of a
single infinite all-encompassing substance, Goethe embraced this suggested view of
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negativity as a means of understanding the “productive drive” underlying the complex
activity of the organic world. Here we begin to understand the stakes of individuation in
the distinction Simondon makes between mechanology and organology, as Goethean
negation falls squarely in line with the often-misunderstood productive force of
Hemmung in Schelling’s nature philosophy. Negation serves as the precondition of life’s
negentropic recursivity, for Goethe as it had for Schelling.400 This revisionist take on
Spinozist negativity also puts Goethe’s thinking into further contact with Schrödinger’s
thinking, drawing further attention to the thermodynamic context of the critique levied by
das Veloziferische. Schrödinger, who was not by chance an avid reader of both Goethe’s
poetics and Spinozist philosophy, famously made the case that biological organisms,
while not exactly rooted in principles that are exogenous to the rest of the physical
universe, possess astoundingly intricate ways of negotiating these principles in exchange
with their surroundings.401 The second law of thermodynamics, which states that entropy
increases irreversibly over time, is never broken in the achievement of organic growth
and reproduction. Instead, entropy is simply negotiated and redistributed in highly diffuse
ways across an organism’s milieu. Disorder and death are deferred in complex ways, but
never overcome.402 The Veloziferische serves to remind us that the bifurcations of the
productive drive can only function so quickly, otherwise they become chaotic and
destructive, impossible to subdue in their velocity. The integrity of individuated beings,
for Goethe, is at stake.
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Goethe was keen to articulate an alternative form of negation which, like
Schrödinger’s negentropy, would play a productive, figurative role, moving at speeds
capable of guiding organic matter along on its path of autopoietic formation. This
requires the drawing of an open boundary between a system and its associated milieu, as
we have seen. A prominent instance of this type of figurative negativity can be found in
Goethe’s 1803 poem “Weltseele,” or “World-Soul,” titled after the philosopher F. W. J.
Schelling’s 1798 essay of the same name.403 In this cosmic paean composed of nine
rhymed quatrains, Goethe lauds the dialectical dynamism of Schelling’s vision of the
cosmos as a complex mode of organization. The poem presents the reader with a
celebration of natural motion, beginning with an energetic urge for the “world soul” to
expand itself into space and to fill the empty khôra with its life force. “Verteilet euch,”
“disperse,” the poet exclaims to the dynamo, urging it onward and outward in its
energetic expansion. Already in the first line the organism is referred to in the plural, and
the world soul is encouraged along in its mitotic, expansive bifurcations. “Rip yourselves
enraptured through the next zones / into the All and fill it out!”404 In the third stanza, the
poem encourages racing, powerful (gewaltig) comets onward in their journey through the
heavens.405 In the fourth, the world soul shows a keenness to exhibit its capacity for
figurative negation, “grasp[ing] rapidly towards unformed earth” with the creative force
of youth.406 In the fifth stanza, the cosmic force begins to slowly retreat from its
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previously expansive, outward-moving impulse. Yet it nonetheless maintains its function
as determinatively figurative, providing a natural grapheme of sorts by pre-scribing
(vorschreiben) solid, recognizable form to piles of previously nondescript stone found in
cavernous vaults.407 It is here we see how the poem stages a new technic of nature in
verse. At the end of the poem, the world-soul eventually runs out of steam. A seemingly
inexhaustible, boundless striving (unbegrenztes Streben) is dissolved in a blissful
exchange of glances with the cosmos, receiving back the life it had given.408 The deferral
of entropy in the autotelic structure of life is nevertheless still only a deferral. Entropy
seems never fully overcome at this moment, however. Despite a seemingly irreversible
closure at the end, there remains hope that other divisions might later occur, creating once
more an open and expansive system of exchange: “No being can fully disintegrate into
nothing,” Goethe reminds us at the beginning of “Vermächtnis.”409 Tellingly,
Schroedinger makes a point of quoting from this very poem at the beginning of one of his
lectures.410
While these passages show that it is not velocity per se that is the object of
critique for Goethe, it is clear that he believes a turning point has been reached in the
pace of life by the time he creates the term das Veloziferische in the 1820s. Modernity
has by this time accelerated, in Goethe’s view, in a manner that is particularly detrimental
to reflection and organic growth. Life and thought, when dominated by ever speedier
systems of communication and transportation, become disformed, rather than carefully
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formed and individuated. In such instances, technical media are complicit in the
disfigurement of life, rather than serving to support it as a parasitic supplement. In a letter
to his friend the composer Carl Friedrich Zelter, Goethe describes his distaste for what he
sees as the senseless chase after wealth (Reichtum) and speed (Schnelligkeit) that is
visible all around him, especially in cities like Berlin.411 He cites the railroad, express
mail, the steam ship, and quickened communication networks as symptoms of this
veloziferisch tendency.412 Of course, Goethe was not alone in this critical attitude. In the
same year as the term veloziferisch went into print, Thomas Carlyle famously described
this set of developments as a “mechanical age” and “the Age of Machinery,” describing
this new period as an age “which, with its whole undivided might, forwards, teaches and
practises the great art of adapting means to ends.”413 The mechanical nature of modernity
emphasized in Carlyle’s essay, in fact, may prove useful for achieving an understanding
of the veloziferisch as a limit point of sorts for modernity. It is here that we begin to
understand how the project of mechanology for Romanticism is not an uncritical embrace
of instrumental reason but an attempt to connect the complexity of technical media with
an attunement to ecological concerns. Das Veloziferische suggests that a sort of
transgression has taken place. Das veloziferische marks the limit beyond which machinic
motion simply outpaces that of Bildung and of organic movement. It serves to uncover a
dangerous separation that has taken place between the mechanical and the organic, a
traumatic rupture lying at the very heart of modernity’s self-image. The term enacts the
rapid speed at which the technicity of figuration—encompassing, poetry, thought, and
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life— loses control, passing over into the totalizing, hegemonic technologos of a
modernity threating to fly off the rails.
Form and Matter: The Steering Function of Technical Media
It is important not to confuse Carlyle’s ‘age of machinery,’ however, with the
project of mechanology writ large. Here we must investigate how the steering function of
technical media, or Steuerung, functions in Goethe’s writings as an attempt to outline a
new conception of form that provides a corrective force for life’s disfigurement. This new
conception of form, differing significantly from the Platonic eidetic and Aristotelianhylomorphic models, articulates the ways in which form is irreducibly bound to
materiality in an interactive process of co-emergence.414 While Plato’s Timaeus and
Aristotle’s Physics understand form as an entity that is initially separate and distinct from
concrete matter, as the two are conjoined through the technē of an artist or demiurge, we
have already seen in Schelling the historical development of an endogenous, even
functional conceptualization of form. 415 This new understanding is developed further and
more explicitly by Goethe, for whom the autopoetic growth of vegetal life, the writing of
an inspired poem, and the aggregative, archival logic of the morphology all bear witness
to an autopoetic logic of processual growth and spontaneous production.416 This organic
conception of form, of course, is often set in direct opposition to technical discourse, in
particular cybernetic notions of control, or Steuerung, which one finds in the
constructivist form of Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory and in the predicative,
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automative logic of Norbert Wiener’s take on Bergsonian biological time in his
Cybernetics.417 Organic life, as hinted at by commentators working in the history of
science such as John Tresch and Bruno Latour, often appears torn asunder from
considerations of the mechanical at the turn of the nineteenth century.418 But how are we
to make sense of the resistance to steering, to mechanisms of Steuerung and its
theorization in conceptualizations of an autotelic notion of form, a sense of agency which
seems to be explicitly mourned by Torquato Tasso in his closing monologue?419 How is
one to understand the seemingly controlled Takt of hexameter verse tapped by Goethe on
the back of his lover in the Römische Elegien, or Goethe’s suggestions for modulating the
rate of vegetal growth in the Metamorphose der Pflanzen alongside this new
understanding of form as endogenous and emergent? Understanding the sense of
Steuerung mourned by Tasso, in fact, requires turning our attention not only to the
intimate connection between form and matter, but to the irreducible technicity of
Goethe’s understanding of the temporal emergence of forms.
The ineluctable technicity of temporal processes of Bildung, which Bernard
Stiegler has dubbed the lack or fault [Faut] of Epimetheus in Technics and Time 1, is
confronted directly by Goethe in his own re-telling of the Prometheus myth in Pandora,
an unfinished project which, perhaps unsurprisingly, contains an iteration of the term
steuern.420 It is only the theological, metaphysical “presence of the Lord,” “die
Gegenwart des Herrn,” Prometheus reminds his brother, Epimetheus, “which increases
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every good” and “controls all possible loss.”421 It is only at the locality of undiluted
presence—the appearance of the ineffable Urpflanze in its totality—that one finds perfect
harmony between form and matter through the modulation afforded by Steuerung.
Steuerung is nevertheless an important political device for the human polis as well. At the
end of Torquato Tasso, we see the young poet mourning his bitter, uncertain fate. The
heartbroken and isolated poet Tasso finds himself cast aside by the court he had long
served. All along, he had been a mere plaything for aristocratic intrigue, deprived of the
restless sort of agency that was so often explored during Goethe’s Sturm und Drang
years. In the final scene, Tasso finds himself alone onstage with Antonio, the peevish,
manipulative secretary who had seemed hellbent on thwarting his artistic and romantic
ambitions at every turn. Only at this moment does Tasso realize it may be in fact have
been Antonio all along who was trying to protect him from the unpredictable whims of
the duke and of the princess whose station he had unwittingly insulted in the previous
scene: “Oh noble man / You remain fest and calm / I appear to be just a wave moved by a
storm,” Tasso cries, continuing in a metaphoric flurry: 422
The rudder is broken
And the ship is creaking on all sides.
The floor beneath my feet is being torn apart
I’m grasping at you with both arms!
Thus grasps at last even the skipper
Tightly to the rocks, where he shall be wrecked. 423
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Rather than a mechanism for a ruling class or a sovereign to maintain political control
over and above its subjects, the Steuer here appears as an everyday cultural technique for
the maintenance of health and stability. Like the kuber of the ancient Greeks, this form of
Wechselwirkung enables one to navigate the throes of life’s torrents more smoothly.
When these steering devices break down, we may find ourselves thrown violently
overboard, clinging desperately to the side of a rocky cliff, as Tasso clings to Antonio
both literally and metaphorically when the curtain falls.424
Another noteworthy feature of Tasso’s closing speech is the way in which Goethe
revises the familiar metaphorology of the shipwreck as described by Hans Blumenberg.
Whereas Blumenberg tells us that the political and aesthetic lessons of catastrophe,
historic or literary, can best be learned from a safe distance on shore, Goethe positions
the speaker Tasso directly on board the metaphorical vessel.425 Goethe’s protagonist can
no longer experience the critical distance between subject and object that is required for
Kantian aesthetics and epistemology to function properly, placing his fate squarely in line
with the Romantic project.426 Not only is this liminal space between subject and object
critical for the immanent unfolding of natural knowledge that Goethe, after Schelling,
refers to as intuitive understanding, but this inability to maintain a critical distance hints
at the crucial role Steuerung plays in developing an alternative form of the technic of
nature. Whereas for Kant, the question of how and why we perceive the spontaneous
development of natural forms is just an exercise in epistemology, for Goethe, it becomes
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a matter of practical knowledge and of technical exchange between natural life and
human aesthetic and political judgment.
The operationality of the rudder provides a cosmogram for the recursivity of postKantian Wechselwirkung, stressing the importance of maintaining a measure of stability
in our personal and political affairs. Steuerung in this sense presents the payoff for
mechanology of an attunement to technical mediation. The stability this affords is not to
be confused with a sort of technocratic, totalitarian neuroticism desiring control over
every aspect of the world. The Steuer must remain open and responsive to the vagaries of
the tide and to the changing winds. Goethe reminds us of this in Pandora, his incomplete
dramatic adaptation of the legend of Epimetheus and Prometheus.427 In this fragment,
which Goethe began at the end of 1807 and ultimately sets aside two years later in order
to write Die Wahlverwandschaften, Goethe explores the Olympian aftermath of the
introduction of primal technology to human society, whereby Prometheus steals fire from
the gods and gives it to humans. While there is indeed much work to be done on this
often-overlooked fragment, one of the most immediately striking aspects of this piece is
the way in which Goethe aims to strike a balance between condemnation of an uncritical,
Promethean attitude towards technological change and acknowledgment of the role
technics plays in introducing an element of contingency into human affairs, refusing the
technocratic impulse that is often associated with hylomorphic thinking.428 “Light the
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fire!“429 begins a refrain from a metalsmith, who is at one point castigated for his
uncritically optimistic views of fire’s capability: “Fire is up above / Highest, he did it /He
stole it. / He who kindled it, / Forges alliances, / Hammered out, rounding / crowning the
head.”430 In the midst of all the chaos ensuring from the opening of Pandora’s box, which
lets the unpredictable demiurges out into the world, Prometheus reprimands his brother:
Look down at the misery! Look at the glow!
Did Eos miss the well-trodden path today?
Red embers shine forth from the noon
A fire in your forest, your homes
Appears to be flaring up.431
And yet the presence of the lord, in the ensuing lines, “die Gegenwart des Herrn,” is able
to increase all possible good and make up for these losses: “Haste! The presence of the
Lord / increases ever good, controlling possible loss.”432 Neither the Tat of a Götz von
Berlichingen nor perfect control can stop the entropic decay of any one particular
individuated object, it would appear. But this does not mean there is no possible
rejuvenation on another, experimental level. While complete control may present an
impossible ideal, the material exchange of Steuerung is subtly presented as a way of
making good on the introduction of technics: “What do I have to lose, now that Pandora
has fled? / It’s burning there! More handsomely will it be built back up again [...],”
Epimetheus replies to his brother.433
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verbündete, / Schmiedete, ründete / Kronen dem Haupt.”
431
Ibid: “Blick' auf aus deinem Jammer! Schau' die Röte dort! / Verfehlet Eos wohlgewohnten Pfades
heut'? / Vom Mittag dorther leuchtet rote Glut empor. / Ein Brand in deinen Wäldern, deinen Wohnungen /
Scheint aufzuflammen.”
432
Ibid. “Eile! Gegenwart des Herrn / Mehrt jedes Gute, steuert möglichem Verlust.”
433
Ibid. “Was hab' ich zu verlieren, da Pandora floh? / Das brenne dort! Viel schöner baut sich's wieder
auf.”
430
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Although this sense of contingency and openness in our attitude towards the fire
of technical life is not explored any further in the unfinished fragment, Goethe had
already hinted at this possibility for a negentropic sort of futurity in his morphological
writings from the 1790s. In his Versuch die Metamorphose der Pflanzen zu erklären,
Goethe uses the undeniably Kantian term Antizipation when discussing the botanist
Linnaeus’s theory of prolepsis. According to Linnaeus, each type of plant and tree in
nature has a particular rate of growth that is inherent to its species.434 Here we see the
temporal politics of technical media come to the fore. The specificity of the term
Antizipation used by Goethe is equally important to understand fully how technical media
and organic life exist hand in hand for Goethe. Rather than using the Linnéan terms
prolepsis or prolepse, which Linnaeus himself employs to describe nature’s ability to
progressively take on new forms within a fixed period frame, Goethe employs the
germanizing word Antizipation in his interrogation of the speed of Bildung in the
Morphology.435 Indeed the entire section, paragraph 17, is not called Linnées Theorie von
der Prolepsis, but rather Linnées “Theorie von der Antizipation.” While Antizipation is
thematized nowhere in Linné, nor is it discussed in popular lexicons from the time such
as the Adelung or Zedler, the term appears first in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason to
describe the temporal logic which mediates the relationship a priori forms of intuition,
which structure our sense perception and the Kantian the architecture of the
understanding, and the material content provided by experience to these forms.436

434

Cf. Prolepsis Plantarum. Upsaliæ, 1760.
For more on this conceptual field, see Lothar Kugelmann’s dissertation Antizipation: eine
begriffsgeschichtliche Untersuchung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986).
436
Cf. Kritik der reinen Vernunft A:17/B:31 – A:41-B:58.
435
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Although the Metamorphose der Pflanzen was purportedly composed at a time when
Goethe was taking a break from considerations related to Kantian philosophy, recent
writings by Eva Geulen and others have forced us to challenge this accepted wisdom.437
Goethe’s thinking at this time bears the unmistakable stamp of Kantian concerns
regarding the technics of nature. When applying the Kantian concept of Antizipation to
Linnaeus’s botany, Goethe argues that the rate of natural figuration and its contingent
play of form and matter are in fact not fixed, but can be carefully modulated through
natural and technical knowledge: “man kann den Blütenstand beschleunigen,” you can
even accelerate Bildung, Goethe summarizes in the next section.438 Goethe is by no
means uncritically in favor of the ‘slow’ or trying to protect a sense of a priori organic
preciousness in his writing. Rather than providing static and predetermined senses of
futurity, such accelerated forms appear as a product of open exchange between natural
processes and the operations of technical media. We see once more that the resonant
nomos of Romantic technical mediation is not to be confused with an unyieldingly
conservative nomos of the earth, where physis is the only nomos available to humans,
resulting in the erasure of all technical mediation and their affective resonances. Nor is
this, however, to be confused with a form of human sovereignty that can exist without
relation to an ecological milieu. Goethe is truly looking out onto the future of political
ecology, with a wholesale critique of Antizipation in any fixed form.

437
438

Aus dem Leben der Form, 10-11.
HU 13, 98.

148

6. Coda
Over the past four chapters, we have seen how attempts to embrace and radicalize
the Kantian Technik der Natur lead to an energetic exploration of the productive
activities of technical media, provoking writers as diverse as Novalis, Schelling,
Hölderlin, and Goethe to two important sets of reflections: on the one hand, the attempt
to articulate a technic of nature that moves beyond the boundary set by Kantian judgment
for reason and sense experience leads to a renewed interest in the possibility of creating a
perpetuum mobile. Like the seventeenth-century priest-cum-astronomer Christoph
Scheiner, who sketched a perpetuum mobile by simply drawing a frame around the limits
of the known universe, these reflections reveal a rather complex set of relations between
technical possibility, cosmology, and ecological concerns at the dawn of the
Anthropocene.439 At the same time, the complex interrelation between technical media
and political ecology lead to a widespread attempt to reconsider the boundary between
the polis and the environmental space that marks its outside, what the Greeks called
khôra. As this classical distinction was in many ways reformulated by Kant in the
distinction drawn between relative (i.e. extended) and absolute (i.e. non-extended) space
for human modes of perception, the Romantics take it upon themselves to draw ever
newer modes of Wechselwirkung that might lead to alternative understandings of politics,
ecology, and their interrelation. For Novalis, this new sort of Wechselwirkung is drawn
up with reference to the orthios nomos of Herodotus’s Arion legend, pointing to the

439

For more on this and other fascinating attempts, see the British patent clerk turned amateur historian
Henry Dircks’s Perpetuum Mobile; or, Search for Self-Motive Power from the 13th to the 19th Century.
(London: Charing Cross, 1861), 24 – 28.

149

possibility of a new mode of co-production and co-actualization of human life and natural
environment, a process of exchange in which technical media plays a central role. For
Novalis, this type of Wechselwirkung leads directly to a dynamic ideal he finds in
Schelling’s World Soul. While pointing to a possible aporia between the functionality of
the system and the figurative operations of organization, however, Schelling himself
leaves open the question of whether or not what Simondon refers to as a ‘general
technology’ might serve as an adequate frame for understanding nature. Schelling
reminds us that the stakes of Romantic mechanology are not merely epistemological,
metaphysical, or cosmological. Indeed, they are ecological and, in a very important way,
existential for twenty-first century readers. This more explicitly ecological and political
side of the project is explored in Hölderlin, for whom the term Energie serves as an
important point of collapse between polis and khôra, leading to a wide-ranging reflection
on poesis as a theater of experimentation capable of overcoming hylomorphic models for
natural and technical figuration. The aim of presenting new models for the relationship
between form and matter is only made available through an attunement to the animating
powers of rivers and other natural forces that bring us beyond an a priori distinction
between organism and mechanism. In Goethe, finally, the non-metaphysical vibrancy and
vulnerability of living beings is brought to the fore. Goethe’s morphology and poetic
writings serve to present a more material and everyday dimension to Romantic nature
philosophy and political ecology, while providing a set of poetic textures for
understanding and thinking through the negentropic aims of mechanology.
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